public records exception in New Mexico

2009The public records exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission of “[r]ecords, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies” that set forth “the activities of the office or agency” or “matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.” Rule ll-803(H)(l)-(2). {8} In State v. Christian, 119 N.M. 776, 778 , 895 P.2d 676, 678 (Ct.App.1995), limited on other grounds by State v. Ruiz, 120 N.M. 534,

2009The public records exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission of “[r]ecords, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies” that set forth “the activities of the office or agency” or “matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.” Rule ll-803(H)(l)-(2). {8} In State v. Christian, 119 N.M. 776, 778 , 895 P.2d 676, 678 (Ct.App.1995), limited on other grounds by State v. Ruiz, 120 N.M. 534,

2009The public records exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission of “[r]ecords, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies” that set forth “the activities of the office or agency” or “matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.” Rule ll-803(H)(l)-(2). {8} In State v. Christian, 119 N.M. 776, 778 , 895 P.2d 676, 678 (Ct.App.1995), limited on other grounds by State v. Ruiz, 120 N.M. 534,

2009The public records exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission of “[r]ecords, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies” that set forth “the activities of the office or agency” or “matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel.” Rule ll-803(H)(l)-(2). {8} In State v. Christian, 119 N.M. 776, 778 , 895 P.2d 676, 678 (Ct.App.1995), limited on other grounds by State v. Ruiz, 120 N.M. 534,

2007Defendant appears to argue that the trial court cannot admit a public record for a limited purpose because “[a] public record cannot be just half-trustworthy.” {27} The rationale behind the public records exception is that this type of record, like the exception for records made in the regular course of business, “should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness.” State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 644-45 , 556 P.2d 43, 52-53 (Ct.App.1976) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786

2007Defendant appears to argue that the trial court cannot admit a public record for a limited purpose because “[a] public record cannot be just half-trustworthy.” {27} The rationale behind the public records exception is that this type of record, like the exception for records made in the regular course of business, “should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness.” State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 644-45 , 556 P.2d 43, 52-53 (Ct.App.1976) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786

2014In doing so, the Second Circuit stated that “the language of Rule 803(8) and the congressional intent, as gleaned from the explicit language of the rule and from independent sources, . . . have impact that extends beyond the immediate confines of exception (8) itself.” Oates, 560 F.2d 45 at 66 . {22} Defendant asks this Court to apply the reasoning of Oates and hold that the bar against police reports being admitted under the public records exception should extend to preclude a police report from being read into the record as a recorded recollection.

2014In doing so, the Second Circuit stated that “the language of Rule 803(8) and the congressional intent, as gleaned from the explicit language of the rule and from independent sources, . . . have impact that extends beyond the immediate confines of exception (8) itself.” Oates, 560 F.2d 45 at 66 . {22} Defendant asks this Court to apply the reasoning of Oates and hold that the bar 9 against police reports being admitted under the public records exception should extend to preclude a police report from being read into the record as a recorded recollection.

2007Defendant appears to argue that the trial court cannot admit a public record for a limited purpose because “[a] public record cannot be just half-trustworthy.” {27} The rationale behind the public records exception is that this type of record, like the exception for records made in the regular course of business, “should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness.” State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 644-45 , 556 P.2d 43, 52-53 (Ct.App.1976) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786

2007Defendant appears to argue that the trial court cannot admit a public record for a limited purpose because “[a] public record cannot be just half-trustworthy.” {27} The rationale behind the public records exception is that this type of record, like the exception for records made in the regular course of business, “should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness.” State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 644-45 , 556 P.2d 43, 52-53 (Ct.App.1976) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786

2010We further noted that in Dedman the Court held that the report was admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay prohibition and did not constitute testimonial evidence, and we concluded, “[a]s did the Dedman Court, ... that Defendant’s right of confrontation provided no basis for exclusion of the ... report.” Nez, No. 26,811, slip op. at 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 24, 30, 45 , 136 N.M. 561 , 102 P.3d 628 .

2010We further noted that in Dedman the Court held that the report was admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay prohibition and did not constitute testimonial evidence, and we concluded, “[a]s did the Dedman Court, ... that Defendant’s right of confrontation provided no basis for exclusion of the ... report.” Nez, No. 26,811, slip op. at 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 24, 30, 45 , 136 N.M. 561 , 102 P.3d 628 .

