conditions exception in Texas

21 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1937–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Ex Parte Campbellgreen texcrimapp · 2008 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2011 2 sentences 2011Coleman v. Dret-ke, 395 F.3d 216 , 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("Coleman’s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.”). 2011Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (" Coleman's holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.").	2	2
Coleman v. Dretkegreen ca5 · 2004 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2011 2 sentences 2011Coleman v. Dret-ke, 395 F.3d 216 , 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("Coleman’s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.”). 2011Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (" Coleman's holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.").	2	2
Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Algergreen tex · 2007 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024We have, however, consistently held that common or innocuous hazards are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. 1 Under this doctrine of common conditions, the standalone fact that a condition has caused an 1 See, e.g., Christ v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 664 S.W.3d 82 , 85, 87, 90 (Tex. 2023) (concluding that the use of painted stripes and buttons instead of concrete barriers to separate travel lanes did not create an unreasonably dangerous condition as a matter of law); McIntire, 646 S.W.3d at 801-04 (concluding that a “profoundly ordinary” divot in a grocery store parking lot was not u	1	1
Zachry Construction Corporation v. Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texasgreen tex · 2014 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 1 sentence 2019However, Zachry stated, “[t]he Act waives immunity for contract claims that meet certain conditions: the existence of a specific type of contract [referring to section 271.157], a demand for certain kinds of damages [referring to section 271.153], a state forum [referring to section 271.156], etc.” Zachry, 449 S.W.3d at 109 (emphasis added).	1	1
Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C.green tex · 2016 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018See id.	1	1
Price v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.green texapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001See Price v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 700 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, no writ)(since trial court initially reinstated case, court of appeals presumed appropriate findings were made).	1	1
Pettit v. Stategreen texapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 1 sentence 1993See Pettit, supra. We find that the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon and to defeat Moosani’s defense.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

