defendant objected instruction in Massachusetts

2017See Commonwealth v. Clemente , 452 Mass. 295 , 319 (2008).

2010Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 319 (2008), cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 1329 (2009).

2017See Commonwealth v. Blais , 428 Mass. 294 , 297-298 (1998). 3 We also discern no error by the trial judge in instructing the jury that "[a]n intoxicated defendant found asleep behind the wheel of a vehicle parked in a public way, with the key in the ignition and the engine on, may be found to have operated the vehicle." Because the defendant objected to the instruction at trial, we review for prejudicial error.

2017See Commonwealth v. Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 189 (2011).

2014Commonwealth v. Corcione, 364 Mass. 611, 618 (1974), and cases cited.

2012In Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 214 (1985), S.C., 423 Mass. 356 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996), we declared, “We need not decide whether such a substitution is reversible error because the defendant did not object to the substitution of judges at the time, nor did he claim dissatisfaction with the answers given to the jury by the first substitute judge.” Here, the defendant objected to the instruction provided by the substitute judge to the supplemental question, but unlike in the Trapp case, where the substitute judge alone answered the jury’s questions, the instruction was app

2010The defendant objected to this instruction below, but makes no challenge on appeal. 10 The fact that the defendant had begun raping Thomas when he was as young as eleven makes this case markedly different from Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 491-492 (1995), where the Supreme Judicial Court found proof of “constructive force” insufficient despite evidence that the defendant had recounted to the complainant “several instances in which the defendant had resorted to violence and threats of violence.” Id. at 491 .

2010The defendant objected to this instruction below, but makes no challenge on appeal. 10 The fact that the defendant had begun raping Thomas when he was as young as eleven makes this case markedly different from Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 491-492 (1995), where the Supreme Judicial Court found proof of “constructive force” insufficient despite evidence that the defendant had recounted to the complainant “several instances in which the defendant had resorted to violence and threats of violence.” Id. at 491 .

2010Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 682 (2003).

2010See Bowden, supra. The defendant objected to the instruction, thus we review his claim for prejudicial error.

2009See Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 Mass. 48, 53 (2009); Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 710 (2008).

2009See Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 Mass. 48, 53 (2009); Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 452 Mass. 700, 710 (2008).

2002Cf. Commonwealth v. Boucher, 403 Mass. 659, 662-663 (1989). (e) The defendant objected to the instruction on consciousness of guilt as it related to his disposal of the knife he used to kill his wife.

1999See Commonwealth v. Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 860 (1984).

1999Cf. Commonwealth v. Brown, 414 Mass. 123, 126-127 (1993) (holding that at a murder trial where identification had been at issue, although the judge should not have referred to flight from the scene as an example of consciousness of guilt because of the absence of any such flight in the facts of that case, the error was not prejudicial given the context of the entire charge, the judge’s admonition that the jury could rely on any example of consciousness of guilt only if they found that evidence existed of it in this case, and the absence of any argument by the prosecutor concerning evidence of

1984Commonwealth v. Robinson, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 604 (1979).

1980The defendant argues that as this was not a situation where the defendant was protecting himself with a dangerous weapon likely to cause serious injury or death, but rather was protecting himself from the onslaught of the victim’s punches with those of his own, contrast Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 690 (1955), the jury should have been instructed that the defendant had the right to use “appropriate and adequate means to protect . . . [himself]” when he “reasonably . . . [believed] that his personal safety or life . . . [was] in peril” (emphasis supplied).