defendant asserting claim in New York

2009The defendant challenged pursuant to Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 [1986]), arguing that, since the prospective juror might be expected to favor the' prosecution due to his law enforcement background, an inference should be drawn that he was stricken because of his race, The trial court held that the defendant failed to meet his burden under the first step of Batson because he had not demonstrated a pattern of discrimination, and denied the defendant’s challenge. “[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors* under Batson , a defendant asserting a cla

2007In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors under Batson , a defendant asserting a claim must show that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution removes one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that facts and other relevant circumstances support a finding that the use of these peremptory challenges excludes potential jurors because of their race (see People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 507 [2002]).

1999A defendant asserting a claim of unlawful discrimination under Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 ), bears the initial burden of demonstrating, inter alia, “facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 ; see, Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 96-98; see also, People v Smith, 81 NY2d 875, 876 ).

1997A defendant asserting a claim of unlawful discrimination under Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 ), bears the initial burden of demonstrating, inter alia, “facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 ; Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 96-98 ; see also, People v Smith, 81 NY2d 875, 876 ).

2020"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors under Batson v Kentucky , the defendant asserting the claim of unlawful discrimination must show that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to remove one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that there exist facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race'" ( People v Jenkins , 84 NY2d 1001, 1002 [citation omitted], quoting People v Childress , 81 NY2d

2002It is well settled that, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors under Batson , a defendant asserting a claim must show that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution removes one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that facts and other relevant circumstances support a finding that the use of these peremptory challenges excludes potential jurors because of their race (see People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 [1993]).

2009The defendant challenged pursuant to Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 [1986]), arguing that, since the prospective juror might be expected to favor the' prosecution due to his law enforcement background, an inference should be drawn that he was stricken because of his race, The trial court held that the defendant failed to meet his burden under the first step of Batson because he had not demonstrated a pattern of discrimination, and denied the defendant’s challenge. “[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors* under Batson , a defendant asserting a cla

2009The defendant challenged pursuant to Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 [1986]), arguing that, since the prospective juror might be expected to favor the' prosecution due to his law enforcement background, an inference should be drawn that he was stricken because of his race, The trial court held that the defendant failed to meet his burden under the first step of Batson because he had not demonstrated a pattern of discrimination, and denied the defendant’s challenge. “[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors* under Batson , a defendant asserting a cla

2020"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors under Batson v Kentucky , the defendant asserting the claim of unlawful discrimination must show that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to remove one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that there exist facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race'" ( People v Jenkins , 84 NY2d 1001, 1002 [citation omitted], quoting People v Childress , 81 NY2d

2020"It is not until that prima facie showing has been made that the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with [*2]a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges" ( People v Jenkins , 84 NY2d at 1002-1003 ).

2011The right to effective assistance of counsel “does not guarantee a perfect trial,” and the defendant bringing such a claim bears a “high burden of showing that he was deprived of a fair trial and meaningful representation” (People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184, 187, 189 [1994]).

2011A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance must demonstrate that his attorney failed to provide “meaningful representation” (People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]).

2009Here, the defendant met his burden by establishing objective facts indicating that the prosecutor had challenged a member of a particular racial group who might be expected to favor the prosecution because of his background (see People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 324 [1992]; People v Scott, 70 NY2d 420, 425 [1987]).

2009Here, the defendant met his burden by establishing objective facts indicating that the prosecutor had challenged a member of a particular racial group who might be expected to favor the prosecution because of his background (see People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 324 [1992]; People v Scott, 70 NY2d 420, 425 [1987]).

2007The mere fact that the prosecutor exercised 5 out of 12 peremptory challenges against Hispanic or African-American women was insufficient to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see People v Brown, supra at 507; People v Fryar, 29 AD3d 919, 920 [2006]; People v Stanley, 292 AD2d 472, 473 [2002]; People v Harrison, 272 AD2d 554 [2000]; People v Phillips, 259 AD2d 565 [1999]).

2007The mere fact that the prosecutor exercised 5 out of 12 peremptory challenges against Hispanic or African-American women was insufficient to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see People v Brown, supra at 507; People v Fryar, 29 AD3d 919, 920 [2006]; People v Stanley, 292 AD2d 472, 473 [2002]; People v Harrison, 272 AD2d 554 [2000]; People v Phillips, 259 AD2d 565 [1999]).

1993First, a defendant asserting a claim under the Batson formula must present a prima facie case by showing that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to remove one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that there exist facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race (Batson v Kentucky, supra, at 96-98; People v Jenkins, 75 NY2d 550, 555-556 , supra; see, Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400 , supra).