Katz test in Connecticut

2025Relevant to the present case, the proper inquiry is whether, pursuant to the Katz framework, ‘‘the person claiming the protec- tion of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has a legitimate expec- tation of privacy in the invaded place.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 107 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L.

2025Relevant to the present case, the proper inquiry is whether, pursuant to the Katz framework, ‘‘the person claiming the protec- tion of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has a legitimate expec- tation of privacy in the invaded place.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 107 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L.

2025Relevant to the present case, the proper inquiry is whether, pursuant to the Katz framework, ‘‘the person claiming the protec- tion of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has a legitimate expec- tation of privacy in the invaded place.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 107 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L.

2025Relevant to the present case, the proper inquiry is whether, pursuant to the Katz framework, ‘‘the person claiming the protec- tion of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has a legitimate expec- tation of privacy in the invaded place.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 107 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L.

2025Relevant to the present case, the proper inquiry is whether, pursuant to the Katz framework, ‘‘the person claiming the protec- tion of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has a legitimate expec- tation of privacy in the invaded place.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 107 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L.

2025Relevant to the present case, the proper inquiry is whether, pursuant to the Katz framework, ‘‘the person claiming the protec- tion of the [f]ourth [a]mendment has a legitimate expec- tation of privacy in the invaded place.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 107 , 588 A.2d 145 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 , 112 S. Ct. 330 , 116 L.

2017See State v. Braswell , 145 Conn.App. 617 , 642, 76 A.3d 231 (2013) (no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy), aff'd, 318 Conn. 815 , 123 A.3d 835 (2015) ; State v. Pierre , 139 Conn.App. 116 , 128 and n.7, 54 A.3d 1060 (2012) (same), aff'd, 311 Conn. 507 , 88 A.3d 489 (2014) ; State v. Lester , Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CR-09-131899, 2011 WL 522936 (January 19, 2011) (no subjective or objective expectation of privacy); State v. Kelly , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CR-06-61742, 2009 WL 323481 (January 8, 2009) (same

2017See State v. Braswell , 145 Conn.App. 617 , 642, 76 A.3d 231 (2013) (no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy), aff'd, 318 Conn. 815 , 123 A.3d 835 (2015) ; State v. Pierre , 139 Conn.App. 116 , 128 and n.7, 54 A.3d 1060 (2012) (same), aff'd, 311 Conn. 507 , 88 A.3d 489 (2014) ; State v. Lester , Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CR-09-131899, 2011 WL 522936 (January 19, 2011) (no subjective or objective expectation of privacy); State v. Kelly , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CR-06-61742, 2009 WL 323481 (January 8, 2009) (same

2025This court has recognized that, because ‘‘[l]egislative enactments are expressions of this state’s public policy’’; State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 375 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); ‘‘they may be relevant to the resolution of whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy is one that Connecticut citizens would recog- nize as reasonable.’’ State v. Bernier, 246 Conn. 63, 73 , 717 A.2d 652 (1998).

2025This court has recognized that, because ‘‘[l]egislative enactments are expressions of this state’s public policy’’; State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 375 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); ‘‘they may be relevant to the resolution of whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy is one that Connecticut citizens would recog- nize as reasonable.’’ State v. Bernier, 246 Conn. 63, 73 , 717 A.2d 652 (1998).

2025This court has recognized that, because ‘‘[l]egislative enactments are expressions of this state’s public policy’’; State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 375 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); ‘‘they may be relevant to the resolution of whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy is one that Connecticut citizens would recog- nize as reasonable.’’ State v. Bernier, 246 Conn. 63, 73 , 717 A.2d 652 (1998).

2025This court has recognized that, because ‘‘[l]egislative enactments are expressions of this state’s public policy’’; State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 375 , 630 A.2d 1315 (1993); ‘‘they may be relevant to the resolution of whether the defendant’s expectation of privacy is one that Connecticut citizens would recog- nize as reasonable.’’ State v. Bernier, 246 Conn. 63, 73 , 717 A.2d 652 (1998).

2022Although Katz involved a unilateral change during negotiations for an initial collective bargaining agreement, ‘‘[t]he Katz doctrine has been extended as well to cases where . . . an existing agreement has expired and negotia- tions on a new one have yet to be completed.’’ Litton Financial Printing Division v. National Labor Rela- tions Board, 501 U.S. 190, 198 , 111 S. Ct. 2215 , 115 L.

