adjournment of the dispositional hearing in New York

2022The court providently exercised its discretion in denying respondent's request for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing in that she provided no legal excuse for her failure to appear either by telephone or virtually, and it was not in the best interests of the children to protract the proceedings ( Matter of Nautica Skyy W. [Amber NY-Cole W.], 198 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2021]; see Matter of Steven B. , 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]).

2022The court providently exercised its discretion in denying respondent's request for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing in that she provided no legal excuse for her failure to appear either by telephone or virtually, and it was not in the best interests of the children to protract the proceedings ( Matter of Nautica Skyy W. [Amber NY-Cole W.], 198 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2021]; see Matter of Steven B. , 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]).

2014Family Court Act § 1048 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may adjourn a . . . dispositional hearing for good cause shown ... on motion of . . . the parent or other person legally responsible for the care of the child.” The granting of an adjournment for any purpose rests in the sound discretion of the hearing court upon a balanced consideration of all relevant factors (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Kinara C. [Jerome C.], 89 AD3d 839, 841 [2011]; Matter of Duane S., Jr. [Duane S.], 88 AD3d 727, 728 [2011]).

2014Family Court Act § 1048 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may adjourn a . . . dispositional hearing for good cause shown ... on motion of . . . the parent or other person legally responsible for the care of the child.” The granting of an adjournment for any purpose rests in the sound discretion of the hearing court upon a balanced consideration of all relevant factors (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Kinara C. [Jerome C.], 89 AD3d 839, 841 [2011]; Matter of Duane S., Jr. [Duane S.], 88 AD3d 727, 728 [2011]).

2014Family Court Act § 1048 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may adjourn a . . . dispositional hearing for good cause shown ... on motion of . . . the parent or other person legally responsible for the care of the child.” The granting of an adjournment for any purpose rests in the sound discretion of the hearing court upon a balanced consideration of all relevant factors (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Kinara C. [Jerome C.], 89 AD3d 839, 841 [2011]; Matter of Duane S., Jr. [Duane S.], 88 AD3d 727, 728 [2011]).

2014Family Court Act § 1048 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may adjourn a . . . dispositional hearing for good cause shown ... on motion of . . . the parent or other person legally responsible for the care of the child.” The granting of an adjournment for any purpose rests in the sound discretion of the hearing court upon a balanced consideration of all relevant factors (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Kinara C. [Jerome C.], 89 AD3d 839, 841 [2011]; Matter of Duane S., Jr. [Duane S.], 88 AD3d 727, 728 [2011]).

2011The Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the mother’s motion for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing (see Matter of Nicholas S., 46 AD3d 830 [2007]; Matter of Venditto v Davis, 39 AD3d at 555 ; Matter of Paulino v Camacho, 36 AD3d at 822 ; Matter of Sicurella v Embro, 31 AD3d at 651 ).

2007The Family Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying the application of the mother’s attorney for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing (see Matter of Venditto v Davis, 39 AD3d 555 [2007]; Matter of Paulino v Camacho, 36 AD3d 821, 822 [2007]; Matter of Sicurella v Embro, 31 AD3d 651 [2006]; cf. Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 283 [1984]; Matter of Hogan v Hogan, 271 AD2d 533 [2000]).

2026To the extent that the mother contends otherwise in appeal No. 1, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her attorney's request for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing ( see Matter of Brandon I.J. [Daisy D.] , 198 AD3d 1310, 1310 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 901 [2022]; Matter of Jazmine M. [Willie R.] , 185 AD3d 1457, 1458 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 902 [2020]).

2026Finally, contrary to the mother's contention in appeal No. 1, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her attorney's request for a suspended judgment ( see Brandon I.J. , 198 AD3d at 1311 ).

2026To the extent that the mother contends otherwise in appeal No. 1, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her attorney's request for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing ( see Matter of Brandon I.J. [Daisy D.] , 198 AD3d 1310, 1310 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 901 [2022]; Matter of Jazmine M. [Willie R.] , 185 AD3d 1457, 1458 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 902 [2020]).

