approach warning in Maryland

1948Baltimore Transit Co. v. Worth, supra; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Alexander, 172 Md. 454 , 192 A. 349 ; Washington B. & A. R.

1948Baltimore Transit Co. v. Worth, supra; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Alexander, 172 Md. 454 , 192 A. 349 ; Washington B. & A. R.

2014First, we consider whether Appellees are “prima facie aggrieved” or, in other words, whether “[their] proximity makes [them] ... adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner[s].” Ray, 430 Md. at 85 , 59 A.3d at 551 .

2014First, we consider whether Appellees are “prima facie aggrieved” or, in other words, whether “[their] proximity makes [them] ... adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner[s].” Ray, 430 Md. at 85 , 59 A.3d at 551 .

2011We refused to adopt such a broad approach to the rule, repeating, by way of explanation, our previous caution in Flowers that the firefighter’s rule does not bar recovery for all negligent conduct. 6 Id., 731 A.2d at 888 . *278 Notwithstanding that the firefighter’s rule has its limits, our recent opinion in Hart makes clear that the rule applies whenever the officer is injured by risks “inherent ] [in the] dangerous occupation” of firefighting and law enforcement, Hart, 385 Md. at 534 , 870 A.2d at 168 , so long as the risks are “directly related to ” the situation requiring the firefighter’s

2011We refused to adopt such a broad approach to the rule, repeating, by way of explanation, our previous caution in Flowers that the firefighter’s rule does not bar recovery for all negligent conduct. 6 Id., 731 A.2d at 888 . *278 Notwithstanding that the firefighter’s rule has its limits, our recent opinion in Hart makes clear that the rule applies whenever the officer is injured by risks “inherent ] [in the] dangerous occupation” of firefighting and law enforcement, Hart, 385 Md. at 534 , 870 A.2d at 168 , so long as the risks are “directly related to ” the situation requiring the firefighter’s

2011We refused to adopt such a broad approach to the rule, repeating, by way of explanation, our previous caution in Flowers that the firefighter’s rule does not bar recovery for all negligent conduct. 6 Id., 731 A.2d at 888 . *278 Notwithstanding that the firefighter’s rule has its limits, our recent opinion in Hart makes clear that the rule applies whenever the officer is injured by risks “inherent ] [in the] dangerous occupation” of firefighting and law enforcement, Hart, 385 Md. at 534 , 870 A.2d at 168 , so long as the risks are “directly related to ” the situation requiring the firefighter’s

2011We refused to adopt such a broad approach to the rule, repeating, by way of explanation, our previous caution in Flowers that the firefighter’s rule does not bar recovery for all negligent conduct. 6 Id., 731 A.2d at 888 . *278 Notwithstanding that the firefighter’s rule has its limits, our recent opinion in Hart makes clear that the rule applies whenever the officer is injured by risks “inherent ] [in the] dangerous occupation” of firefighting and law enforcement, Hart, 385 Md. at 534 , 870 A.2d at 168 , so long as the risks are “directly related to ” the situation requiring the firefighter’s

2009It is true that the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra,[ 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ] and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , relaxed under certain circumstances the requirements as to a right of search and seizure of motor vehicles because of their mobility, but those holdings do not imply that any difference in the requirements for standing should exist in the search of a home, office, phone booth, or automobile.

2009It is true that the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra,[ 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ] and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , relaxed under certain circumstances the requirements as to a right of search and seizure of motor vehicles because of their mobility, but those holdings do not imply that any difference in the requirements for standing should exist in the search of a home, office, phone booth, or automobile.

2009It is true that the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra,[ 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ] and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , relaxed under certain circumstances the requirements as to a right of search and seizure of motor vehicles because of their mobility, but those holdings do not imply that any difference in the requirements for standing should exist in the search of a home, office, phone booth, or automobile.

2009It is true that the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra,[ 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) ] and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , relaxed under certain circumstances the requirements as to a right of search and seizure of motor vehicles because of their mobility, but those holdings do not imply that any difference in the requirements for standing should exist in the search of a home, office, phone booth, or automobile.

1948Koester Bakery Co. v. Poller, 187 Md. 324 , 50 A. 2d 234 , that the street railway owes its passengers a duty to deliver them to their destination as quickly as possible, consistent with safety, it has been held by this Court in numerous cases that it is the duty of the motorman, when operating a street car on the public streets, to keep a lookout, signal the approach when such warning is reasonably necessary, move at a moderate speed and stop when necessity for stopping becomes apparent.

1948Koester Bakery Co. v. Poller, 187 Md. 324 , 50 A. 2d 234 , that the street railway owes its passengers a duty to deliver them to their destination as quickly as possible, consistent with safety, it has been held by this Court in numerous cases that it is the duty of the motorman, when operating a street car on the public streets, to keep a lookout, signal the approach when such warning is reasonably necessary, move at a moderate speed and stop when necessity for stopping becomes apparent.