Case	Cited	Years
Smith v. State green texcrimapp · 2002 2 sentences 2002We are also aware that at the time the trial court ruled on appellant’s motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals had not yet announced that the prosecutor “is responsible for crafting the conditions of an immunity agreement” and “is in the best position to evaluate performance before and after a dismissal.” Smith , 70 S.W.3d at 855 . 2002We are also aware that at the time the trial court ruled on appellant’s motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals had not yet announced that the prosecutor “is responsible for crafting the conditions of an immunity agreement” and “is in the best position to evaluate performance before and after a dismissal.” Smith, 70 S.W.3d at 855 .	4	2002–2021
Campbell v. Regents of the University green scotus · 2005 2 sentences 2011Coleman v. Dret-ke, 395 F.3d 216 , 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("Coleman’s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.”). 2011Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (" Coleman's holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.").	2	2010–2011
Tony Ray Coleman v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division green ca5 · 2005 2 sentences 2011Coleman v. Dret-ke, 395 F.3d 216 , 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("Coleman’s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.”). 2011Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (" Coleman's holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.").	2	2010–2011
In Re Doe green texapp · 2000 2 sentences 2004This Court’s opinion in In re Doe involved a female inmate of a privately managed jail facility who alleged she was raped while in custody. 22 S.W.3d 601 (Tex.App. — Austin 1994, orig. proceeding, mand. granted). 2004This Court's opinion in In re Doe involved a female inmate of a privately managed jail facility who alleged she was raped while in custody. 22 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, orig. proceeding, mand. granted).	2	2004–2004
Rogers, William green texcrimapp · 2018 1 sentence 2022Rogers, 550 S.W.3d at 193 .	1	2022–2022
Stetler v. SRN Enterprises, Inc. green scotus · 2005 2 sentences 2011Coleman v. Dret-ke, 395 F.3d 216 , 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("Coleman’s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.”). 2011Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (" Coleman's holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.").	1	2011–2011
Kulesa v. Small green scotus · 2005 2 sentences 2011Coleman v. Dret-ke, 395 F.3d 216 , 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ("Coleman’s holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.”). 2011Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.2004), reh'g en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 938 , 126 S.Ct. 427 , 163 L.Ed.2d 325 (2005); see Ex parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (" Coleman's holding was about what process must be afforded to the releasee before sex offender conditions may be imposed, not about whether sex offender conditions may be imposed at all.").	1	2011–2011
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. red scotus · 1982 2 sentences 1987The plurality in Northern Pipeline acknowledged that the public rights doctrine "may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued". 458 U.S. at 67 , 102 S.Ct. at 2869 . 1987The plurality in Northern Pipeline acknowledged that the public rights doctrine “may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued”. 458 U.S. at 67 , 102 S.Ct. at 2869 .	1	1987–1987
Cochran v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n of Houston green tex · 1979 2 sentences 1983We held in Cochran v. American Savings & Loan Association, 586 S.W.2d 849 (Tex.1979), that it is not the lender's subjective intent to charge usury that makes a loan usurious, but rather his intent to make the bargain that was made. 1983We held in Cochran v. American Savings & Loan Association, 586 S.W.2d 849 (Tex.1979), that it is not the lender’s subjective intent to charge usury that makes a loan usurious, but rather his intent to make the bargain that was made.	1	1983–1983
State v. McDavitt green nj · 1972 2 sentences 1973These “qualifications” from Valdes were adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals, Div. 3, in State v. Ross, 7 Wash.App. 62 , 497 P.2d 1343 (1972). 6 Similar qualifications were required in Sate v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36 , 297 A.2d 849 (1972), by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 1973These “qualifications” from Valdes were adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals, Div. 3, in State v. Ross, 7 Wash.App. 62 , 497 P.2d 1343 (1972). 6 Similar qualifications were required in Sate v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36 , 297 A.2d 849 (1972), by the New Jersey Supreme Court.	1	1973–1973
State v. Ross green washctapp · 1972 2 sentences 1973These “qualifications” from Valdes were adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals, Div. 3, in State v. Ross, 7 Wash.App. 62 , 497 P.2d 1343 (1972). 6 Similar qualifications were required in Sate v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36 , 297 A.2d 849 (1972), by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 1973These “qualifications” from Valdes were adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals, Div. 3, in State v. Ross, 7 Wash.App. 62 , 497 P.2d 1343 (1972). 6 Similar qualifications were required in Sate v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36 , 297 A.2d 849 (1972), by the New Jersey Supreme Court.	1	1973–1973
Dalton v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. green texcommnapp · 1919 2 sentences 1961Soc., Tex.Com.App., 213 S.W. 230, 231 , it is held that a contract of insurance “is to be construed in accordance with the terms and subject to the conditions of the standard form of policy in use by the insurer at the time.” Our statutes provide that a policy of life insurance must contain and must not contain certain provisions. 1961Soc., Tex.Com.App., 213 S.W. 230, 231 , it is held that a contract of insurance "is to be construed in accordance with the terms and subject to the conditions of the standard form of policy in use by the insurer at the time." Our statutes provide that a policy of life insurance must contain and must not contain certain provisions.	1	1961–1961
Penrod Drilling Co. v. Silvertooth green texapp · 1940 1 sentence 1947The doctrine is recognized in Texas, and in the Supreme Court case of Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968, 969 , 160 A.L.R. 1445 , Judge Brewster concisely states the conditions under which the rule may be invoked: “Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided (1) the character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which caused the inj	1	1947–1947
Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott green tex · 1935 2 sentences 1947In a proper case for the application of the rule where the physical facts involved in 'an accident are of such a character as to 'compel an inference that it resulted from 'negligence, such facts are themselves evidence of negligence, and it is incumbent upon the defendant, if he wishes to avoid the effect of the doctrine, to introduce evidence to explain, rebut or otherwise overcome the presumption or inference that the injury complained of was due to negligence.” Again, in the case of Wichita Falls Traction Company v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248 , 81 S.W.2d 659, 664 , the Supreme Court in answer t 1947In a proper case for the application of the rule where the physical facts involved in 'an accident are of such a character as to 'compel an inference that it resulted from 'negligence, such facts are themselves evidence of negligence, and it is incumbent upon the defendant, if he wishes to avoid the effect of the doctrine, to introduce evidence to explain, rebut or otherwise overcome the presumption or inference that the injury complained of was due to negligence.” Again, in the case of Wichita Falls Traction Company v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248 , 81 S.W.2d 659, 664 , the Supreme Court in answer t	1	1947–1947
Honea, by Next Friend v. Coca Cola Bot. Co. green tex · 1944 2 sentences 1947The doctrine is recognized in Texas, and in the Supreme Court case of Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968, 969 , 160 A.L.R. 1445 , Judge Brewster concisely states the conditions under which the rule may be invoked: “Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided (1) the character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which caused the inj 1947The doctrine is recognized in Texas, and in the Supreme Court case of Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968, 969 , 160 A.L.R. 1445 , Judge Brewster concisely states the conditions under which the rule may be invoked: “Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided (1) the character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which caused the inj	1	1947–1947
Arado v. Keitel neutral · 1944 1 sentence 1946However, in order for appellants to obtain the benefit of the employment experience of the predecessor corporation in computing their contribution rate for 1943, the requirements of clause (b) of said subsection * * * must also be satisfied. * * *. ” See also Lindley case, supra, and Arado v. Keitel, Mo.Sup., 182 S.W.2d 176 .	1	1946–1946
Byrnes v. Curtin neutral texapp · 1919 2 sentences 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 . 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 .	1	1937–1937
Harris v. Seinsheimer neutral tex · 1887 2 sentences 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 . 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 .	1	1937–1937
Wallace v. Stevens neutral tex · 1889 2 sentences 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 . 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 .	1	1937–1937
Webb v. Koger neutral tex · 1890 2 sentences 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 . 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 .	1	1937–1937
Bush v. Barron neutral cadc · 1890 2 sentences 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 . 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 .	1	1937–1937
Wootters v. Hale green · 1892 2 sentences 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 . 1937In support of the last proposition, see Wootters v. Hale, 83 Tex. 563 , 19 S.W. 134 ; Harris v. Seinsheimer, 67 Tex. 356 , 3 S.W. 307 ; Bush v. Barron, 78 Tex. 5 , 14 S.W. 238 ; Wallace v. Stevens, 74 Tex. 559 , 12 S.W. 283 ; Byrnes v. Curtin (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 405 .	1	1937–1937

Where else courts name it

CA 26 (1935–2023) TX 21 (1937–2024) WA 18 (1955–2018) PA 15 (1906–1990) NJ 11 (1952–2025) NY 11 (1916–2010) OR 10 (1961–2005) IN 10 (1976–2019) FL 9 (1958–2018) IL 8 (1932–2025) IA 8 (1930–1998) WI 7 (1904–2020) UT 7 (2000–2026) MA 6 (1978–2012) MI 6 (1972–2020) CT 6 (1937–2013) KY 6 (1926–1978) OH 5 (2002–2021) MT 5 (1932–2026) NE 4 (1891–2022) CO 4 (1964–2022) OK 3 (1913–1969) NC 3 (1979–2018) MS 3 (1999–2012) AL 3 (1962–1989) MO 3 (1952–1990) RI 3 (1980–2014) WY 2 (1962–2008) NM 2 (1990–2014) AZ 2 (1973–1975) AK 2 (1992–1994)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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