Katz analysis in Oregon

1987In State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343 , 630 P.2d 854 (1981), the court applied the Katz analysis in considering whether the protection of Article I, section 9, extended beyond a physical trespass, although it did so because the defendant had not argued that the analysis should be different than under the Fourth Amendment.

1987In State v. Holt, 291 Or. 343 , 630 P.2d 854 (1981), the court applied the Katz analysis in considering whether the protection of Article I, section 9, extended beyond a physical trespass, although it did so because the defendant had not argued that the analysis should be different than under the Fourth Amendment.

1987It amazes me, in light of the various opinions in Dixson/Digby , that the majority can say that no Oregon appellate case has rejected the Katz analysis. 87 Or App at 614 n 3.

1987It amazes me, in light of the various opinions in Dixson/Digby , that the majority can say that no Oregon appellate case has rejected the Katz analysis. 87 Or App at 614 n 3.

1988App. at 259 , 605 P.2d 746 , is meaningless except in the context of the Katz test.

1988App. at 259 , 605 P.2d 746 , is meaningless except in the context of the Katz test.

1988Article I, section 9, protects the people's right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure * * *." In State v. Turechek, 74 Or.

1988Article I, section 9, protects the people's right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure * * *." In State v. Turechek, 74 Or.

1988See State v. Louis, 296 Or 57 , 672 P2d 708 (1983); State v. Rounds, 73 Or App 148 , 698 P2d 71 , rev den 299 Or 663 (1985); State v. Campbell, 87 Or App 415 , 742 P2d 683 (1987), rev allowed 305 Or 21 (1988); State v. Dixson/Digby, 87 Or App 1 , 740 P2d 1224 , rev allowed 304 Or 437 (1987).

1988See State v. Louis, 296 Or 57 , 672 P2d 708 (1983); State v. Rounds, 73 Or App 148 , 698 P2d 71 , rev den 299 Or 663 (1985); State v. Campbell, 87 Or App 415 , 742 P2d 683 (1987), rev allowed 305 Or 21 (1988); State v. Dixson/Digby, 87 Or App 1 , 740 P2d 1224 , rev allowed 304 Or 437 (1987).

1988See State v. Ohling, 70 Or App 249 , 252 n 4, 688 P2d 1384 , rev den 298 Or 334 (1984); State v. Russo, 68 Or App 760 , 764 n 1, 683 P2d 163 (1984).

1988See State v. Ohling, 70 Or App 249 , 252 n 4, 688 P2d 1384 , rev den 298 Or 334 (1984); State v. Russo, 68 Or App 760 , 764 n 1, 683 P2d 163 (1984).

1988See State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57 , 672 P.2d 708 (1983); State v. Rounds, 73 Or.

1988See State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57 , 672 P.2d 708 (1983); State v. Rounds, 73 Or.

1988However, in doing so it criticized the Katz test, 304 Or. at 321 -22 n. 7, 745 P.2d 757 , and did not use it in determining the defendant's rights.

1988However, in doing so it criticized the Katz test, 304 Or. at 321 -22 n. 7, 745 P.2d 757 , and did not use it in determining the defendant's rights.

1986That, at least, is to hold that the Katz analysis supplanted rather than supplemented prior doctrine, a holding contrary to what we so recently said in State v. Louis, supra. This and other recent decisions of this court, such as State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986), and State v. Bennett, 301 Or 299 , 721 P2d 1375 (1986), mean that the present majority has reversed the longstanding rule that warrantless searches are limited to a few carefully delineated exceptions based on necessity.

1986That, at least, is to hold that the Katz analysis supplanted rather than supplemented prior doctrine, a holding contrary to what we so recently said in State v. Louis, supra. This and other recent decisions of this court, such as State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986), and State v. Bennett, 301 Or 299 , 721 P2d 1375 (1986), mean that the present majority has reversed the longstanding rule that warrantless searches are limited to a few carefully delineated exceptions based on necessity.

1986That, at least, is to hold that the Katz analysis supplanted rather than supplemented prior doctrine, a holding contrary to what we so recently said in State v. Louis, supra. This and other recent decisions of this court, such as State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986), and State v. Bennett, 301 Or 299 , 721 P2d 1375 (1986), mean that the present majority has reversed the longstanding rule that warrantless searches are limited to a few carefully delineated exceptions based on necessity.

1986That, at least, is to hold that the Katz analysis supplanted rather than supplemented prior doctrine, a holding contrary to what we so recently said in State v. Louis, supra. This and other recent decisions of this court, such as State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986), and State v. Bennett, 301 Or 299 , 721 P2d 1375 (1986), mean that the present majority has reversed the longstanding rule that warrantless searches are limited to a few carefully delineated exceptions based on necessity.

1986The majority’s general rule now is that police officers almost always may seize and search a person or personal effects without a warrant on probable cause alone, except when they enter a house to do so and cannot persuade a judge that they obtained prior consent to do so, or in very limited circumstances such as in State v. Kock, 302 Or 29 , 725 P2d 1285 (1986).

