15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1906–1990 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Scranton Citygreen2 sentences1972As we said long ago in Scranton Gas Co. v. Scranton City, 214 Pa. 586, 590-91 , 64 Atl. 84 (1906) : “Calling the legislative grant of privilege to use the streets a contract does not avoid the conditions on which the privilege is to be exercised. 1972As we said long ago in Scranton Gas Co. v. Scranton City, 214 Pa. 586, 590-91 , 64 Atl. 84 (1906) : “Calling the legislative grant of privilege to use the streets a contract does not avoid the conditions on which the privilege is to be exercised. | 1 | 3 |
Muncy Borough v. Steingreen2 sentences1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). 1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Galvin v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. of Californiagreen2 sentences1969We have said in Galvin v. Occidental Life Insurance Company of California, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 61, 65 , 211 A. 2d 120, 122-128 (1965) : “The intention of the parties is paramount and in construing such a contract the Court will adopt the interpretation which, under all of the circumstances of the case, ascribes the most reasonable, probable, and natural intention of the parties, bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished. . . . 1969We have said in Galvin v. Occidental Life Insurance Company of California, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 61, 65 , 211 A. 2d 120, 122-128 (1965) : “The intention of the parties is paramount and in construing such a contract the Court will adopt the interpretation which, under all of the circumstances of the case, ascribes the most reasonable, probable, and natural intention of the parties, bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Lesick v. Proctor.green1 sentence1939See Lesick et ux. v. Proctor, 300 Pa. 347, 349 ; Kehres v. Stuempfle et al., 288 Pa. 534, 538 ; Floyd v. Lehigh Valley R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co.
green
2 sentences1972Whether such limitation or conditions be expressed in the grant or not is immaterial, for, as said in Butchers’ Union Slaughter House v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing Co., 111 U.S. 746 , the power to control and regulate the streets so as to protect the public health, is one that cannot be bargained away by legislative or municipal grant. 1943Whether such limitation or conditions be expressed in the grant or not is immaterial, for, as said in Butchers’ Union Slaughter House Co. v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing Co., 111 U. S. 746 , the power to control and regulate the streets so as to protect the public health, is one that cannot be bargained away by legislative or municipal grant. | 7 | 1906–1972 |
Talley v. Borough of Trainer
green
2 sentences1990In Talley v. Borough of Trainer, 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441 , 394 A.2d 645 (1978), this court stated that although “the mere presence of such vehicles on a person’s property cannot, in and of itself, support a [finding of a nuisance in fact], we do believe that the presence of such vehicles, combined with the conditions and factors discussed above, may create a public hazard and support a finding of nuisance in fact.” 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 444 , 394 A.2d at 646 . 1990In Talley v. Borough of Trainer, 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441 , 394 A.2d 645 (1978), this court stated that although “the mere presence of such vehicles on a person’s property cannot, in and of itself, support a [finding of a nuisance in fact], we do believe that the presence of such vehicles, combined with the conditions and factors discussed above, may create a public hazard and support a finding of nuisance in fact.” 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 444 , 394 A.2d at 646 . | 2 | 1981–1990 |
DuBree v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1976The conditions to this immunity are that the conduct must not be intentionally malicious, wanton or reckless. 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 574 , 303 A.2d at 534 . 1976The conditions to this immunity are that the conduct must not be intentionally malicious, wanton or reckless. 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 574 , 303 A.2d at 534 . | 2 | 1974–1976 |
HILLTOWN TWP. v. MAGER Et Ux.
green
1 sentence1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Hilltown Township v. Mager
green
1 sentence1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz
green
2 sentences1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). 1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc.
green
1 sentence1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence1980See Muncy Borough v. Stein, 440 Pa. 503 , 270 A.2d 213 (1970); Honey Brook Township v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614 , 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Mager v. Hilltown Township, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 90 , 293 A.2d 631 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 979 , 93 S.Ct. 2273 , 36 L.Ed.2d 955 (1973); Robert S. Ryan, Zoning Law and Practice in Pennsylvania § 9.4.21 (1970). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Montgomery v. Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1976With regard to the meaning of the term “high public official,” Judge Blatt, speaking for the Court, stated: “The Supreme Court, however, has yet to define clearly who is a ‘high public official.’ In Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra, it suggests that the test of whether or not a public officer is in that category ‘should depend upon the nature of his duties, the importance of his office, and particularly whether or not he has policymaking functions.’ 392 Pa. at 186 , 140 A.2d at 105 .” 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 571 , 303 A.2d at 532 . 1976With regard to the meaning of the term “high public official,” Judge Blatt, speaking for the Court, stated: “The Supreme Court, however, has yet to define clearly who is a ‘high public official.’ In Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra, it suggests that the test of whether or not a public officer is in that category ‘should depend upon the nature of his duties, the importance of his office, and particularly whether or not he has policymaking functions.’ 392 Pa. at 186 , 140 A.2d at 105 .” 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 571 , 303 A.2d at 532 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Commonwealth v. Halteman
green
1 sentence1974Commonwealth v. Halteman, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 379 (1960). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Kehres v. Stuempfle
green
1 sentence1939See Lesick et ux. v. Proctor, 300 Pa. 347, 349 ; Kehres v. Stuempfle et al., 288 Pa. 534, 538 ; Floyd v. Lehigh Valley R. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.