2022Although Katz involved a unilateral change during negotiations for an initial collective bargaining agreement, ‘‘[t]he Katz doctrine has been extended as well to cases where . . . an existing agreement has expired and negotia- tions on a new one have yet to be completed.’’ Litton Financial Printing Division v. National Labor Rela- tions Board, 501 U.S. 190, 198 , 111 S. Ct. 2215 , 115 L.

2016Similarly, in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 955 , in which the court concluded that the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle constituted a search, Justice Sotomayor observed that "the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations." An example of an area in which reasonable expectations of privacy have been reshaped by advances in technology is aerial surveillance.

2016Similarly, in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 955 , in which the court concluded that the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle constituted a search, Justice Sotomayor observed that "the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations." An example of an area in which reasonable expectations of privacy have been reshaped by advances in technology is aerial surveillance.

2016For example, in Florida v. Riley , supra, 488 U.S. at 448 , 450 , 109 S.Ct. 693 , the court concluded that flying a police helicopter at a height of 400 feet over the defendant's backyard, to look through openings in the roof of the defendant's backyard greenhouse, did not constitute a search.

2016For example, in Florida v. Riley , supra, 488 U.S. at 448 , 450 , 109 S.Ct. 693 , the court concluded that flying a police helicopter at a height of 400 feet over the defendant's backyard, to look through openings in the roof of the defendant's backyard greenhouse, did not constitute a search.

2015Id., 751–52.

2015Id., 751–52.

2012“The determination that a particular place is protected under the fourth amendment requires that it be one in which society is prepared, because of its code of values and its notions of custom and civility, to give deference to a manifested expectation of privacy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, supra, 218 Conn. 95 . “[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 , 92 S. Ct. 2125 , 32 L.

2012“The determination that a particular place is protected under the fourth amendment requires that it be one in which society is prepared, because of its code of values and its notions of custom and civility, to give deference to a manifested expectation of privacy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mooney, supra, 218 Conn. 95 . “[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed”; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 , 92 S. Ct. 2125 , 32 L.

2011Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz’ analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state’s reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d 588 , Powell v. State, supra, 574 N.E.2d 331 , and Kleve v. Hill, 185 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999).

2011We merely note that one necessary cost accompanying a precedential judicial system such as ours, which "has a built-in presumption of retroactivity"; Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); is that there will be times when courts will be forced to disturb the settled soils of justice. [25] Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz' analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state's reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 588 , 825 N.Y.S.2d 678 , 859 N.E.2d 484 , Powell v. State, supra, 57

2011Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz’ analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state’s reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d 588 , Powell v. State, supra, 574 N.E.2d 331 , and Kleve v. Hill, 185 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999).

2011We merely note that one necessary cost accompanying a precedential judicial system such as ours, which "has a built-in presumption of retroactivity"; Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); is that there will be times when courts will be forced to disturb the settled soils of justice. [25] Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz' analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state's reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 588 , 825 N.Y.S.2d 678 , 859 N.E.2d 484 , Powell v. State, supra, 57

2011We merely note that one necessary cost accompanying a precedential judicial system such as ours, which "has a built-in presumption of retroactivity"; Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); is that there will be times when courts will be forced to disturb the settled soils of justice. [25] Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz' analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state's reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 588 , 825 N.Y.S.2d 678 , 859 N.E.2d 484 , Powell v. State, supra, 57

2011We merely note that one necessary cost accompanying a precedential judicial system such as ours, which "has a built-in presumption of retroactivity"; Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); is that there will be times when courts will be forced to disturb the settled soils of justice. [25] Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz' analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state's reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 588 , 825 N.Y.S.2d 678 , 859 N.E.2d 484 , Powell v. State, supra, 57

2011We merely note that one necessary cost accompanying a precedential judicial system such as ours, which "has a built-in presumption of retroactivity"; Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); is that there will be times when courts will be forced to disturb the settled soils of justice. [25] Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz' analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state's reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 588 , 825 N.Y.S.2d 678 , 859 N.E.2d 484 , Powell v. State, supra, 57

2011We merely note that one necessary cost accompanying a precedential judicial system such as ours, which "has a built-in presumption of retroactivity"; Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 , 104 S.Ct. 1338 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984); is that there will be times when courts will be forced to disturb the settled soils of justice. [25] Indeed, one of our primary concerns about Justice Katz' analysis is that she appears to undervalue the importance of the state's reliance interest in cases such as Policano v. Herbert, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 588 , 825 N.Y.S.2d 678 , 859 N.E.2d 484 , Powell v. State, supra, 57