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20 California opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences1986(Ibid.; accord People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 84-86 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 460 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1100 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ].) Although location is no longer the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, it remains significant under the Katz test. 1986(Ibid.; accord People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 84-86 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 460 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1100 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ].) Although location is no longer the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, it remains significant under the Katz test. | 4 | 4 |
Lorenzana v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985(E.g., Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 638 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 , 511 P.2d 33 ]; People v. Edwards, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1103 .) The inquiry is whether the government intruded unreasonably on an expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as valid. ( People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 106 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 628 , 679 P.2d 62 ].) (4) Though location is no longer the sine qua non of search-and-seizure analysis, it remains relevant under the Katz test. 1985(E.g., Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 638 [ 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 , 511 P.2d 33 ]; People v. Edwards, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1103 .) The inquiry is whether the government intruded unreasonably on an expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as valid. ( People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 106 [ 201 Cal. Rptr. 628 , 679 P.2d 62 ].) (4) Though location is no longer the sine qua non of search-and-seizure analysis, it remains relevant under the Katz test. | 3 | 4 |
Arkansas v. Sandersred2 sentences1980(Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764, fn. 13 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 245 ; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 1978) 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment. 1980(Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764, fn. 13 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 245 ; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 1978) 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Chapmangreen2 sentences1985(People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 106 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 679 P.2d 62 ].) Though location is no longer the sine qua non of search-and-seizure analysis, it remains relevant under the Katz test. 1985(People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 106 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 679 P.2d 62 ].) Though location is no longer the sine qua non of search-and-seizure analysis, it remains relevant under the Katz test. | 3 | 3 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 (Katz), affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (Id. at p. 351.) Under the Katz standard as applied in California, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance has come to encompass an assessment of the reasonableness of the individual’s expectation of privacy in a particular situation, wherever he is, and whether or not government agents trespassed physically on his property interests. 2014In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 (Katz), affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (Id. at p. 351.) Under the Katz standard as applied in California, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance has come to encompass an assessment of the reasonableness of the individual’s expectation of privacy in a particular situation, wherever he is, and whether or not government agents trespassed physically on his property interests. | 2 | 8 |
People v. Bradleygreen2 sentences1986(Ibid.; accord People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 84-86 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 460 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1100 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ].) Although location is no longer the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, it remains significant under the Katz test. 1986(Ibid.; accord People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 84-86 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 460 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1100 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ].) Although location is no longer the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, it remains significant under the Katz test. | 2 | 2 |
Goldman v. United Statesred2 sentences1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Shieldsgreen2 sentences1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 | 2 | 2 |
Bell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1980(Cf., Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764-765 [ 61 L.Ed. 235 , 245, fn. 13; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment.” 6 Reverting, then, to the facts of the instant case, an unsecured pillowcase partially filled with hard objects, does not in our view command the expectatio 1980(Cf., Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764-765 [ 61 L.Ed. 235 , 245, fn. 13; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment.” 6 Reverting, then, to the facts of the instant case, an unsecured pillowcase partially filled with hard objects, does not in our view command the expectatio | 1 | 2 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Southern Coach & Body Company, Inc.green2 sentences2020Stevens & Co., supra, 239 NLRB 738 [employer presented the union with a “ ‘Hobson’s choice’—either accept or reject unilaterally predetermined modifications in benefit programs”; “this tactic was a most effective means of undermining the collective-bargaining process and denigrating the Union’s status as collective-bargaining agent”].) Gerawan contends this conclusion was erroneous because “[w]age changes that merely reflect continuations