allied offenses analysis in Ohio

2025An allied-offenses analysis must be driven by the facts of each case. “[T]he analysis must focus on the defendant's conduct to determine whether one or more convictions may result, because an offense may be committed in a variety of ways and the offenses committed may have different import.” Id. {¶8} There are two circumstances in which offenses will be deemed dissimilar in import, making sentences for multiple counts permissible.

2021In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892 , the Ohio Supreme Court explained that an allied offenses analysis is not limited to consideration of the defendant’s conduct.

2022This court’s original allied-offenses test implicitly incorporates the analysis set forth in Blockburger: if a defendant is found guilty of two offenses and both offenses do not contain an element distinct from the other, then the commission of the one offense must necessarily result in the commission of the other. {¶ 50} In short, R.C. 2941.25(B) provides “a clear indication of the General Assembly’s intent to permit cumulative sentencing for the commission of (1) offenses of dissimilar import and (2) offenses of similar import committed separately or with separate animus.” State v. Brown, 11

2022This court’s original allied-offenses test implicitly incorporates the analysis set forth in Blockburger: if a defendant is found guilty of two offenses and both offenses do not contain an element distinct from the other, then the commission of the one offense must necessarily result in the commission of the other. {¶ 50} In short, R.C. 2941.25(B) provides “a clear indication of the General Assembly’s intent to permit cumulative sentencing for the commission of (1) offenses of dissimilar import and (2) offenses of similar import committed separately or with separate animus.” State v. Brown, 11

2025State v. Washington, 2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 18 . {¶8} When a defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses, courts apply the allied offenses analysis in R.C. 2941.25 to determine if the offenses merge or if the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses.

2025Id. {¶32} When a defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses, courts apply the allied offenses analysis in R.C. 2941.25 to determine if the offenses merge or if the defendant may be convicted of separate offenses.

2020State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013- Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 75} We review de novo a trial court’s ruling as to whether convictions merge under the allied-offenses doctrine.

2018State v. Washington , 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013-Ohio-4982 , 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni , 33 Ohio St.3d 65 , 67, 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 83} We review de novo a trial court's ruling as to whether convictions merge under the allied-offenses doctrine.

2024Different results are permissible because “‘the statute instructs courts to examine a defendant’s conduct—an inherently subjective determination.’” Id. {¶ 205} In State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126 (1979), the Supreme Court provided guidelines for determining whether kidnapping and another offense are allied offenses.

2019“Where an individual’s immediate motive involves the commission of one offense, but in the course of committing that crime he must, [a] priori, commit another, then he may well possess but a single animus, and in that event may be convicted of only one crime.” Id. at 131 . {¶ 44} As previously noted, Cargle contends that his convictions for rape, kidnapping to engage in sexual activity, and kidnapping to facilitate a felony or flight thereafter should have merged pursuant to the allied-offenses doctrine.

2023Pleading guilty as charged also did not impair Buckhannon’s ability to raise an allied-offense argument. “[I]n determining whether convictions are for allied offenses of similar import, finding factual guilt of each offense is a prerequisite to merger, and thus, an allied offenses claim is -8- consistent with an admission of guilt and therefore is not waived by pleading guilty to offenses that might be allied offenses of similar import.” State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385 , 2015-Ohio-2459 , 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 19 . {¶ 17} Finally, on the record before us we see no reasonable probability that the

2023Pleading guilty as charged also did not impair Buckhannon’s ability to raise an allied-offense argument. “[I]n determining whether convictions are for allied offenses of similar import, finding factual guilt of each offense is a prerequisite to merger, and thus, an allied offenses claim is -8- consistent with an admission of guilt and therefore is not waived by pleading guilty to offenses that might be allied offenses of similar import.” State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385 , 2015-Ohio-2459 , 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 19 . {¶ 17} Finally, on the record before us we see no reasonable probability that the

2018State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28 . {¶31} Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A), “[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, * * * the defendant may be convicted of only one.” {¶32} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 30-31 , the Ohio Supreme Court detailed the allied offenses analysis: Rather than compare the elements of two offenses to determine whether they are allied offenses of similar import, the analysis must focus on the defendant’s conduct to

2018State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482 , 2012-Ohio-5699 , 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28 . {¶31} Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A), “[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, * * * the defendant may be convicted of only one.” {¶32} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 30-31 , the Ohio Supreme Court detailed the allied offenses analysis: Rather than compare the elements of two offenses to determine whether they are allied offenses of similar import, the analysis must focus on the defendant’s conduct to

2026State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459 , ¶ 19; State v. Folk, 2020-Ohio-4373, ¶ 22 .

