15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2017In a separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, who joined the five-justice majority subscribing to the trespass theory, warned that "GPS monitoi'ing generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” She nevertheless conceded that “the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.” 565 U.S. at 415 , 132 S.Ct. 945 (Sotomayor, J. 2017In a separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, who joined the five-justice majority subscribing to the trespass theory, warned that "GPS monitoi'ing generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” She nevertheless conceded that “the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.” 565 U.S. at 415 , 132 S.Ct. 945 (Sotomayor, J. | 4 | 5 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016In determining then whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred, we apply the court’s factual findings to the test pronounced in Katz, supra. Rather than limit the constitutional appraisal to a trespass analysis, 13 the Katz test requires a two-fold showing: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as *381 ‘reasonable.’” 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). 14 Even under the more flexible Katz test, however, rapid advancements in technology make ascertain 2016In determining then whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred, we apply the court’s factual findings to the test pronounced in Katz, supra. Rather than limit the constitutional appraisal to a trespass analysis, 13 the Katz test requires a two-fold showing: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as *381 ‘reasonable.’” 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). 14 Even under the more flexible Katz test, however, rapid advancements in technology make ascertain | 2 | 5 |
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Walker, 432 Md. at 605 (referring to the Katz test). 2025Walker, 432 Md. at 605 (referring to the Katz test). | 2 | 2 |
Kyllo v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016The Court then noted that, although the Katz test — “whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” — may be difficult to apply to some locations, such as telephone booths and automobiles — the expectation of privacy in the home had “roots deep in the common law.” Id. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038 . *385 In support of the use of its thermal imaging technology, the government in Kyllo argued that there was no “search” because the device detected “ ‘only heat radiating from the external surface of the house[.]’ ” Id. at 35 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 . 2016The Court then noted that, although the Katz test — “whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” — may be difficult to apply to some locations, such as telephone booths and automobiles — the expectation of privacy in the home had “roots deep in the common law.” Id. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038 . *385 In support of the use of its thermal imaging technology, the government in Kyllo argued that there was no “search” because the device detected “ ‘only heat radiating from the external surface of the house[.]’ ” Id. at 35 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 . | 1 | 2 |
Corbin v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”). 7 The Katz test consists of two parts, “each of which must be satisfied in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a defendant must ‘demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place searched’ and (2) ‘prove that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Walker, 432 Md. at 605 , 69 A.3d 1066 ( 2014See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”). 7 The Katz test consists of two parts, “each of which must be satisfied in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a defendant must ‘demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place searched’ and (2) ‘prove that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Walker, 432 Md. at 605 , 69 A.3d 1066 ( | 1 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hoanggreen2 sentences2015Whether Katz Violated MLRPC 8.4(a) And (d) Katz also takes exception to the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions that he violated MLRPC 8.4(a) and (d). “[I]t is well-settled that a lawyer’s willful failure to file his or her personal income tax returns violates the prohibition of [MLRPC] 8.4(d) of engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hoang, 433 Md. 600, 610 , 72 A.3d 548, 554 (2013) (citation omitted). 2015Whether Katz Violated MLRPC 8.4(a) And (d) Katz also takes exception to the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions that he violated MLRPC 8.4(a) and (d). “[I]t is well-settled that a lawyer’s willful failure to file his or her personal income tax returns violates the prohibition of [MLRPC] 8.4(d) of engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hoang, 433 Md. 600, 610 , 72 A.3d 548, 554 (2013) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
McFarlin v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“A person demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy by showing that he or she sought ‘to preserve something as private.’ ” Williamson, 413 Md. at 535 , 993 A.2d 626 (quoting McFarlin v. State, 409 Md. 391, 404 , 975 A.2d 862 (2009)). 2014“A person demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy by showing that he or she sought ‘to preserve something as private.’ ” Williamson, 413 Md. at 535 , 993 A.2d 626 (quoting McFarlin v. State, 409 Md. 391, 404 , 975 A.2d 862 (2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Williamson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”). 7 The Katz test consists of two parts, “each of which must be satisfied in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a defendant must ‘demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place searched’ and (2) ‘prove that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Walker, 432 Md. at 605 , 69 A.3d 1066 ( 2014See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”). 