plea or sentencing hearing in Ohio

2019State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013-Ohio-4982 , 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 11} First, Jeffery argues that a remand is necessary because the trial court decided the merger issue “prior to hearing any facts regarding the offenses.” The allied- offense analysis is “[a]t its heart * * * dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26. 6. {¶ 12} In this case, the state provided a summary of the evidence against Jeffery during the sentencing hearing, which is appr

2019State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013-Ohio-4982 , 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 11} First, Jeffery argues that a remand is necessary because the trial court decided the merger issue “prior to hearing any facts regarding the offenses.” The allied- offense analysis is “[a]t its heart * * * dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26. 6. {¶ 12} In this case, the state provided a summary of the evidence against Jeffery during the sentencing hearing, which is appr

2024Thus, the trial court should not vacate or dismiss the guilt determination. 2010-Ohio-2, ¶26 .

2024Thus, the trial court should not vacate or dismiss the guilt determination. 2010-Ohio-2, ¶26 .

2023Different results are permissible because “the statute instructs courts to examine a defendant’s conduct—an inherently subjective determination.” Id., quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , ¶ 52 (plurality opinion per Brown, C.J.). {¶ 11} Initially, we observe that while Witcher Smith filed a sentencing memorandum and argued at sentencing that the convictions should merge for purposes of sentencing, he failed to present the facts of the case—either at the plea hearing, in his memorandum, or at the sentencing hearing—other than to briefly state that th

2023Different results are permissible because “the statute instructs courts to examine a defendant’s conduct—an inherently subjective determination.” Id., quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , ¶ 52 (plurality opinion per Brown, C.J.). {¶ 11} Initially, we observe that while Witcher Smith filed a sentencing memorandum and argued at sentencing that the convictions should merge for purposes of sentencing, he failed to present the facts of the case—either at the plea hearing, in his memorandum, or at the sentencing hearing—other than to briefly state that th

2021“The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the offenses have similar import.” Id. {¶ 98} With regard to animus, “ ‘[w]here an individual’s immediate motive involves the commission of one offense, but in the course of committing that crime he must, [a] priori, commit another, then he may well possess but a single animus, and in that event may be convicted of only one crime.’ ” State v. Ramey, 2015-Ohio-5389 , 55 N.E.3d 542 , ¶ 70 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 , 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).

2021“The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the offenses have similar import.” Id. {¶ 98} With regard to animus, “ ‘[w]here an individual’s immediate motive involves the commission of one offense, but in the course of committing that crime he must, [a] priori, commit another, then he may well possess but a single animus, and in that event may be convicted of only one crime.’ ” State v. Ramey, 2015-Ohio-5389 , 55 N.E.3d 542 , ¶ 70 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 , 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).

2021Butler No. CA2018-10-200, 2019-Ohio-3317, ¶ 29 , quoting Ruff at ¶ 26. {¶ 15} Suder pled guilty to one count of trafficking in persons.

2021Butler No. CA2014-12-256, 2015-Ohio-4649, ¶ 40 , quoting Ruff at ¶ 31. "'The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the offenses have similar import.'" State v. Slamka, 12th Dist.

2021“The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the offenses have similar import.” Id. {¶ 98} With regard to animus, “ ‘[w]here an individual’s immediate motive involves the commission of one offense, but in the course of committing that crime he must, [a] priori, commit another, then he may well possess but a single animus, and in that event may be convicted of only one crime.’ ” State v. Ramey, 2015-Ohio-5389 , 55 N.E.3d 542 , ¶ 70 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 , 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).

2021“The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the offenses have similar import.” Id. {¶ 98} With regard to animus, “ ‘[w]here an individual’s immediate motive involves the commission of one offense, but in the course of committing that crime he must, [a] priori, commit another, then he may well possess but a single animus, and in that event may be convicted of only one crime.’ ” State v. Ramey, 2015-Ohio-5389 , 55 N.E.3d 542 , ¶ 70 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 , 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).

2021In other words, “[i]f the defendant acted with the same purpose, intent, or motive in both instances, the animus is identical for both offenses.” State v. Hudson, 2013-Ohio-2351 , 993 N.E.2d 443 , ¶ 54 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Lewis, 12th Dist.

2019State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013-Ohio-4982 , 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 11} First, Jeffery argues that a remand is necessary because the trial court decided the merger issue “prior to hearing any facts regarding the offenses.” The allied- offense analysis is “[a]t its heart * * * dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26. 6. {¶ 12} In this case, the state provided a summary of the evidence against Jeffery during the sentencing hearing, which is appr

2019State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013-Ohio-4982 , 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 11} First, Jeffery argues that a remand is necessary because the trial court decided the merger issue “prior to hearing any facts regarding the offenses.” The allied- offense analysis is “[a]t its heart * * * dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26. 6. {¶ 12} In this case, the state provided a summary of the evidence against Jeffery during the sentencing hearing, which is appr

2019State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 12 . {¶ 10} Appellant was sentenced on two counts of possession of heroin in the fifth degree.

2019State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 12 . {¶ 10} Appellant was sentenced on two counts of possession of heroin in the fifth degree.

2017Hamilton No. C-120483, 2013-Ohio-1626 , 2013 WL 1750454 , ¶ 12-14 (finding no abuse of discretion in discounting the credibility of exculpatory affidavits of victim and her mother, and in deciding the Crim.R. 32.1 motion without a hearing, when defendant acknowledged "fault" and apologized at sentencing and did not assert his innocence at the plea or sentencing hearing or in a direct appeal). {¶ 40} And we conclude that the court abused its discretion in deciding West's Crim.R. 32.1 motion in a "paper hearing[ ]." See Calhoun at 285, 714 N.E.2d 905 .