2026State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459 , ¶ 19; State v. Folk, 2020-Ohio-4373, ¶ 22 .

2020State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013- Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 75} We review de novo a trial court’s ruling as to whether convictions merge under the allied-offenses doctrine.

2020State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013- Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 75} We review de novo a trial court’s ruling as to whether convictions merge under the allied-offenses doctrine.

2014State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264-265 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001), citing State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681 , 687 N.E.2d 1358 (1998); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117 , 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). {¶45} Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , which instructed the court to look to the defendant’s conduct in the particular case under the first prong, does not change the analysis.

2014State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264-265 , 2001-Ohio-1340 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 , citing State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681 , 1998-Ohio-171 , 687 N.E.2d 1358 ; State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117 , 1997-Ohio-355 , 684 N.E.2d 668 . {¶22} Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , which instructed the court to look to the defendant’s conduct in the particular case under the first prong, does not change the analysis.

2014State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264-265 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001), citing State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681 , 687 N.E.2d 1358 (1998); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117 , 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). {¶45} Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , which instructed the court to look to the defendant’s conduct in the particular case under the first prong, does not change the analysis.

2014State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264-265 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001), citing State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681 , 687 N.E.2d 1358 (1998); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117 , 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). {¶45} Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , which instructed the court to look to the defendant’s conduct in the particular case under the first prong, does not change the analysis.

2014State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264-265 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001), citing State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681 , 687 N.E.2d 1358 (1998); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117 , 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). {¶45} Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , which instructed the court to look to the defendant’s conduct in the particular case under the first prong, does not change the analysis.

2014State v. Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 264-265 , 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001), citing State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 681 , 687 N.E.2d 1358 (1998); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 117 , 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). {¶45} Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , which instructed the court to look to the defendant’s conduct in the particular case under the first prong, does not change the analysis.

2010However, even assuming arguendo that aggravated robbery pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) and felonious assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) are allied offenses of similar import, when considering the second step in the allied-offenses analysis, under the particular facts of this case, we find that the aggravated robbery and felonious assault were committed separately and with separate animus. {¶ 25} Again, “[i]f the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.” Brown, 119 Ohio S

2010However, even assuming arguendo that aggravated robbery pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) and felonious assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) are allied offenses of similar import, when considering the second step in the allied-offenses analysis, under the particular facts of this case, we find that the aggravated robbery and felonious assault were committed separately and with separate animus. {¶25} Again, “[i]f the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.” Brown, 119 Ohio St

2024“The imposition of concurrent sentences[,]” however, “is not the equivalent of merging allied offenses.” State v. Damron, 2011-Ohio-2268, ¶ 17 . 7 {¶17} This Court will not perform an allied offenses analysis in the first instance unless it is apparent from the face of the record that the convictions cannot merge.

2021See R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); State v. Powell, 90 Ohio App.3d 260, 264 , 629 N.E.2d 13 (1st Dist.1993).

2021See R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); State v. Powell, 90 Ohio App.3d 260, 264 , 629 N.E.2d 13 (1st Dist.1993).

2020However, upon a review of the jury verdict form associated with Count 1, corrupting another with drugs, we found there exists a question as to whether the jury verdict form complied with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) in light of State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2007-Ohio-256 , 860 N.E.2d 735 , and State v. McDonald, 137 Ohio St.3d 517 , 2013-Ohio-5042 , 1 N.E.3d 374 .2 2 With regard to Count 2, promoting prostitution, this court found no prejudice existed because the trial court imposed a sentence based upon the least degree of the charged offense — a felony of the fourth degree.

2020However, upon a review of the jury verdict form associated with Count 1, corrupting another with drugs, we found there exists a question as to whether the jury verdict form complied with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) in light of State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2007-Ohio-256 , 860 N.E.2d 735 , and State v. McDonald, 137 Ohio St.3d 517 , 2013-Ohio-5042 , 1 N.E.3d 374 .2 2 With regard to Count 2, promoting prostitution, this court found no prejudice existed because the trial court imposed a sentence based upon the least degree of the charged offense — a felony of the fourth degree.