of past company policy are not considered changes in existing work conditions, and thus fall outside the Katz rule.” (Aaron Brothers Co. v. NLRB (9th Cir. 19 2020Stevens & Co., supra, 239 NLRB 738 [employer presented the union with a “ ‘Hobson’s choice’—either accept or reject unilaterally predetermined modifications in benefit programs”; “this tactic was a most effective means of undermining the collective-bargaining process and denigrating the Union’s status as collective-bargaining agent”].) Gerawan contends this conclusion was erroneous because “[w]age changes that merely reflect continuations of past company policy are not considered changes in existing work conditions, and thus fall outside the Katz rule.” (Aaron Brothers Co. v. NLRB (9th Cir. 19 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Karogreen1 sentence2013(Id. at pp. 948, 953.) The high court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies not only “when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’” but also when a trespass to the defendant’s personal property (“effects”), is “conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” (Id. at pp. 950-951 & fn. 5.) The court termed the latter test “the common-law trespassory test”; and explained that it was separate from and existed prior to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Salihgreen2 sentences1990(People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 638, 653 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 764 ].) However, monitoring of an electronic tracking device, which does not transgress privacy expectations when it is installed, has been held not to be a search subject to Fourth Amend *1646 ment protection “unless the monitoring reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.” (People v. Salih (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 603 ].) Irrespective of the terminology, under the Katz standard, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance encompasses an assessment of th 1990(People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 638, 653 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 764 ].) However, monitoring of an electronic tracking device, which does not transgress privacy expectations when it is installed, has been held not to be a search subject to Fourth Amend *1646 ment protection “unless the monitoring reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.” (People v. Salih (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 603 ].) Irrespective of the terminology, under the Katz standard, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance encompasses an assessment of th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences1990(People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 638, 653 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 764 ].) However, monitoring of an electronic tracking device, which does not transgress privacy expectations when it is installed, has been held not to be a search subject to Fourth Amend *1646 ment protection “unless the monitoring reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.” (People v. Salih (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 603 ].) Irrespective of the terminology, under the Katz standard, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance encompasses an assessment of th 1990(People v. Smith (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 638, 653 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 764 ].) However, monitoring of an electronic tracking device, which does not transgress privacy expectations when it is installed, has been held not to be a search subject to Fourth Amend *1646 ment protection “unless the monitoring reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.” (People v. Salih (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 603 ].) Irrespective of the terminology, under the Katz standard, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance encompasses an assessment of th | 1 | 1 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Katzgreen2 sentences1984(See Kaplan’s Fruit & Produce Co. (1979) 6 ALRB No. 36.) In its concluding remarks, the Katz court stated: “[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that there might be circumstances which the Board could or should accept as excusing or justifying unilateral action. ...” (Labor Board v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 748 [8 L.Ed.2d at pp. 238-239].) Subsequently, the principle gradually developed that a unilateral increase granted to maintain the “dynamic status quo,” in accordance with the established company practice, falls within an exception to the Katz rule. 1984(See Kaplan’s Fruit & Produce Co. (1979) 6 ALRB No. 36.) In its concluding remarks, the Katz court stated: “[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that there might be circumstances which the Board could or should accept as excusing or justifying unilateral action. ...” (Labor Board v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 748 [8 L.Ed.2d at pp. 238-239].) Subsequently, the principle gradually developed that a unilateral increase granted to maintain the “dynamic status quo,” in accordance with the established company practice, falls within an exception to the Katz rule. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Krivdared | 1 | 1 |
| Griswold v. Connecticutgreen | 1 | 1 |
White v. Davisgreen2 sentences1979(See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 166 , 529 P.2d 590 ]; White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757 , 11A [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 533 P.2d 222 ]; People v. Krivda, 5 Cal.3d 357, 364-365 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 62 , 486 P.2d 1262 ]; People v. Doyle, 11 Cal.App.3d 126, 128 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 639 ].) The Brovelli decision also was written before Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 514-515 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 ] where the United States Supreme Court declared: “[SJpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give the 1979(See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 166 , 529 P.2d 590 ]; White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757 , 11A [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 533 P.2d 222 ]; People v. Krivda, 5 Cal.3d 357, 364-365 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 62 , 486 P.2d 1262 ]; People v. Doyle, 11 Cal.App.3d 126, 128 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 639 ].) The Brovelli decision also was written before Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 514-515 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 ] where the United States Supreme Court declared: “[SJpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give the | 1 | 1 |