1986The majority’s general rule now is that police officers almost always may seize and search a person or personal effects without a warrant on probable cause alone, except when they enter a house to do so and cannot persuade a judge that they obtained prior consent to do so, or in very limited circumstances such as in State v. Kock, 302 Or 29 , 725 P2d 1285 (1986).

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985The cases in which it applied involve areas which do not fit neatly within the constitutional protection of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” See, e.g., State v. Holt, 291 Or 343 , 630 P2d 854 (1981) (observation in a public restroom held not a search); State v. Carter/Burton, 54 Or App 852 , 636 P2d 460 (1981) (observation in an open field held an illegal search); State v. Goude, 49 Or App 721 , 620 P2d 957 (1980), rev den 290 Or 651 (1981) (examination of car parked in private driveway held an illegal search).

1985The cases in which it applied involve areas which do not fit neatly within the constitutional protection of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” See, e.g., State v. Holt, 291 Or 343 , 630 P2d 854 (1981) (observation in a public restroom held not a search); State v. Carter/Burton, 54 Or App 852 , 636 P2d 460 (1981) (observation in an open field held an illegal search); State v. Goude, 49 Or App 721 , 620 P2d 957 (1980), rev den 290 Or 651 (1981) (examination of car parked in private driveway held an illegal search).

1985App. 313, 317 , 619 P.2d 930 (1980), reversed on other grounds 292 Or. 216 , 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. den. 457 U.S. 1111 , 102 S.Ct. 2915 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982). [5] The former majority opinion in this case misconstrued the relevance of the Katz test in writing: "* * * Traditionally, a two-part `expectation of privacy' test has been applied to determine whether a search violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backpack; and (2) whether that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

1985App. 313, 317 , 619 P.2d 930 (1980), reversed on other grounds 292 Or. 216 , 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. den. 457 U.S. 1111 , 102 S.Ct. 2915 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982). [5] The former majority opinion in this case misconstrued the relevance of the Katz test in writing: "* * * Traditionally, a two-part `expectation of privacy' test has been applied to determine whether a search violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backpack; and (2) whether that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

1985App. 313, 317 , 619 P.2d 930 (1980), reversed on other grounds 292 Or. 216 , 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. den. 457 U.S. 1111 , 102 S.Ct. 2915 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982). [5] The former majority opinion in this case misconstrued the relevance of the Katz test in writing: "* * * Traditionally, a two-part `expectation of privacy' test has been applied to determine whether a search violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backpack; and (2) whether that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985The cases in which it applied involve areas which do not fit neatly within the constitutional protection of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” See, e.g., State v. Holt, 291 Or 343 , 630 P2d 854 (1981) (observation in a public restroom held not a search); State v. Carter/Burton, 54 Or App 852 , 636 P2d 460 (1981) (observation in an open field held an illegal search); State v. Goude, 49 Or App 721 , 620 P2d 957 (1980), rev den 290 Or 651 (1981) (examination of car parked in private driveway held an illegal search).

1985The cases in which it applied involve areas which do not fit neatly within the constitutional protection of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” See, e.g., State v. Holt, 291 Or 343 , 630 P2d 854 (1981) (observation in a public restroom held not a search); State v. Carter/Burton, 54 Or App 852 , 636 P2d 460 (1981) (observation in an open field held an illegal search); State v. Goude, 49 Or App 721 , 620 P2d 957 (1980), rev den 290 Or 651 (1981) (examination of car parked in private driveway held an illegal search).

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985Although there is some justification for the parties’ assumption that the analysis under both the state and federal constitutional provisions is that enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 , 88 S Ct 507 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), see, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962); State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741 , 653 P2d 942 (1982); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337 , 667 P2d 996 (1983); State v. Perry, 298 Or 21 , 688 P2d 827 (1984), the Katz analysis has undergone something akin to metamorphosis, culminating in Oliver v. United States, 466 US 170 , 104 S Ct 1735 , 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984)

1985App. 313, 317 , 619 P.2d 930 (1980), reversed on other grounds 292 Or. 216 , 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. den. 457 U.S. 1111 , 102 S.Ct. 2915 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982). [5] The former majority opinion in this case misconstrued the relevance of the Katz test in writing: "* * * Traditionally, a two-part `expectation of privacy' test has been applied to determine whether a search violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backpack; and (2) whether that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

1985App. 313, 317 , 619 P.2d 930 (1980), reversed on other grounds 292 Or. 216 , 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. den. 457 U.S. 1111 , 102 S.Ct. 2915 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982). [5] The former majority opinion in this case misconstrued the relevance of the Katz test in writing: "* * * Traditionally, a two-part `expectation of privacy' test has been applied to determine whether a search violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backpack; and (2) whether that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

1985App. 313, 317 , 619 P.2d 930 (1980), reversed on other grounds 292 Or. 216 , 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. den. 457 U.S. 1111 , 102 S.Ct. 2915 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982). [5] The former majority opinion in this case misconstrued the relevance of the Katz test in writing: "* * * Traditionally, a two-part `expectation of privacy' test has been applied to determine whether a search violates the protections of the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backpack; and (2) whether that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.