14 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1954–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zuliani v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669 ; Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. 2012See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 2.03 (c), 9.02, 9.31, 9.32 (West 2011); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Langford v. Kraftgreen2 sentences1979Langford v. Kraft (Beaumont Tex.Civ.App.1973) 498 S.W.2d 42, 50 , NRE; Sanderlin v. Dransfield, cited supra; Vol. 1, McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, (1965), “Venue”, Section 4.17.1, p. 473. 1978Langford v. Craft, 498 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.). | 1 | 4 |
Matlock, Marcus Dewaynegreen1 sentence2016See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669 ; Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Cousin v. Smallgreen1 sentence2006At the summary judgment stage of a section 1983 action, “a defendant asserting immunity is not required to establish the defense beyond peradventure, as he would have to do for other affirmative defenses.” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir.2003) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
James v. Dryegreen2 sentences1973Insofar as any factual differences exist in the record, we will follow the rule announced in James v. Drye, 159 Tex. 321 , 320 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1959): “On appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege every reasonable intendment must be resolved in favor of the trial court’s judgment.” Subdivision 9, Art. 1995, permits the maintenance of a suit in the county where the trespass was committed by the defendant; and “ [u]pon the venue hearing, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that a trespass has been committed; (b) that it was committed in the county of suit; a 1973Insofar as any factual differences exist in the record, we will follow the rule announced in James v. Drye, 159 Tex. 321 , 320 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1959): “On appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege every reasonable intendment must be resolved in favor of the trial court’s judgment.” Subdivision 9, Art. 1995, permits the maintenance of a suit in the county where the trespass was committed by the defendant; and “ [u]pon the venue hearing, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that a trespass has been committed; (b) that it was committed in the county of suit; a | 1 | 1 |
Federal Mortgage Co. v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence1973In Meredith v. McClendon, 130 Tex. 527 , 111 S.W.2d 1062, 1065 (1938), the Court held that the act complained of “ ‘must be committed willfully, or the injury inflicted intentionally .... | 1 | 1 |
Lusk v. Onstottgreen1 sentence1973Insofar as any factual differences exist in the record, we will follow the rule announced in James v. Drye, 159 Tex. 321 , 320 S.W.2d 319, 323 (1959): “On appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege every reasonable intendment must be resolved in favor of the trial court’s judgment.” Subdivision 9, Art. 1995, permits the maintenance of a suit in the county where the trespass was committed by the defendant; and “ [u]pon the venue hearing, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that a trespass has been committed; (b) that it was committed in the county of suit; a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morriss v. Enron Oil & Gas Co.
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Industrial Supply Co. v. Stockton Oil Co.
neutral
1 sentence1977To sustain venue in Bexar County under Subd. 9, appellees had the burden of showing: (1) a trespass has been committed; (2) it was committed in the county of the suit; (3) the defendant asserting his privilege committed the act, or the act was committed by another under circumstances that made the defendant legally responsible. 1 McDonald Texas Civil Practice § 4.17.1, pp. 442, 443; Sanderlin v. Dransfield, 523 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1975, no writ); Industrial Supply Co. v. Stockton Oil Co., 408 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1966, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sanderlin v. Dransfield
neutral
1 sentence1977To sustain venue in Bexar County under Subd. 9, appellees had the burden of showing: (1) a trespass has been committed; (2) it was committed in the county of the suit; (3) the defendant asserting his privilege committed the act, or the act was committed by another under circumstances that made the defendant legally responsible. 1 McDonald Texas Civil Practice § 4.17.1, pp. 442, 443; Sanderlin v. Dransfield, 523 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1975, no writ); Industrial Supply Co. v. Stockton Oil Co., 408 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1966, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Meredith v. McClendon
green
1 sentence1973In Meredith v. McClendon, 130 Tex. 527 , 111 S.W.2d 1062, 1065 (1938), the Court held that the act complained of “ ‘must be committed willfully, or the injury inflicted intentionally .... | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Gilley v. Morse
green
1 sentence1968The court held that plaintiffs had failed to prove by competent evidence that they had in fact a bona fide cause of action against the resident defendants. 375 S.W.2d 569, 570 , col. 1. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Keeney v. Coffee
neutral
1 sentence1954But the opposite result is settled.” In his 1954 cumulative supplement to the same work, the author has the following to say about the case of Kee-ney v. Coffee, supra: “Plaintiff alleged that the defendant asserting his privilege and the defendants resident in the county were partners. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.