2020Initially, we conclude that the father preserved his contention inasmuch as he requested the adjournment ( cf. Matter of Jaydalee P. [Codilee R.] , 156 AD3d 1477, 1477 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 904 [2018]; see generally Matter of Cassini , 182 AD3d 1 , 5-8 [2d Dept 2020]).

2016The court properly denied respondent’s request, through her attorney, for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing since her explanation for not being present, that she missed her train, was unsupported by any additional detail, and she had a history of failing to appear at visitations and other meetings connected with the proceedings (see Matter of VanSkiver v Clancy, 128 AD3d 1408 [4th Dept 2015]; Matter of Jaynices D. [Yesenia Del V.], 67 AD3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2009]).

2011Contrary to the father’s contention, we find no basis to disturb the Family Court’s determination to place the subject children under the supervision of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services, subject to certain conditions (see generally Matter of Roland Noele B., 66 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2009]; Matter of Heidi S., 151 AD2d 578, 579 [1989]).

2011Ordered that mother’s appeal from so much of as the order as placed the subject children under the supervision of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services, subject to certain conditions, is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a portion of an order entered on the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Samantha B. [Arthur Eugene SJ, 72 AD3d 682, 683 [2010]; Matter of Geraldine Rose W., 196 AD2d 313 [1994]); and it is further, Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed on the mother’s appeal and insofar as appealed from by the father, without costs or disbursem

2011Contrary to the father’s contention, we find no basis to disturb the Family Court’s determination to place the subject children under the supervision of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services, subject to certain conditions (see generally Matter of Roland Noele B., 66 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2009]; Matter of Heidi S., 151 AD2d 578, 579 [1989]).

2010In simply not appearing at the scheduled hearing, respondent failed to demonstrate the required “good cause” for such an adjournment (Family Ct Act § 626 [a]; see Matter of Shawna U., 277 AD2d 731, 734 [2000]; Matter of Noele D., 209 AD2d 828, 829 [1994]).

2010In simply not appearing at the scheduled hearing, respondent failed to demonstrate the required “good cause” for such an adjournment (Family Ct Act § 626 [a]; see Matter of Shawna U., 277 AD2d 731, 734 [2000]; Matter of Noele D., 209 AD2d 828, 829 [1994]).

2009Family Court properly denied respondent’s request for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing that resulted in the termination of her parental rights to Myra, Shakira and Jaynices, since respondent’s need for an adjournment arose from her own conduct (see Matter of Steven B., 24 AD3d 384, 385 [2005], affd 6 NY3d 888 [2006]).

2009Respondent’s challenge to the court’s denial of his request for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing is academic, as the order of disposition has expired by its own terms (see Matter of Vincent L., 46 AD3d 395, 396 [2007]).

2009While age is a factor to be considered, it is not the only or, necessarily, a dispositive factor in determining whether a child’s best interests would be served by the adoption (see Matter of Jennifer A., 225 AD2d 204, 207 [1996], lv denied 91 NY2d 809 [1998]).

2007In light of the mother’s history of nonappearance for at least two prior court dates and her knowledge of the hearing date (see Matter of Starcy G., 13 AD3d 532, 532-533 [2004]), the Family Court properly proceeded with the dispositional hearing in the mother’s absence (see Family Ct Act § 1042).

2007The Family Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying the application of the mother’s attorney for an adjournment of the dispositional hearing (see Matter of Venditto v Davis, 39 AD3d 555 [2007]; Matter of Paulino v Camacho, 36 AD3d 821, 822 [2007]; Matter of Sicurella v Embro, 31 AD3d 651 [2006]; cf. Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 283 [1984]; Matter of Hogan v Hogan, 271 AD2d 533 [2000]).

1976(Family Ct. Act, § 749, subd [c]; see, also, Zirn v Bradley, 270 App Div 829 ; and Matter of Case, 24 AD2d 797 .) No appeal has been taken from the determination adjudging appellant a juvenile delinquent.