Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1946–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Robinson, A., Aplt.green1 sentence2019See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 198 A.3d 340 (Pa. 2018) (evenly divided court). | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome Communities, L.P.green1 sentence2018See Excavation Technologies , 985 A.2d at 841-43 & n.3 (quoting Adams , 816 A.2d at 305 , and citing Aikens , 501 A.2d at 278-79 ). 22 Indeed, *1056 the Excavation Technologies Court did not discuss Bilt-Rite 's approach to the doctrine, set forth above, at all. | 1 | 1 |
Aikens v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co.green1 sentence2018See Excavation Technologies , 985 A.2d at 841-43 & n.3 (quoting Adams , 816 A.2d at 305 , and citing Aikens , 501 A.2d at 278-79 ). 22 Indeed, *1056 the Excavation Technologies Court did not discuss Bilt-Rite 's approach to the doctrine, set forth above, at all. | 1 | 1 |
Excavation Technologies, Inc. v. Columbia Gas Co.green1 sentence2018See Excavation Technologies , 985 A.2d at 841-43 & n.3 (quoting Adams , 816 A.2d at 305 , and citing Aikens , 501 A.2d at 278-79 ). 22 Indeed, *1056 the Excavation Technologies Court did not discuss Bilt-Rite 's approach to the doctrine, set forth above, at all. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bakergreen2 sentences2014The Baker Court noted at the outset that we were not necessarily holding that the approach to such a claim should be coterminous under the federal and state charters, but that we would analyze the claim “purely under the federal standard” because the appellant deemed that standard to be controlling and did not provide a distinct argument under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 78 A.3d at 1048 & n. 5; accord id. at 1053 (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Saylor & Todd, JJ.). 2014The Baker Court noted at the outset that we were not necessarily holding that the approach to such a claim should be coterminous under the federal and state charters, but that we would analyze the claim “purely under the federal standard” because the appellant deemed that standard to be controlling and did not provide a distinct argument under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 78 A.3d at 1048 & n. 5; accord id. at 1053 (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Saylor & Todd, JJ.). | 1 | 1 |
Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2013Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 492 Pa. 1 , 421 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1980) ("The standard of review of agency proceedings by appellate courts in this Commonwealth is the determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency.”); see also Morrison v. Department of Public Welfare, 538 Pa. 122 , 646 A.2d 565, 570 (1994) (explaining that the standard of review refers to the manner by which an appellate court examines a case, or the "degree of scrutiny” that is to be applied to the appeal). . 2013Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 492 Pa. 1 , 421 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1980) ("The standard of review of agency proceedings by appellate courts in this Commonwealth is the determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency.”); see also Morrison v. Department of Public Welfare, 538 Pa. 122 , 646 A.2d 565, 570 (1994) (explaining that the standard of review refers to the manner by which an appellate court examines a case, or the "degree of scrutiny” that is to be applied to the appeal). . | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. Com., Dept. of Pub. Welfaregreen2 sentences2013Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 492 Pa. 1 , 421 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1980) ("The standard of review of agency proceedings by appellate courts in this Commonwealth is the determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency.”); see also Morrison v. Department of Public Welfare, 538 Pa. 122 , 646 A.2d 565, 570 (1994) (explaining that the standard of review refers to the manner by which an appellate court examines a case, or the "degree of scrutiny” that is to be applied to the appeal). . 2013Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 492 Pa. 1 , 421 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1980) ("The standard of review of agency proceedings by appellate courts in this Commonwealth is the determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency.”); see also Morrison v. Department of Public Welfare, 538 Pa. 122 , 646 A.2d 565, 570 (1994) (explaining that the standard of review refers to the manner by which an appellate court examines a case, or the "degree of scrutiny” that is to be applied to the appeal). . | 1 | 1 |
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.green2 sentences2011Compare, e.g., Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 258-60 , 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1974) (dispensing with the plain error doctrine in civil cases in Pennsylvania), with Conn. Practice Book 1998, § 60-5 (embodying the plain error doctrine as applicable in Connecticut). 2011Compare, e.g., Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 258-60 , 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1974) (dispensing with the plain error doctrine in civil cases in Pennsylvania), with Conn. Practice Book 1998, § 60-5 (embodying the plain error doctrine as applicable in Connecticut). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Freemangreen2 sentences2006First, Appellee contends *547 that, since at the time of trial and the litigation of the post-verdict motions and the direct appeal, this Court maintained a policy of relaxed waiver, see generally Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 545-65 , 827 A.2d 385, 393-405 (2003) (describing the practice of relaxed waiver), appellate counsel was not restricted to pursuing issues raised on post-verdict motions. 2006First, Appellee contends *547 that, since at the time of trial and the litigation of the post-verdict motions and the direct appeal, this Court maintained a policy of relaxed waiver, see generally Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 545-65 , 827 A.2d 385, 393-405 (2003) (describing the practice of relaxed waiver), appellate counsel was not restricted to pursuing issues raised on post-verdict motions. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kotteakos v. United States
green
2 sentences1972In Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 119 A. 2d 849 (1956), this Court said at pp. 473-74: “The best approach to a rule was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 50 A. 2d 742 , where we adopted the following language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S. Ct. 1239 : ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . 1972In Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 119 A. 2d 849 (1956), this Court said at pp. 473-74: “The best approach to a rule was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 50 A. 2d 742 , where we adopted the following language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S. Ct. 1239 : ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . | 4 | 1946–1972 |
