Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2021But the Wilson court emphasized that accomplice testimony “is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused.” Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d at 349 . ¶ 64 The concerns expressed in Hoyt, Grove, and Wilson are embodied in IPI Criminal No. 3.17. 2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is “ ‘fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused’ [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth.” People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). | 3 | 9 |
People v. Newellgreen2 sentences2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is “ ‘fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused’ [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth.” People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). 2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is " 'fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused' [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth." People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). | 3 | 4 |
People v. Ashgreen2 sentences2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is “ ‘fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused’ [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth.” People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). 2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is " 'fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused' [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth." People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Baynesgreen2 sentences2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is “ ‘fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused’ [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth.” People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). 2007Our supreme court has emphasized that accomplice testimony is " 'fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused' [citation], and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth." People v. Newell, 103 Ill. 2d 465, 470 (1984), quoting People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 (1977); see also People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (1981). | 2 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. LaCoco
green
2 sentences1984(People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165 .) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, ‘acted upon with great caution’ (People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313 ), and have the ‘absolute conviction of the truth’ (People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. 1984It is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused. ( People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165 .) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, `acted upon with great caution' ( People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313 ), and have the `absolute conviction of the truth' ( People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1984 |
The People v. Gleitsmann
neutral
2 sentences1984(People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165 .) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, ‘acted upon with great caution’ (People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313 ), and have the ‘absolute conviction of the truth’ (People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. 1984It is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused. ( People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165 .) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, `acted upon with great caution' ( People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313 ), and have the `absolute conviction of the truth' ( People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1984 |
People v. Zaeske
green
2 sentences1984(People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165 .) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, ‘acted upon with great caution’ (People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313 ), and have the ‘absolute conviction of the truth’ (People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. 1984It is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused. ( People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165 .) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, `acted upon with great caution' ( People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313 ), and have the `absolute conviction of the truth' ( People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1984 |
People v. Rivera
green
1 sentence2021The pattern instruction is labeled “Testimony Of An Accomplice” (IPI Criminal No. 3.17), and People v. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d 279 , 292- 93 (1995), holds that the instruction may be used when a witness testifies (or his prior statement is admitted as substantive evidence) that he acted as an accomplice together with the defendant in committing the charged offense. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Bartall
green
1 sentence1984(People v. Ash (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 ; People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 ; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 139, 142 ; People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 ; People v. Clements (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 534, 538 .) While we will not lightly regard the jury’s judgment on credibility question, “it is our duty, where a verdict of guilty is returned by a jury *** not only to carefully consider the evidence but to reverse the judgment if the evidence is not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt and is not sufficient to create an abiding conviction th | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Pittman
green
1 sentence1984(People v. Ash (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 ; People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 ; People v. Pittman (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 39, 57 ; People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 480, 484-85 .) We have emphasized, however, that accomplice testimony “is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused” (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 ), and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
The PEOPLE v. Clements
green
1 sentence1984(People v. Ash (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 ; People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 232 ; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 139, 142 ; People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 ; People v. Clements (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 534, 538 .) While we will not lightly regard the jury’s judgment on credibility question, “it is our duty, where a verdict of guilty is returned by a jury *** not only to carefully consider the evidence but to reverse the judgment if the evidence is not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt and is not sufficient to create an abiding conviction th | 1 | 1984–1984 |
The PEOPLE v. Wollenberg
green
1 sentence1984(People v. Ash (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 485, 493 ; People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 ; People v. Pittman (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 39, 57 ; People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 480, 484-85 .) We have emphasized, however, that accomplice testimony “is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused” (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 ), and should therefore be accepted only with utmost caution and suspicion and have the absolute conviction of its truth. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Hermens
green
2 sentences1983Accomplice testimony of this kind is inherently unreliable as it often may be motivated by pressures other than the witness’ desire to reveal the truth, “such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused.” (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 .) This court has often stated that it “will not hesitate to reverse a conviction based upon the testimony of an accomplice when that testimony lacks material corroboration or is discredited by other credible evidence.” E.g., People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 277, 286 . 1983Accomplice testimony of this kind is inherently unreliable as it often may be motivated by pressures other than the witness' desire to reveal the truth, "such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused." ( People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill.2d 346, 349 .) This court has often stated that it "will not hesitate to reverse a conviction based upon the testimony of an accomplice when that testimony lacks material corroboration or is discredited by other credible evidence." E.g., People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill.2d 277, 286 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Savory
neutral
2 sentences1980App. 3d 750, 752 , 379 N.E.2d 372, 374 .) However, whether accomplice testimony is a satisfactory basis for conviction goes to the weight of the evidence, and is therefore a question for the finder of fact. 1980Such testimony is “fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused.” (People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349 , 362 N.E.2d 291, 292 .) Accomplice testimony is therefore subject to careful scrutiny, and if uncorroborated, is sufficient to sustain a conviction only if it carries an “absolute conviction of the truth.” (Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349-50 , 362 N.E.2d 291, 292 ; People v. Savory (1978), 62 Ill. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
The PEOPLE v. Werhollick
green
2 sentences1976The supreme court in announcing its decision stated: “Matters which the client intends his attorney to disclose to a third person (who is not the agent of either the client or the attorney) are not privileged. [Citations.] Thus, any offer or acceptance of an offer made by Bodnar [the witness] through his attorney to the State’s Attorney to become a prosecution witness in return for a promise of leniency or immunity is not privileged.” ( 45 Ill. 2d 459, 462 , 259 N.E.2d 265, 266 .) Contrary to the attempts by the State to distinguish Werhottick, the case is dispositive of the issue before us. 1976The supreme court in announcing its decision stated: “Matters which the client intends his attorney to disclose to a third person (who is not the agent of either the client or the attorney) are not privileged. [Citations.] Thus, any offer or acceptance of an offer made by Bodnar [the witness] through his attorney to the State’s Attorney to become a prosecution witness in return for a promise of leniency or immunity is not privileged.” ( 45 Ill. 2d 459, 462 , 259 N.E.2d 265, 266 .) Contrary to the attempts by the State to distinguish Werhottick, the case is dispositive of the issue before us. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Dickerson v. Dickerson
green
1 sentence1970(Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492 ; Spencer v. Burns, 413 Ill. 240 .) Thus, any offer or acceptance of an offer made by Bodnar through his attorney to the State’s Attorney to become a prosecution witness in return for a promise of leniency or immunity is not privileged. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Spencer v. Burns
green
1 sentence1970(Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492 ; Spencer v. Burns, 413 Ill. 240 .) Thus, any offer or acceptance of an offer made by Bodnar through his attorney to the State’s Attorney to become a prosecution witness in return for a promise of leniency or immunity is not privileged. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.