prosecutor argues standard in Michigan

2026“When the prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is intentionally trying to mislead the jury, he is in effect stating that defense counsel does not believe his own client.” People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569, 580 ; 419 NW2d 609 (1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“When the prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is intentionally trying to mislead the jury, he is in effect stating that defense counsel does not believe his own client.” People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569, 580 ; 419 NW2d 609 (1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“However, the prosecutor’s comments must be considered in light of defense counsel’s comments.” Watson, 245 Mich App at 592-593 .

2026Defense counsel appeared to acknowledge this fact in closing argument, when he stated: “The issue is whether or not [defendant] struck [Chief Krause], she didn’t, and he gave a lawful command.” Defense counsel’s strategy did not center on the legality of Chief Krause’s conduct; rather, it focused on whether the evidence proved beyond reasonable 10 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -7- doubt that defendant struck Chief Krause or knowingly resisted arrest.11 Defense counsel was not unreasonable in pursuing a strategy aligning with the evidence, which demonstrated there was an

2026Defense counsel appeared to acknowledge this fact in closing argument, when he stated: “The issue is whether or not [defendant] struck [Chief Krause], she didn’t, and he gave a lawful command.” Defense counsel’s strategy did not center on the legality of Chief Krause’s conduct; rather, it focused on whether the evidence proved beyond reasonable 10 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -7- doubt that defendant struck Chief Krause or knowingly resisted arrest.11 Defense counsel was not unreasonable in pursuing a strategy aligning with the evidence, which demonstrated there was an

2016Schaw, 288 Mich App at 236 . 11 Citing Baker v State, 906 A2d 139, 148 (Del, 2006) (“[i]f the Court determine[s] that no misconduct occurred, [the] analysis should end there”), the prosecutor argues that error requiring reversal should only occur when the prosecutor acted in bad faith.

2016Id. at 88 . -2- When the prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is intentionally trying to mislead the jury, he is in effect stating that defense counsel does not believe his own client.

2016The danger of such a suggestion was explained by this Court in People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 102 ; 351 NW2d 255 (1984): When the prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is intentionally trying to mislead the jury, he is in effect stating that defense counsel does not believe his own client.

2016The danger of such a suggestion was explained by this Court in People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 102 ; 351 NW2d 255 (1984): When the prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is intentionally trying to mislead the jury, he is in effect stating that defense counsel does not believe his own client.

1997People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 16 ; 472 NW2d 289 (1991).

1997People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 16 ; 472 NW2d 289 (1991).

1993While the four dissenting justices in Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530 ; 106 S Ct 2056 ; 90 L Ed 2d 514 (1986), would have ruled that this exception is firmly rooted, the majority declined to adopt that analysis.

1993While the four dissenting justices in Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530 ; 106 S Ct 2056 ; 90 L Ed 2d 514 (1986), would have ruled that this exception is firmly rooted, the majority declined to adopt that analysis.

1983Such waiver as we have in this case is a trial tactic within the province of counsel.” People v Johnson, 70 Mich App 349, 350 ; 247 NW2d 310 (1976).

1983Such waiver as we have in this case is a trial tactic within the province of counsel.” People v Johnson, 70 Mich App 349, 350 ; 247 NW2d 310 (1976).

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979Defendant contends that the proper standard for ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable person in concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, see People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467 ; 255 NW2d 648 (1977), People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975).

1979Defendant contends that the proper standard for ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable person in concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, see People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467 ; 255 NW2d 648 (1977), People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975).

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979He claims that the judge erred by employing an improper standard in ruling on the motion, by failing to view the evidence presented by the prosecution, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, by considering evidence presented by the defendant and by allowing an inaccurate view of the possible punishment to affect his decision. 2 The prosecutor argues that the standard to be applied in determining whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted is whether there is any evidence on each material element of the offense and that questions of

1979Defendant contends that the proper standard for ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable person in concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, see People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467 ; 255 NW2d 648 (1977), People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975).

1979Defendant contends that the proper standard for ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable person in concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, see People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467 ; 255 NW2d 648 (1977), People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975).

1913Johnson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 877 ( 69 S. E. 1104 ); Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 35 ( 5 S. W. 523 ); United States v. Sprague, 8 Utah, 378 ( 31 Pac. 1049 ).

1913Johnson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 877 ( 69 S. E. 1104 ); Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 35 ( 5 S. W. 523 ); United States v. Sprague, 8 Utah, 378 ( 31 Pac. 1049 ).

1913Johnson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 877 ( 69 S. E. 1104 ); Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 35 ( 5 S. W. 523 ); United States v. Sprague, 8 Utah, 378 ( 31 Pac. 1049 ).

1913Johnson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 877 ( 69 S. E. 1104 ); Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 35 ( 5 S. W. 523 ); United States v. Sprague, 8 Utah, 378 ( 31 Pac. 1049 ).

1913Johnson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 877 ( 69 S. E. 1104 ); Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 35 ( 5 S. W. 523 ); United States v. Sprague, 8 Utah, 378 ( 31 Pac. 1049 ).