DuBree v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1981The Supreme Court there abandoned an approach to immunity based upon a classification of officials and employees and opted for “rules which, though requiring case-by-case determinations, more often produce equitable results.” Id., 481 Pa. at 547 , 393 A.2d at 296 . 1981The Supreme Court there abandoned an approach to immunity based upon a classification of officials and employees and opted for “rules which, though requiring case-by-case determinations, more often produce equitable results.” Id., 481 Pa. at 547 , 393 A.2d at 296 . | 2 | 1979–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Blose
green
2 sentences1972In Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 119 A. 2d 849 (1956), this Court said at pp. 473-74: “The best approach to a rule was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 50 A. 2d 742 , where we adopted the following language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S. Ct. 1239 : ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . 1972In Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 119 A. 2d 849 (1956), this Court said at pp. 473-74: “The best approach to a rule was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 50 A. 2d 742 , where we adopted the following language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S. Ct. 1239 : ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . | 2 | 1956–1972 |
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2014In rejecting the claim on the merits, the Court explained that the federal proportionality test, which derives from Solem v. Helm, examines: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 78 A.3d at 1047 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 ). 2014In rejecting the claim on the merits, the Court explained that the federal proportionality test, which derives from Solem v. Helm, examines: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 78 A.3d at 1047 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Simeone v. Simeone
green
2 sentences1991As stated above, the court also discarded the prior approach which permitted inquiry into the reasonableness of a prenuptial agreement, noting that “the reasonableness of a prenuptial bargain is not a proper subject for judicial review.” Simeone, 525 Pa. at 401 , 581 A.2d at 166 . 1991As stated above, the court also discarded the prior approach which permitted inquiry into the reasonableness of a prenuptial agreement, noting that “the reasonableness of a prenuptial bargain is not a proper subject for judicial review.” Simeone, 525 Pa. at 401 , 581 A.2d at 166 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Commonwealth v. Paige
green
2 sentences1989Citing this approach as error, appellant relies on our decision in Commonwealth v. Paige, 287 Pa.Super. 133 , 429 A.2d 1135 (1985). 1989Citing this approach as error, appellant relies on our decision in Commonwealth v. Paige, 287 Pa.Super. 133 , 429 A.2d 1135 (1985). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Provident Tradesmens Bank And Trust Company v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company
green
1 sentence1977In Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 , 323 A. 2d 341 (1974), Judge Sydney Hoffman stated that the only requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be successfully invoked are: “(1) that the issue or issues of fact determined in a prior action be the same as those appearing in a subsequent action, there being no necessity that the cause of action be the same; (2) that the party against whom the defense is invoked is identical to or in privity to the party in the first action.” We are also aware that Pennsylvania takes a liberal approach to the doctrine of mutu | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Posternack v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading
green
2 sentences1977In Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 , 323 A. 2d 341 (1974), Judge Sydney Hoffman stated that the only requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be successfully invoked are: “(1) that the issue or issues of fact determined in a prior action be the same as those appearing in a subsequent action, there being no necessity that the cause of action be the same; (2) that the party against whom the defense is invoked is identical to or in privity to the party in the first action.” We are also aware that Pennsylvania takes a liberal approach to the doctrine of mutu 1977In Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 , 323 A. 2d 341 (1974), Judge Sydney Hoffman stated that the only requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be successfully invoked are: “(1) that the issue or issues of fact determined in a prior action be the same as those appearing in a subsequent action, there being no necessity that the cause of action be the same; (2) that the party against whom the defense is invoked is identical to or in privity to the party in the first action.” We are also aware that Pennsylvania takes a liberal approach to the doctrine of mutu | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills
green
2 sentences1977In Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 , 323 A. 2d 341 (1974), Judge Sydney Hoffman stated that the only requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be successfully invoked are: “(1) that the issue or issues of fact determined in a prior action be the same as those appearing in a subsequent action, there being no necessity that the cause of action be the same; (2) that the party against whom the defense is invoked is identical to or in privity to the party in the first action.” We are also aware that Pennsylvania takes a liberal approach to the doctrine of mutu 1977In Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 260 , 323 A. 2d 341 (1974), Judge Sydney Hoffman stated that the only requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be successfully invoked are: “(1) that the issue or issues of fact determined in a prior action be the same as those appearing in a subsequent action, there being no necessity that the cause of action be the same; (2) that the party against whom the defense is invoked is identical to or in privity to the party in the first action.” We are also aware that Pennsylvania takes a liberal approach to the doctrine of mutu | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Commonwealth v. Savor
green
2 sentences1972In Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 119 A. 2d 849 (1956), this Court said at pp. 473-74: “The best approach to a rule was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 50 A. 2d 742 , where we adopted the following language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S. Ct. 1239 : ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . 1972In Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469 , 119 A. 2d 849 (1956), this Court said at pp. 473-74: “The best approach to a rule was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 50 A. 2d 742 , where we adopted the following language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S. Ct. 1239 : ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.