performance of a chemical test in North Dakota

2013B [¶ 19] Relying on this Court’s decision in Dettler v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54 , 676 N.W.2d 799 , the Department argues, even without the witnesses’ statements, circumstantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding that Dawson was driving or in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of the performance of a chemical test because one could infer the accident happened just pri- or to dispatch’s initial report to Officer Van Inwagen. [¶ 20] In Dettler , an officer observed a vehicle in a snow-covered ditch on the north side of Main Street, Fargo, North Dakota.

2013B [¶ 19] Relying on this Court’s decision in Dettler v. Sprynczynatyk, 2004 ND 54 , 676 N.W.2d 799 , the Department argues, even without the witnesses’ statements, circumstantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding that Dawson was driving or in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of the performance of a chemical test because one could infer the accident happened just pri- or to dispatch’s initial report to Officer Van Inwagen. [¶ 20] In Dettler , an officer observed a vehicle in a snow-covered ditch on the north side of Main Street, Fargo, North Dakota.

2003State v. Whitney, 377 N.W.2d 132, 133 (N.D.1985) (citing State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985); State v. Gawryluk, 351 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1984); State v. Kisse, 351 N.W.2d 97 (1984)). “[T]he crime created by subsection (l)(b) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, regardless of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration.” State v. Schwab, 2003 ND 119, ¶ 8 , 665 N.W.2d 52 (citing City of Minot v. Bjelland, 452 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1990)).

1991Vogel argues that this • part created a “mandatory irrebuttable presumption” because it “contained no qualifying phrases and thus would lead a reasonable juror to have understood that once the State had proved the Defendant had a blood alcohol content above .10 that was it.” *89 Vogel was convicted of violating NDCC 39-08-01(l)(b) by actual physical control of a vehicle while “under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” See State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985).

2017(Emphasis added.) “To establish a per se violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a chemical test must be. performed within two hours of driving.” Pavek, 1997 ND 77, ¶ 7 , 562 N.W.2d 574 . [¶ 11] The Department’s report and notice form is. admissible as prima facie evidence of its contents once it is forwarded to the director of the Department.

2017(Emphasis added.) “To establish a per se violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a chemical test must be. performed within two hours of driving.” Pavek, 1997 ND 77, ¶ 7 , 562 N.W.2d 574 . [¶ 11] The Department’s report and notice form is. admissible as prima facie evidence of its contents once it is forwarded to the director of the Department.

2015That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” [¶ 5] ‘We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by drawing all inferences in favor of the verdict.” State v. Lusby, 1998 ND 19, ¶ 5 , 574 N.W.2d 805 (citing State v. Olson, 552 N.W.2d 362, 364 (N.D.1996)).

2015That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” [¶ 5] ‘We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by drawing all inferences in favor of the verdict.” State v. Lusby, 1998 ND 19, ¶ 5 , 574 N.W.2d 805 (citing State v. Olson, 552 N.W.2d 362, 364 (N.D.1996)).

2013III [¶8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if . . . [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if . . . [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2013III [¶ 8] The Department argues the hearing officer’s findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Painte was in actual physical control of the vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. [¶ 9] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(l)(a), a person is prohibited from being “in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if ... [t]hat person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the

2003State v. Whitney, 377 N.W.2d 132, 133 (N.D.1985) (citing State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985); State v. Gawryluk, 351 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1984); State v. Kisse, 351 N.W.2d 97 (1984)). “[T]he crime created by subsection (l)(b) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, regardless of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration.” State v. Schwab, 2003 ND 119, ¶ 8 , 665 N.W.2d 52 (citing City of Minot v. Bjelland, 452 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1990)).

2003State v. Whitney, 377 N.W.2d 132, 133 (N.D.1985) (citing State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985); State v. Gawryluk, 351 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1984); State v. Kisse, 351 N.W.2d 97 (1984)). “[T]he crime created by subsection (l)(b) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, regardless of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration.” State v. Schwab, 2003 ND 119, ¶ 8 , 665 N.W.2d 52 (citing City of Minot v. Bjelland, 452 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1990)).

2003State v. Whitney, 377 N.W.2d 132, 133 (N.D.1985) (citing State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985); State v. Gawryluk, 351 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1984); State v. Kisse, 351 N.W.2d 97 (1984)). “[T]he crime created by subsection (l)(b) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, regardless of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration.” State v. Schwab, 2003 ND 119, ¶ 8 , 665 N.W.2d 52 (citing City of Minot v. Bjelland, 452 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1990)).

2003State v. Whitney, 377 N.W.2d 132, 133 (N.D.1985) (citing State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985); State v. Gawryluk, 351 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1984); State v. Kisse, 351 N.W.2d 97 (1984)). “[T]he crime created by subsection (l)(b) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, regardless of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration.” State v. Schwab, 2003 ND 119, ¶ 8 , 665 N.W.2d 52 (citing City of Minot v. Bjelland, 452 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1990)).

1992NDCC §§ 1-02-02,1-02-03; State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d 365 (N.D.1987).

1985It is therefore of no import that the State cannot establish the test was performed within two hours of Kimball’s driving. 2 *604 In this case there was sufficient evidence, see State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.1982); Engebretson, supra, both in the form of the test results and the law enforcement officer’s testimony, that Kim-ball was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 39-08-01(l)(b). 3 Kimball’s final argument is that the results of his blood test should have been suppressed as a product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and

1985It is therefore of no import that the State cannot establish the test was performed within two hours of Kimball’s driving. 2 *604 In this case there was sufficient evidence, see State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.1982); Engebretson, supra, both in the form of the test results and the law enforcement officer’s testimony, that Kim-ball was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 39-08-01(l)(b). 3 Kimball’s final argument is that the results of his blood test should have been suppressed as a product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and