continuing validity rule in Pennsylvania

1992Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179 , 415 A.2d 399 (1980); Commonwealth v. Williams, 490 Pa. 187 , 415 A.2d 403 (1980).

1992Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179 , 415 A.2d 399 (1980); Commonwealth v. Williams, 490 Pa. 187 , 415 A.2d 403 (1980).

1992Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179 , 415 A.2d 399 (1980); Commonwealth v. Williams, 490 Pa. 187 , 415 A.2d 403 (1980).

1992Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179 , 415 A.2d 399 (1980); Commonwealth v. Williams, 490 Pa. 187 , 415 A.2d 403 (1980).

2018As to the continuing validity of the privilege recognized in Hartranft, our Supreme Court in Costello v. Rice, 153 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1959), cited Hartranft, observing that “[i]t was held more than eighty years ago by this court, under the present Constitution, that the Governor is exempt from the process of the courts whenever engaging in any duty pertaining to his office and that his immunity from judicial process extends to his subordinates and agents when acting in their official capacity.” Costello, 153 A.2d at 892 .

2018As to the continuing validity of the privilege recognized in Hartranft, our Supreme Court in Costello v. Rice, 153 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1959), cited Hartranft, observing that “[i]t was held more than eighty years ago by this court, under the present Constitution, that the Governor is exempt from the process of the courts whenever engaging in any duty pertaining to his office and that his immunity from judicial process extends to his subordinates and agents when acting in their official capacity.” Costello, 153 A.2d at 892 .

1996In Barker v. Brown, 236 Pa.Superior Ct. 76, 340 A.2d 566 (1975), cited by DOT, the Superior Court noted, in dicta, the continuing validity of the rule of non-liability of the rural property owner for injury caused to others outside the land by a natural condition of the land.

1989As we shall see, however, the Supreme Court has itself cast doubt on the continuing validity of this rule by dictum in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 506 Pa. 12 , 483 A.2d 1339 (1984).

1989As we shall see, however, the Supreme Court has itself cast doubt on the continuing validity of this rule by dictum in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 506 Pa. 12 , 483 A.2d 1339 (1984).

1989The only case to cast doubt on the continuing validity of this rule is Commonwealth v. Sandly, 371 Pa.Super. 486 , 538 A.2d 546 (1988).

1989The only case to cast doubt on the continuing validity of this rule is Commonwealth v. Sandly, 371 Pa.Super. 486 , 538 A.2d 546 (1988).

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1987By way of a footnote, the majority wrote, without dissent, as follows: There is little or no vitality left to this practice which stems from this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978). *231 The continuing validity of the rule was seriously undermined by our decisions holding that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter may be given only where the evidence would support such a verdict.

1981He stated, “There is arguable merit to the contention, that Mayle , by stripping away sovereign immunity, affected the sovereign’s immunity to the running of the statute of limitations”: 404 A.2d at 695 .

1977The continuing validity of the doctrine that involuntary manslaughter is not a permissible verdict on a murder indictment is also brought into question by our decision in Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317 , 344 A.2d 850 (1975). *459 Moore was indicted for murder and voluntary manslaughter and, in a separate indictment, charged with involuntary manslaughter.

1977The continuing validity of the doctrine that involuntary manslaughter is not a permissible verdict on a murder indictment is also brought into question by our decision in Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317 , 344 A.2d 850 (1975). *459 Moore was indicted for murder and voluntary manslaughter and, in a separate indictment, charged with involuntary manslaughter.

1971See, Fine v. Fine, 367 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 (1951). [1] In Hillegass Estate , the relevant portion of the agreement read as follows: "`Whereas it is the intention of the intended wife to waive, relinquish and bar all her inchoate intestate and other rights or interests, either as wife or widow of the First Party, in and to any property now owned or hereafter acquired by the First Party, including her right of election to take against the Will of the First Party.'" Id. at 147 , 244 A. 2d at 674 (emphasis omitted). [2] See, e.g., Estate of Duncan, 87 Colo. 149 , 285 P. 757 (1930); Trecker's Es

1971See, Fine v. Fine, 367 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 (1951). [1] In Hillegass Estate , the relevant portion of the agreement read as follows: "`Whereas it is the intention of the intended wife to waive, relinquish and bar all her inchoate intestate and other rights or interests, either as wife or widow of the First Party, in and to any property now owned or hereafter acquired by the First Party, including her right of election to take against the Will of the First Party.'" Id. at 147 , 244 A. 2d at 674 (emphasis omitted). [2] See, e.g., Estate of Duncan, 87 Colo. 149 , 285 P. 757 (1930); Trecker's Es

1971See, Fine v. Fine, 367 Pa. 227 , 77 A. 2d 436 (1951). [1] In Hillegass Estate , the relevant portion of the agreement read as follows: "`Whereas it is the intention of the intended wife to waive, relinquish and bar all her inchoate intestate and other rights or interests, either as wife or widow of the First Party, in and to any property now owned or hereafter acquired by the First Party, including her right of election to take against the Will of the First Party.'" Id. at 147 , 244 A. 2d at 674 (emphasis omitted). [2] See, e.g., Estate of Duncan, 87 Colo. 149 , 285 P. 757 (1930); Trecker's Es

1970This case raises a serious question as to the continuing validity of this presumption in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969), and Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 , 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970).

1970This case raises a serious question as to the continuing validity of this presumption in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969), and Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 , 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970).

1970This case raises a serious question as to the continuing validity of this presumption in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969), and Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 , 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970).

1970This case raises a serious question as to the continuing validity of this presumption in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969), and Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 , 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970).