| Nelson v. Specialty Records, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Flygreen | 1 | 1 |
| North v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vidaurri v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Bradley Raymond Neumann
green
2 sentences1980(Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764, fn. 13 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 245 ; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 1978) 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment. 1980(Cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764, fn. 13 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 245 ; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 1978) 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment. | 4 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Jones
green
2 sentences2013“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance,” thus necessitating broadening the scope of a *1516 Katz-based approach. (565 U.S._,_[ 132 S.Ct. 945 , 955] (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) “In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention,” and Justice Sotomayor would “take . . . attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of 2013“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance,” thus necessitating broadening the scope of a *1516 Katz-based approach. (565 U.S._,_[ 132 S.Ct. 945 , 955] (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) “In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention,” and Justice Sotomayor would “take . . . attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Willard
green
2 sentences1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 1985(See Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 134-136 [ 86 L.Ed. 1322, 1327-1328 , 62 S.Ct. 993 ]; see also People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1102-1107 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 458 P.2d 713 ], citing People v. Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 188 ]; People v. Willard (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 292 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 734 ]; People v. Johnson (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 698, 701, 702 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 214 ].) However, in 1967, Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347 , affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” (P. 351 [ 19 | 2 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Minjares
green
2 sentences1980(Cf., Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764-765 [ 61 L.Ed. 235 , 245, fn. 13; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment.” 6 Reverting, then, to the facts of the instant case, an unsecured pillowcase partially filled with hard objects, does not in our view command the expectatio 1980(Cf., Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. 753, 764-765 [ 61 L.Ed. 235 , 245, fn. 13; United States v. Neumann (8th Cir. 585 F.2d 355 [no protectible privacy interest in an unsecured department store box in plain view in automobile].) As one commentator has noted, whether in a given factual instance a reasonable privacy expectation may be said to exist under the Katz standard of justifiable reliance, is largely a matter of value judgment.” 6 Reverting, then, to the facts of the instant case, an unsecured pillowcase partially filled with hard objects, does not in our view command the expectatio | 2 | 1980–1980 |
Aaron Brothers Company, a Division of Chromalloy American Corp., Petitioner-Cross v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent-Cross
green
2 sentences2020Stevens & Co., supra, 239 NLRB 738 [employer presented the union with a “ ‘Hobson’s choice’—either accept or reject unilaterally predetermined modifications in benefit programs”; “this tactic was a most effective means of undermining the collective-bargaining process and denigrating the Union’s status as collective-bargaining agent”].) Gerawan contends this conclusion was erroneous because “[w]age changes that merely reflect continuations of past company policy are not considered changes in existing work conditions, and thus fall outside the Katz rule.” (Aaron Brothers Co. v. NLRB (9th Cir. 19 2020Stevens & Co., supra, 239 NLRB 738 [employer presented the union with a “ ‘Hobson’s choice’—either accept or reject unilaterally predetermined modifications in benefit programs”; “this tactic was a most effective means of undermining the collective-bargaining process and denigrating the Union’s status as collective-bargaining agent”].) Gerawan contends this conclusion was erroneous because “[w]age changes that merely reflect continuations of past company policy are not considered changes in existing work conditions, and thus fall outside the Katz rule.” (Aaron Brothers Co. v. NLRB (9th Cir. 19 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ng v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2016(Rich, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1080 .) We therefore conclude that respondent superior court’s order granting Katz’s motion to suppress evidence should be vacated and a new order should issue denying the motion to suppress evidence.2 DISPOSITION The accelerated Palma procedure ( Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171 ) is appropriate here because “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue. . . .” (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing respondent superior court | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Rich
green