2019See NMSA 1978, § 40-13-2(D)(1) (2018, amended 2019) (defining “domestic abuse” to include “an incident of stalking or sexual assault whether committed by a household member or not”); NMSA 1978, § 40-13-5(A) (2008, amended 2019) (explaining that orders of protection are to be entered upon finding or stipulation that domestic abuse has occurred); see, e.g., Best v. Marino, 2017-NMCA-073, ¶ 17 , 404 P.3d 450 (illustrating).

2012See State v. Litteral, 110 N.M. 138 , 8 141, 793 P.2d 268, 271 (1990) (“Evidence inadmissible for one purpose may be 9 admissible for other purposes under a different rule of evidence.”). 10 ISSUE 4 11 Defendant continues to claim that the district court erred by ruling that he 12 opened the door to his character when he stated “I won’t do that” in reference to 13 drinking and driving. [DS 5; MIO 3, 16] Defendant has suggested that this is a 14 reference to future behavior, not past behavior.

2012See State v. Litteral, 110 N.M. 138 , 8 141, 793 P.2d 268, 271 (1990) (“Evidence inadmissible for one purpose may be 9 admissible for other purposes under a different rule of evidence.”). 10 ISSUE 4 11 Defendant continues to claim that the district court erred by ruling that he 12 opened the door to his character when he stated “I won’t do that” in reference to 13 drinking and driving. [DS 5; MIO 3, 16] Defendant has suggested that this is a 14 reference to future behavior, not past behavior.

2012See State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 38 , 4 1 141 N.M. 53 , 150 P.3d 1003 (noting that we will uphold the decision of a district court 2 if it is right for any reason). 3 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant argues that the 911 call did not 4 constitute a statement of identity for purposes of making it admissible as non-hearsay 5 under Rule 11-801(D)(1)(c) NMRA. [MIO 14-15] We do not deem it necessary to 6 consider whether the evidence was admissible under this alternative theory because 7 it was admissible as a public records exception.

2012See State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 38 , 4 1 141 N.M. 53 , 150 P.3d 1003 (noting that we will uphold the decision of a district court 2 if it is right for any reason). 3 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant argues that the 911 call did not 4 constitute a statement of identity for purposes of making it admissible as non-hearsay 5 under Rule 11-801(D)(1)(c) NMRA. [MIO 14-15] We do not deem it necessary to 6 consider whether the evidence was admissible under this alternative theory because 7 it was admissible as a public records exception.

2010Defendant cited State v. Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, ¶ 24 , 136 N.M. 561 , 17 102 P.3d 628 , overruled by State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007 , 147 N.M 487, 226 18 P.3d 1 , for the proposition that toxicology reports are admissible under the business 19 records and public records exceptions to the hearsay rule.

2010See Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, ¶ 16 ; see also State 11 v. Aragon, 2010-NMSC-008, ¶ 17 , 147 N.M. 474 , 225 P.3d 1280 .

2010See Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, ¶ 16 ; see also State 11 v. Aragon, 2010-NMSC-008, ¶ 17 , 147 N.M. 474 , 225 P.3d 1280 .

2010See Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007, ¶ 16 ; see also State 11 v. Aragon, 2010-NMSC-008, ¶ 17 , 147 N.M. 474 , 225 P.3d 1280 .

2007Defendant appears to argue that the trial court cannot admit a public record for a limited purpose because “[a] public record cannot be just half-trustworthy.” {27} The rationale behind the public records exception is that this type of record, like the exception for records made in the regular course of business, “should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness.” State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 644-45 , 556 P.2d 43, 52-53 (Ct.App.1976) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786

2007Defendant appears to argue that the trial court cannot admit a public record for a limited purpose because “[a] public record cannot be just half-trustworthy.” {27} The rationale behind the public records exception is that this type of record, like the exception for records made in the regular course of business, “should be admissible despite the hearsay rule where the sources of information and the method of preparation indicate trustworthiness.” State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 644-45 , 556 P.2d 43, 52-53 (Ct.App.1976) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786

2004Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (“Properly administered the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions”) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Hemandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The public records exception is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”).

1998See Rule 11-803(H); Ramirez, 89 N.M. at 645 , 556 P.2d at 53 (admission pursuant to the public records exception does not require the testimony of custodian or other qualified witness); Christian, 119 N.M. at 781-82 , 895 P.2d at 681-82 (blood-alcohol test admitted pursuant to public records hearsay exception); see also United States v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1988) (actual results of the breathalyser test admissible pursuant to public records exception); State v. Smith, 66 Or.App. 703 , 675 P.2d 510 (1984) (certificates of breathalyser machine inspections admissible pursuant to pu