zoning ordinance challenge in New Jersey

2020Subsequently, our Supreme Court in Miah, 179 N.J. at 529 , determined N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(h) requires a landlord to provide tenants evicted because of a zoning-ordinance violation for an illegal dwelling, with a fixed amount of relocation-assistance benefits equaling six-times the monthly rent.

2009Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 6-3.3 at 143 (Gann 2008), citing Ketcherick v. Bor. of Mountain Lakes, 256 N.J.Super. 647, 657 , 607 A. 2d 1039 (App.Div.1992); Green Meadows, supra, 329 N.J.Super. at 22 , 746 A. 2d 1009 .] A C2 variance applicant must set forth what purposes of the MLUL will be advanced by granting the requested variance.

2009Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 6-3.3 at 143 (Gann 2008), citing Ketcherick v. Bor. of Mountain Lakes, 256 N.J.Super. 647, 657 , 607 A. 2d 1039 (App.Div.1992); Green Meadows, supra, 329 N.J.Super. at 22 , 746 A. 2d 1009 .] A C2 variance applicant must set forth what purposes of the MLUL will be advanced by granting the requested variance.

2009Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 6-3.3 at 143 (Gann 2008), citing Ketcherick v. Bor. of Mountain Lakes, 256 N.J.Super. 647, 657 , 607 A. 2d 1039 (App.Div.1992); Green Meadows, supra, 329 N.J.Super. at 22 , 746 A. 2d 1009 .] A C2 variance applicant must set forth what purposes of the MLUL will be advanced by granting the requested variance.

2009Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 6-3.3 at 143 (Gann 2008), citing Ketcherick v. Bor. of Mountain Lakes, 256 N.J.Super. 647, 657 , 607 A. 2d 1039 (App.Div.1992); Green Meadows, supra, 329 N.J.Super. at 22 , 746 A. 2d 1009 .] A C2 variance applicant must set forth what purposes of the MLUL will be advanced by granting the requested variance.

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2001Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance “in whole or in *290 application to any particular property” is “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.” Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., supra, 63 N.J. at 343 , 307 A.2d 563 ; accord Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 610-11 , 538 A.2d 808 ; Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 368 , 521 A.2d 841 (1987); Harvard Enters., Inc., supra,

2000In this exclusionary zoning litigation, defendants Township of West Windsor, the Township’s Mayor and Council, and its Planning Board, appeal from a judgment declaring the Township’s zoning ordinance in violation of Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 , 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).

2000In this exclusionary zoning litigation, defendants Township of West Windsor, the Township’s Mayor and Council, and its Planning Board, appeal from a judgment declaring the Township’s zoning ordinance in violation of Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158 , 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).

2000In May 1993, Toll Brothers, owner of a 293-acre tract, instituted an action seeking a site-specific builder's remedy, alleging that the Township's fair-share plan was defective due to unreasonable zoning constraints, market conditions and other factors. [2] After a lengthy trial, Judge Carchman rendered a written opinion, reported at 303 N.J.Super. 518 , 697 A. 2d 201 (Law Div.1996), declaring the Township's zoning ordinance in violation of Mount Laurel II, and awarding Toll Brothers a builder's remedy to construct a development of single-family and multiple-family dwellings, including 175 aff

2000In May 1993, Toll Brothers, owner of a 293-acre tract, instituted an action seeking a site-specific builder's remedy, alleging that the Township's fair-share plan was defective due to unreasonable zoning constraints, market conditions and other factors. [2] After a lengthy trial, Judge Carchman rendered a written opinion, reported at 303 N.J.Super. 518 , 697 A. 2d 201 (Law Div.1996), declaring the Township's zoning ordinance in violation of Mount Laurel II, and awarding Toll Brothers a builder's remedy to construct a development of single-family and multiple-family dwellings, including 175 aff

1986In Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114 (1955), Justice Heher dealt with these two sources of individual rights as one when analyzing a zoning ordinance under challenge.

1980Counsel for the Town in this case readily conceded at oral argument before us that the municipality would have done better to seek injunctive relief rather than to file a complaint in the municipal court. 3 See, e. g., Borough of Saddle River v. Bobinski, supra. Finally, we point out that the Court views with disfavor the conduct of the attorney of record for defendant.

1977The court directed that trial courts, in reviewing the constitutional validity of a local zoning ordinance, give attention "to the substance of a zoning ordinance under challenge and to bona fide efforts toward the elimination or minimization of undue cost-generating requirements in respect of reasonable areas of a developing municipality." 72 N.J. at 499 .

1972Harvard Ent., Inc. v. Board of Adj. of Madison, 56 N.J. 362, 368 (1970); Morris v. Postma, supra, 41 N.J. at 359 ; Vickers v. Township Com. of Gloucester Tp., supra, 37 N.J. at 242 ; Bogert v. Washington Tp., 25 N.J. 57, 62 (1957).

1972Harvard Ent., Inc. v. Board of Adj. of Madison, 56 N.J. 362, 368 (1970); Morris v. Postma, supra, 41 N.J. at 359 ; Vickers v. Township Com. of Gloucester Tp., supra, 37 N.J. at 242 ; Bogert v. Washington Tp., 25 N.J. 57, 62 (1957).

1962Defendant does not argue the burden of proof in a zoning ordinance violation case, but seems to assume that the rules applicable to appellate review of a non-jury civil case, *414 such as Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J.

1962Super. 436 ( App. Div. 1960), affirmed on opinion, 33 N.J. 78 (1960), apply here.