forensic analysis in Ohio

2020Id. {¶19} Thereafter, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 663-65 , 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), the Court held admission of the report of a defendant's blood-alcohol level violated the defendant's right to confront the analyst who prepared the report.

2014The court also held that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in admitting the autopsy report because Crawford had indicated that "business records are, 'by their nature,' not testimonial" and thus were admissible, id. at ¶ 81, and that "[a]n autopsy report prepared by a medical examiner and documenting objective findings, is the 'quintessential business record.'" Id. at ¶ 82, quoting Rollins v. State, 161 Md.App. 34, 81 (2005). {¶ 38} After Craig was decided, the United States Supreme Court decided Melendez- Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 , in which the court held that three notarized certificates of a

2023Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). “[T]he admission of a testimonial hearsay statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the Sixth Amendment unless (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2014-Ohio-1914 , 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 173 , citing Crawford at 68 .

2023Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). “[T]he admission of a testimonial hearsay statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the Sixth Amendment unless (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2014-Ohio-1914 , 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 173 , citing Crawford at 68 .

2023Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). “[T]he admission of a testimonial hearsay statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the Sixth Amendment unless (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2014-Ohio-1914 , 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 173 , citing Crawford at 68 .

2023Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). “[T]he admission of a testimonial hearsay statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the Sixth Amendment unless (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2014-Ohio-1914 , 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 173 , citing Crawford at 68 .

2019(Emphasis added). {¶ 52} “ ‘As an initial matter, the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross- examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’ State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 , 613 N.E.2d 225 , citing State v. Thompson (1987), 33 -27- Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407 .” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67 , 2011-Ohio- 6524, 960 N.E.2d 955 , ¶ 66.

2019(Emphasis added). {¶ 52} “ ‘As an initial matter, the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross- examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’ State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 , 613 N.E.2d 225 , citing State v. Thompson (1987), 33 -27- Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407 .” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67 , 2011-Ohio- 6524, 960 N.E.2d 955 , ¶ 66.

2019(Emphasis added). {¶ 52} “ ‘As an initial matter, the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross- examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’ State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 , 613 N.E.2d 225 , citing State v. Thompson (1987), 33 -27- Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407 .” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67 , 2011-Ohio- 6524, 960 N.E.2d 955 , ¶ 66.

2019(Emphasis added). {¶ 52} “ ‘As an initial matter, the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross- examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’ State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 , 613 N.E.2d 225 , citing State v. Thompson (1987), 33 -27- Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407 .” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67 , 2011-Ohio- 6524, 960 N.E.2d 955 , ¶ 66.

2019(Emphasis added). {¶ 52} “ ‘As an initial matter, the failure to call an expert and instead rely on cross- examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’ State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 , 613 N.E.2d 225 , citing State v. Thompson (1987), 33 -27- Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11, 514 N.E.2d 407 .” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67 , 2011-Ohio- 6524, 960 N.E.2d 955 , ¶ 66.

2016Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00069 33 {¶108} If the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of an offense, it is not necessary for “‘such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.’” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272 , 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value [.]’” Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2016Stark County, Case No. 2016CA00069 33 {¶108} If the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of an offense, it is not necessary for “‘such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.’” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272 , 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value [.]’” Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2014Being “quite plainly affidavits,” they constituted testimonial statements because they were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ” Id. at 310-311 , quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).

2014Being “quite plainly affidavits,” they constituted testimonial statements because they were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ” Id. at 310-311 , quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).

2006Moreover, "whether an offender is `likely to reoffend sexually' is not bound by or couched in terms of recidivism test results, but is instead defined by the application and examination of statutory factors and consideration of relevant circumstances and evidence on a case-by-case basis." Robertson, 147 Ohio App.3d at 102 . {¶ 20} In explaining its finding, the trial court chose to accept Mr. Morrison's clinical opinion over the forensic test results, stating: The court finds that it is the opinion of Mr. Morrison that in spite of the test results that would indicate that the defendant is in a

2006He contends that the trial court effectively ignored the forensic test results that indicated he was at a low risk level to reoffend. {¶ 19} In making a sexual predator determination, "courts are generally free to accept or reject the entirety or portions of a psychologist's conclusions." State v. Robertson, 147 Ohio App.3d 94 , 101 .

2005Further, the record does not contain any support for Appellant's argument that evidence was withheld when in fact the testing did not occur given Appellant's defense of consensual sex. {¶ 13} We note that within Appellant's first assignment of error he also argues that the State's "concealment of the forensic test results and latent fingerprints recovered from the gun used as an exhibit in the Appellant's trial are obvious Brady violations" under Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 .

2005Further, the record does not contain any support for Appellant's argument that evidence was withheld when in fact the testing did not occur given Appellant's defense of consensual sex. {¶ 13} We note that within Appellant's first assignment of error he also argues that the State's "concealment of the forensic test results and latent fingerprints recovered from the gun used as an exhibit in the Appellant's trial are obvious Brady violations" under Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 .