7 The Katz test consists of two parts, “each of which must be satisfied in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a defendant must ‘demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place searched’ and (2) ‘prove that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Walker, 432 Md. at 605 , 69 A.3d 1066 ( | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”). 7 The Katz test consists of two parts, “each of which must be satisfied in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a defendant must ‘demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place searched’ and (2) ‘prove that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Walker, 432 Md. at 605 , 69 A.3d 1066 ( 2014See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”). 7 The Katz test consists of two parts, “each of which must be satisfied in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply: (1) a defendant must ‘demonstrate an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place searched’ and (2) ‘prove that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Walker, 432 Md. at 605 , 69 A.3d 1066 ( | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Jardinesgreen2 sentences2014Indeed, the Jones Court made clear that “we do not make trespass the exclusive test” and “where a classic trespassory search is not involved ... resort must be had to Katz analysis.” 132 S.Ct. at 953-54 ; see also Florida v. Jardines, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1417 , 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (stating that "[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to ... ’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment”) (quoting Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952 ). . 2014Indeed, the Jones Court made clear that “we do not make trespass the exclusive test” and “where a classic trespassory search is not involved ... resort must be had to Katz analysis.” 132 S.Ct. at 953-54 ; see also Florida v. Jardines, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1417 , 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (stating that "[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been added to ... ’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment”) (quoting Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952 ). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bridgesgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Bridges, 513 A.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Me.1986) (defendants who made no effort to conceal their movements in a publicly visible location manifested no subjective expectation of privacy and therefore there was no need to consider the objective part of the Katz inquiry); State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843-44 (Tenn.2001) (observing that an individual may have an expectation of privacy in a motel room that society would recognize as reasonable, but under the facts of the case, concluding that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy after disclaiming any interest in a key to th 2013See State v. Bridges, 513 A.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Me.1986) (defendants who made no effort to conceal their movements in a publicly visible location manifested no subjective expectation of privacy and therefore there was no need to consider the objective part of the Katz inquiry); State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843-44 (Tenn.2001) (observing that an individual may have an expectation of privacy in a motel room that society would recognize as reasonable, but under the facts of the case, concluding that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy after disclaiming any interest in a key to th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rossgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Bridges, 513 A.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Me.1986) (defendants who made no effort to conceal their movements in a publicly visible location manifested no subjective expectation of privacy and therefore there was no need to consider the objective part of the Katz inquiry); State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843-44 (Tenn.2001) (observing that an individual may have an expectation of privacy in a motel room that society would recognize as reasonable, but under the facts of the case, concluding that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy after disclaiming any interest in a key to th 2013See State v. Bridges, 513 A.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Me.1986) (defendants who made no effort to conceal their movements in a publicly visible location manifested no subjective expectation of privacy and therefore there was no need to consider the objective part of the Katz inquiry); State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843-44 (Tenn.2001) (observing that an individual may have an expectation of privacy in a motel room that society would recognize as reasonable, but under the facts of the case, concluding that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy after disclaiming any interest in a key to th | 1 | 1 |
Kee v. State Highway Administrationgreen2 sentences2009The test for determining whether the legislature has waived a local government agency’s governmental immunity (applicable only to government functions) has two conditions: “First, the Legislature must authorize suits for damages, and second, there must be provision for the payment of judgments.” Kee, 313 Md. at 455 , 545 A.2d at 1317 (summarizing the Katz test). 2009The test for determining whether the legislature has waived a local government agency’s governmental immunity (applicable only to government functions) has two conditions: “First, the Legislature must authorize suits for damages, and second, there must be provision for the payment of judgments.” Kee, 313 Md. at 455 , 545 A.2d at 1317 (summarizing the Katz test). | 1 | 1 |