1 sentence2016(Rich, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1080 .) We therefore conclude that respondent superior court’s order granting Katz’s motion to suppress evidence should be vacated and a new order should issue denying the motion to suppress evidence.2 DISPOSITION The accelerated Palma procedure ( Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171 ) is appropriate here because “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue. . . .” (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing respondent superior court | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016(Rich, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1080 .) We therefore conclude that respondent superior court’s order granting Katz’s motion to suppress evidence should be vacated and a new order should issue denying the motion to suppress evidence.2 DISPOSITION The accelerated Palma procedure ( Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171 ) is appropriate here because “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue. . . .” (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing respondent superior court 2016(Rich, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1080 .) We therefore conclude that respondent superior court’s order granting Katz’s motion to suppress evidence should be vacated and a new order should issue denying the motion to suppress evidence.2 DISPOSITION The accelerated Palma procedure ( Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171 ) is appropriate here because “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue. . . .” (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing respondent superior court | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Cook
green
2 sentences2014The privacy one is entitled to expect in a particular place is governed primarily by common habits in the use of such property. [Citations.]” (People v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373, 379 .) Thus, courts “guard with particular zeal an 7 individual’s right to carry on private activities within the interior of a home or office, free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. [Citations.] We also recognize a high privacy interest in the ‘curtilage’ of a residence — that zone immediately surrounding the home where its private interior life can be expected to extend. [Citation.] For example, a governmen 2014The privacy one is entitled to expect in a particular place is governed primarily by common habits in the use of such property. [Citations.]” (People v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373, 379 .) Thus, courts “guard with particular zeal an 7 individual’s right to carry on private activities within the interior of a home or office, free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. [Citations.] We also recognize a high privacy interest in the ‘curtilage’ of a residence — that zone immediately surrounding the home where its private interior life can be expected to extend. [Citation.] For example, a governmen | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Knotts
green
2 sentences2013(Id. at pp. 948, 953.) The high court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies not only “when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’” but also when a trespass to the defendant’s personal property (“effects”), is “conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” (Id. at pp. 950-951 & fn. 5.) The court termed the latter test “the common-law trespassory test”; and explained that it was separate from and existed prior to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. 2013(Id. at pp. 948, 953.) The high court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies not only “when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’” but also when a trespass to the defendant’s personal property (“effects”), is “conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” (Id. at pp. 950-951 & fn. 5.) The court termed the latter test “the common-law trespassory test”; and explained that it was separate from and existed prior to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Nicolai Caymen, AKA Andre Patrick Payne
green
1 sentence2013The answer is an emphatic “No.” As stated most baldly by the Ninth Circuit: “The Fourth Amendment does not protect a defendant from a warrantless search of property that he stole, because regardless of whether he expects to maintain privacy in the contents of stolen property, such an expectation is not one that ‘society is prepared to accept as reasonable.’ ” (U.S. v. Caymen (9th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 1196, 1200 .) The principle enjoys wide acceptance. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carsten v. Psychology Examining Committee
green
1 sentence2006(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) “The requirement that a petitioner be ‘beneficially interested’ has been generally interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the person has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.” (Carsten, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 796 .) “The petitioner’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings must be substantial, i.e., a writ will not issue to enforce a technical, abstract or moot right. [Citations.] The petitioner also must show his legal rights a | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Braude v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2006(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) “The requirement that a petitioner be ‘beneficially interested’ has been generally interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the person has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.” (Carsten, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 796 .) “The petitioner’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings must be substantial, i.e., a writ will not issue to enforce a technical, abstract or moot right. [Citations.] The petitioner also must show his legal rights a | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences2003(Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 353 .) In Smith v. Maryland, supra, 442 U.S. 735 , the court followed the Katz standard, concluding that individuals have no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed to or from their telephone lines. 2003(Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 353 .) In Smith v. Maryland, supra, 442 U.S. 735 , the court followed the Katz standard, concluding that individuals have no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed to or from their telephone lines. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Burrows v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Doyle green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.