required balancing test in Texas

2025“Rather, the trial court is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once a party objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court rules on the objection, unless the record indicates otherwise.” Id.; see Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195–96; Maldonado v. State, 452 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.).

2025“Rather, the trial court is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once a party objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court rules on the objection, unless the record indicates otherwise.” Id.; see Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195–96; Maldonado v. State, 452 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2014, no pet.).

2019See Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195 (“[A] judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked and we refuse to hold that the silence of the record implies otherwise.”); Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 173 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 1997) (noting that “a judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked and we refuse to hold that the silence of the record implies otherwise”); Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 173 .

2025For that reason, where, as here, “nothing in the record shows the trial judge did not perform the balancing test, we have found no error when the judge simply listened to the defendant’s objections, then overruled them.” Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim.

2025For that reason, where, as here, “nothing in the record shows the trial judge did not perform the balancing test, we have found no error when the judge simply listened to the defendant’s objections, then overruled them.” Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim.

2024Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 787 .

2015Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim.

2023Id.

2019See id.; Yates v. State, 941 S.W.2d 357, 367 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref’d) (“By overruling the Rule 403 objection, the court necessarily conducted the balancing test when it considered the objection.”).

2002Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); see also Howeland v. State, 966 S.W.2d 98, 103 , (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), aff'd , 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999) (holding that the court does not have to conduct a formal hearing or announce on the record that it has mentally conducted the Rule 403 balancing test).

2002Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); see also Howeland v. State, 966 S.W.2d 98, 103 , (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), aff’d , 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999) (holding that the court does not have to conduct a formal hearing or announce on the record that it has mentally conducted the Rule 403 balancing test).

2002Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); see also Howeland v. State, 966 S.W.2d 98, 103 , (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), aff'd , 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999) (holding that the court does not have to conduct a formal hearing or announce on the record that it has mentally conducted the Rule 403 balancing test).

2002Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); see also Howeland v. State, 966 S.W.2d 98, 103 , (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), aff’d , 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999) (holding that the court does not have to conduct a formal hearing or announce on the record that it has mentally conducted the Rule 403 balancing test).

2018Id.

2015In reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion, an appellate court must (1) decide whether the trial judge did in fact conduct the required balancing test and “did not simply rule arbitrarily or capriciously,” and (2) “measure the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision is to be made.” Montgomery v State, 810 S.W. 2d 372, 392 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Bryant v. State, 997 S.W. 2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet); Nolen v. State, 872 S.W. 2d 807 . 812 (Tex. App.-Ft.

2003See Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 173 (holding standard of review is abuse of discretion); Nolen , 872 S.W.2d at 812 (relying on presumption that trial court conducted balancing test and overruling complaint on that basis without reaching harm analysis).

2025Id. at 195–96; Reyes v. State, 480 S.W.3d 70, 77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d).

2018See Reyes v. State, 480 S.W.3d 70, 77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d).

2025“Rather, the trial court is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once a party objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court rules on the objection, unless the record indicates otherwise.” Id.; see Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195–96; Maldonado v. State, 452 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.).

2025“Rather, the trial court is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once a party objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court rules on the objection, unless the record indicates otherwise.” Id.; see Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195–96; Maldonado v. State, 452 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2014, no pet.).

2018App. 1997) (“[A] judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked and we refuse to hold that the silence of the record implies otherwise.”); Hinojosa v. State, 995 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“Because appellant objected on specific grounds and the trial court overruled the objection, we assume that the trial court applied Rule 403 and determined that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice.”).

2015App. 1997) (“[A] judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked and we refuse to hold that the silence of the record implies otherwise.”); Hinojosa v. State, 995 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“Because appellant objected on specific grounds and the trial court overruled the objection, we assume that the trial court applied Rule 403 and determined that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice.”).

2015See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 642 n. 8 ("In some of our precedents, we stated that a proper Rule 403 analysis included, but was not limited to, four factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury -10- A judge is presumed to have engaged in the required balancing test once rule 403 is invoked.

2015See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 642 n. 8 (“In some of our precedents, we stated that a proper Rule 403 analysis included, but was not limited to, four factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury –10– A judge is presumed to have engaged in the required balancing test once rule 403 is invoked.

2012App. 1997); see also Alami v. State, 333 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). ―However, a trial judge is not required to sua sponte place any findings he makes or conclusions he draws when engaging in this test into the record.‖ Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195 . ―Rather, a judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked,‖ and the trial court's failure to conduct the balancing test on the record does not imply otherwise.

2011App. 1997); see also Alami v. State, 333 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). ―However, a trial judge is not required to sua sponte place any 10 findings he makes or conclusions he draws when engaging in this test into the record.‖ Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195 . ―Rather, a judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked,‖ and the trial court‘s failure to conduct the balancing test on the record does not imply otherwise.

2024Presumptive prejudice and length of delay To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make an initial showing that “the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651–52 (1992)); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–32 (holding that length of delay is “triggering mechanism” for analysis of other factors).

2021See Wheeler, 67 S.W.3d at 888 .

2020Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. 1 Although Appellant objects to the admission of Exhibits 64 and 65 as autopsy photos, these exhibits in the appellate record are not autopsy photos.

2018See McLellan v. Benson, 877 S.W.2d 454 , (finding that once an opponent objects under 404(b) he must further object under rule 403 in order for the trial court to conduct the required balancing test).

2018Perez points to decisions issued by courts in other states declaring similar statutes unconstitutional, see State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603 , 606–08 (Mo. 2007), superseded by constitutional amendment as discussed in State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 280 (Mo. 2018); State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 772 (Iowa 2010), but we are not persuaded by their reasoning, see Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 211–13 (acknowledging Ellison and Cox but adopting the reasoning of Belcher and Harris, opinions of our sister courts, in upholding article 38.37).

2018See Hung Phuoc Le, 479 S.W.3d at 469 ; see also Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195 (“[A] judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is invoked and we refuse to hold that the silence of the record implies otherwise.”).

2018Perez points to decisions issued by courts in other states declaring similar statutes unconstitutional, see State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603 , 606–08 (Mo. 2007), superseded by constitutional amendment as discussed in State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275, 280 (Mo. 2018); State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 772 (Iowa 2010), but we are not persuaded by their reasoning, see Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 211–13 (acknowledging Ellison and Cox but adopting the reasoning of Belcher and Harris, opinions of our sister courts, in upholding article 38.37).

2015Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d), (citation omitted); see also Padilla v. State, No. 02-11-00336-CR, 2012 WL 4815506 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[A] trial judge is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once rule 403 is invoked, and the judge is not required to sua sponte place any findings or conclusions made into the record.”).

2015See Bryant v. State, 997 S.W. 2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet); Nolen v. State, 872 S.W. 2d 807 . 812 (Tex. App.-Ft.