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15 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2026Ct. App. 2009) (citing Stewart v. Stewart, 864 So. 2d 934, 938-39 (¶16) (Miss. 2003))). 2023See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 864 So. 2d 934, 938 (¶13) (Miss. 2003) (family-use doctrine converted family home to marital property); Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So. 2d 1216, 1221 (¶17-23) (Miss. 2002) (same); Hankins [v. Hankins], 866 So. 2d [508,] 511 (¶16) (Miss. | 7 | 7 |
Rhodes v. Rhodesgreen2 sentences2023“Property that was once separate may convert to marital property under the family-use doctrine.” Rhodes, 52 So. 3d at 438 (¶25). 2017Rhodes v. Rhodes , 52 So.3d 430 , 438 (¶ 25) (Miss. | 3 | 4 |
Faerber v. Faerbergreen2 sentences2026Further, we stated, “According to the [S]upreme [C]ourt, the family-use doctrine will almost always convert a separately owned ‘marital’ home to marital property.” Id. (citing Faerber v. Faerber, 13 So. 3d 853, 861 (¶29) (Miss. 2024We have also stated that “the family-use doctrine will almost always convert a separately owned ‘marital’ home to marital property.” Faerber v. Faerber, 13 So. 3d 853, 861 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). ¶67. | 3 | 3 |
Boutwell v. Boutwellgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 864 So. 2d 934, 938 (¶13) (Miss. 2003) (family-use doctrine converted family home to marital property); Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So. 2d 1216, 1221 (¶17-23) (Miss. 2002) (same); Hankins [v. Hankins], 866 So. 2d [508,] 511 (¶16) (Miss. 2013See Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So.2d 1216, 1221 (¶ 19) (Miss.2002). | 3 | 3 |
McKissack v. McKissackgreen2 sentences2021McKissack v. McKissack, 45 So. 3d 716, 720 (¶22) (Miss. 2011McKissack, 45 So.3d at 720-21 (¶¶ 19-25). | 2 | 2 |
Lockert v. Lockertgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., id. at 938 (¶ 13) (affirming the chancellor’s finding that the family residence and the personal property used in the residence was subject to familial use and lost its character as separate property); Boutwell, 829 So.2d at 1221 (¶ 21); Hankins v. Hankins, 866 So.2d 508, 511 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (holding that the “long-term family use of the property converted the residential house and lot into marital property”); Lockert v. Lockert, 815 So.2d 1267, 1269 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). ¶ 19. 2009See Lockert, 815 So.2d at 1269 (¶¶ 7-8). | 2 | 2 |
Garriga v. Garrigagreen2 sentences2009See Garriga v. Garriga, 770 So.2d 978, 984 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (funds used by a spouse to pursue an extramarital relationship were waste, requiring reimbursement to the marital estate). 2009See Garriga v. Garriga, 770 So.2d 978, 984 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (funds used by a spouse to pursue an extramarital relationship were waste, requiring reimbursement to the marital estate). | 2 | 2 |
Tiffany Ellen Turpin Davidson v. Timothy Charles Davidsongreen2 sentences2026Further, we stated, “According to the [S]upreme [C]ourt, the family-use doctrine will almost always convert a separately owned ‘marital’ home to marital property.” Id. (citing Faerber v. Faerber, 13 So. 3d 853, 861 (¶29) (Miss. 2026We disagreed, pointing out that “[p]roperty that was once separate may convert to marital property under the family-use doctrine.” Id. at 613 (¶17). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2013See Stewart, 864 So.2d at 937 (¶ 12) (“Separate property that has been ‘commingled with the joint marital estate’ ... becomes marital property subject to equitable distribution.” (quoting Johnson, 650 So.2d at 1286 )); see also Rhodes, 52 So.3d at 438 (¶ 26) (discussing family-use doctrine). 2013See Stewart v. Stewart, 864 So.2d 934, 937 (¶ 12) (Miss.2003) (“Separate property that has been ‘commingled with the joint marital estate’ also becomes marital property subject to equitable distribution.” (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1286 (Miss.1994))); see also Rhodes v. Rhodes, 52 So.3d 430, 438 (¶ 26) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (discussing family-use doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
Larue v. Laruegreen1 sentence2011Larue, 969 So.2d at 104 (¶ 11). [2] For example, reasoning that it is untenable to apply the family-use doctrine to cash and cash equivalents, this court held that the proper analysis for that particular type of property is the commingling doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Pittman v. Pittmangreen2 sentences2010See Pittman, 791 So.2d at 867 (¶ 31) (suggesting that a spouse store property in a place only accessible by the owner spouse in order to keep the asset separate and not subject it to the family-use doctrine). 2010This Court applied the family-use doctrine in Pittman v. Pittman, 791 So.2d 857, 866 (¶ 30) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Hankins v. Hankinsgreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., id. at 938 (¶ 13) (affirming the chancellor’s finding that the family residence and the personal property used in the residence was subject to familial use and lost its character as separate property); Boutwell, 829 So.2d at 1221 (¶ 21); Hankins v. Hankins, 866 So.2d 508, 511 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (holding that the “long-term family use of the property converted the residential house and lot into marital property”); Lockert v. Lockert, 815 So.2d 1267, 1269 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). ¶ 19. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carter v. Carter
green
1 sentence2018Therefore, the chancery court found that Frederick's retirement became marital under the family-use doctrine and the appreciation of $810,020.48 was "marital property subject to property division." Although Frederick acknowledges that the couple met with financial advisors several times regarding their retirement accounts, he claims that the accounts were never commingled, which was evidence the couple never intended for the accounts to be considered marital property. ¶ 17. "[P]roperty division 'is committed to the discretion and conscience of the [c]ourt, having in mind all of the equities an | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Chamblee v. Chamblee
green
1 sentence2018Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Chamblee v. Chamblee , 637 So.2d 850 , 864 (Miss. 1994) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Carney v. Carney
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 457 . 2016Id. at 457 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.