Sproates v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The Court of Appeals of Maryland has articulated the Katz principle by stating that “Lt]he scope of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is defined in terms of the individual’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy.’ ” Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 731 , 684 A.2d 823 (1996); see Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (describing the principle as a “legitimate or reasonable” expectation of privacy). 8 When the teachings of Katz and its progeny are applied to field sobriety tests, we must determine whether the State has intruded into an area where an individual 2006The Court of Appeals of Maryland has articulated the Katz principle by stating that “Lt]he scope of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is defined in terms of the individual’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy.’ ” Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 731 , 684 A.2d 823 (1996); see Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (describing the principle as a “legitimate or reasonable” expectation of privacy). 8 When the teachings of Katz and its progeny are applied to field sobriety tests, we must determine whether the State has intruded into an area where an individual | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Knotts
green
2 sentences2016Agreeing with Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Knotts v. United States, Justice Scalia expounded that “ ‘when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. at 951 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 , 103 S.Ct. 1081 , 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983)). 2016Agreeing with Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Knotts v. United States, Justice Scalia expounded that “ ‘when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. at 951 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 , 103 S.Ct. 1081 , 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983)). | 2 | 2012–2016 |
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences2017Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); see Part I.A.2 of this opinion above, . 2017Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); see Part I.A.2 of this opinion above, . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Raynor v. State
green
2 sentences2015The Katz test, from Justice Harlan’s concurrence to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), remains the “lodestar for determining whether police conduct is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Raynor, 440 Md. at 83 , 99 A.3d at 759 . 2015The Katz test, from Justice Harlan’s concurrence to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), remains the “lodestar for determining whether police conduct is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Raynor, 440 Md. at 83 , 99 A.3d at 759 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stone v. State
green
2 sentences2013The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress, explaining its ruling: I believe that the Stone [v. State, 178 Md.App. 428 , 941 A.2d 1238 (2008) ], case is the Maryland case that’s on point and that is supported by U.S. v. Knotts, for the proposition that the first question is, is there a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize under the Katz test. 2013The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress, explaining its ruling: I believe that the Stone [v. State, 178 Md.App. 428 , 941 A.2d 1238 (2008) ], case is the Maryland case that’s on point and that is supported by U.S. v. Knotts, for the proposition that the first question is, is there a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize under the Katz test. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Maynard
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 949 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C.Cir.2010)). 2012Id. at 949 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C.Cir.2010)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Venner v. State
green
2 sentences2011See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing two-prong test); Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 51-52 , 367 A.2d 949 (1977) (adopting the Katz test). 2011See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing two-prong test); Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 51-52 , 367 A.2d 949 (1977) (adopting the Katz test). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2011A legitimate expectation of privacy is one that has its source outside of the Fourth Amendment “either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 143-44 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). 2011A legitimate expectation of privacy is one that has its source outside of the Fourth Amendment “either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 143-44 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bushek v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 482 n. 2. 19 . 2010Id. at 482 n. 2. 19 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jackson v. Housing Opportunities Commission
green
2 sentences2009A housing authority has power ‘[t]o sue and be sued.’ The power is unqualified.” Id. at 124, 422 A.2d at 379 . 2009A housing authority has power ‘[t]o sue and be sued.’ The power is unqualified.” Id. at 124, 422 A.2d at 379 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Stanberry v. State
green
2 sentences2006The Court of Appeals of Maryland has articulated the Katz principle by stating that “Lt]he scope of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is defined in terms of the individual’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy.’ ” Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 731 , 684 A.2d 823 (1996); see Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (describing the principle as a “legitimate or reasonable” expectation of privacy). 8 When the teachings of Katz and its progeny are applied to field sobriety tests, we must determine whether the State has intruded into an area where an individual 2006The Court of Appeals of Maryland has articulated the Katz principle by stating that “Lt]he scope of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is defined in terms of the individual’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy.’ ” Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 731 , 684 A.2d 823 (1996); see Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (describing the principle as a “legitimate or reasonable” expectation of privacy). 8 When the teachings of Katz and its progeny are applied to field sobriety tests, we must determine whether the State has intruded into an area where an individual | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.