required balancing test in Illinois

2015We thus apply de novo review to defendant’s first argument, that the trial court did not exercise discretion in any meaningful way before instructing the jury as to robbery. ¶ 39 Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it “gave no hint of what factors it considered much less indicated that it had done the required balancing of the factors.” In People v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 282 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court held that, “under appropriate circumstances, a trial court possesses the discretion to instruct a jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses, even where the State does

2015We thus apply de novo review to defendant's first argument, that the trial court did not exercise discretion in any meaningful way before instructing the jury as to robbery. ¶ 39 Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it "gave no hint of what factors it considered much less indicated that it had done the required balancing of the factors." In People v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 282 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court held that, "under appropriate circumstances, a trial court possesses the discretion to instruct a jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses, even where the State does

2015We thus apply de novo review to defendant’s first argument, that the trial court did not exercise discretion in any meaningful way before instructing the jury as to robbery. ¶ 39 Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it “gave no hint of what factors it considered much less indicated that it had done the required balancing of the factors.” In People v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 282 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court held that, “under appropriate circumstances, a trial court possesses the discretion to instruct a jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses, even where the State does

2015We thus apply de novo review to defendant's first argument, that the trial court did not exercise discretion in any meaningful way before instructing the jury as to robbery. ¶ 39 Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it "gave no hint of what factors it considered much less indicated that it had done the required balancing of the factors." In People v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 282 (1999), the Illinois Supreme Court held that, "under appropriate circumstances, a trial court possesses the discretion to instruct a jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses, even where the State does

2010See, e.g., Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 289-94 , 696 P.2d 95, 104-07 , 211 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711-15 (1985) (conducting a balancing analysis and concluding that an oral contract for remodeling was enforceable, notwithstanding a statute which required that remodeling contracts in excess of $500 be in writing and which made violations of the statute a misdemeanor offense).

2010See, e.g., Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 289-94 , 696 P.2d 95, 104-07 , 211 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711-15 (1985) (conducting a balancing analysis and concluding that an oral contract for remodeling was enforceable, notwithstanding a statute which required that remodeling contracts in excess of $500 be in writing and which made violations of the statute a misdemeanor offense).

2009Moreover, under the required balancing test established by the supreme court in Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d 173, 194 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 993 (1986), the preponderance burden of proof was appropriate.

2009Moreover, under the required balancing test established by the supreme court in Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill. 2d 173, 194 , 497 N.E.2d 984, 993 (1986), the preponderance burden of proof was appropriate.

2002See Atkinson , 186 Ill. 2d at 459 , 713 N.E.2d at 536-37 (rejecting mere-fact method as a halfway measure which admits all convictions without the required balancing test).

2002See Atkinson , 186 Ill. 2d at 459 , 713 N.E.2d at 536-37 (rejecting mere-fact method as a halfway measure which admits all convictions without the required balancing test).

1999The dissenting opinion stated that, absent precedent from this court requiring application of the mere-fact approach, defendant's conviction was not obtained in error because the trial court had applied the required balancing test. 288 Ill.

1999The dissenting opinion stated that, absent precedent from this court requiring application of the mere-fact approach, defendant’s conviction was not obtained in error because the trial court had applied the required balancing test. 288 Ill.

2025See Landmark American Insurance Co. v. NIP Group, Inc., 2011 IL App (1st) 101155, ¶ 52 (rejecting an argument that reversal was required based on “an inadequate record” of the trial court’s forum non conveniens analysis where the parties had presented detailed arguments to the court and the court “explicitly indicated it had applied the required balancing analysis”). ¶ 31 While we do not dispute that the better practice for a trial court is to provide a record of its full forum non conveniens analysis, we find the failure to make such a record here does not, alone, require reversal.

2012Most importantly, the record establishes the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the defendant's] motion to transfer." Landmark American Insurance Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 101155, ¶ 52 , 356 Ill.Dec. 877 , 962 N.E.2d at 577-78 . ¶ 24 Defendant proceeds to contend that the trial court's reference to the St.

2026See Pizzo, 2022 IL App (2d) 210073-U, ¶ 112; Ross, 2018 IL App (2d) 161079, ¶ 173.

2025The issue on review “is not the detail of the underlying order, but whether the circuit court abused its discretion.” Estate of Rath v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 2012 IL App (5th) 100096, ¶ 23 ; see Meier v. Ryan, 2023 IL App (1st) 211674, ¶ 13 (stating a trial court’s forum non conveniens order may be affirmed on any basis supported by the record).

2011Most importantly, the record establishes the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying NIP’s motion to transfer. ¶ 53 We also reject NIP’s assertion that Landmark’s choice of Cook County, Illinois, as the proper forum for this suit is entitled to no deference because Landmark’s evident “forum shopping” is established by the fact that neither NIP nor Landmark is a resident of Illinois and the acts giving rise to this action did not arise here. “[S]uits on insurance contracts are ordinarily considered transitory actions which may be brought wherever jurisdiction of the parties may be