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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thornton v. Dennis M.green2 sentences1972The courts have created the defense as a control on illegal police conduct ‘out of regard for [the court’s] own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law.’ (People v. Benford, supra, 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ].) Moreover, this court acknowledged the continuing validity of the rule of the Valverde case in In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 457, fn. 10 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]. 3 ” The rale of Winship is not contrary to the rale of Moran. 1972The courts have created the defense as a control on illegal police conduct ‘out of regard for [the court’s] own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law.’ (People v. Benford, supra, 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ].) Moreover, this court acknowledged the continuing validity of the rule of the Valverde case in In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 457, fn. 10 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]. 3 ” The rale of Winship is not contrary to the rale of Moran. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Pratergreen2 sentences2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . 2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Correagreen2 sentences2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . 2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Benfordgreen2 sentences1972The courts have created the defense as a control on illegal police conduct ‘out of regard for [the court’s] own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law.’ (People v. Benford, supra, 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ].) Moreover, this court acknowledged the continuing validity of the rule of the Valverde case in In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 457, fn. 10 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]. 3 ” The rale of Winship is not contrary to the rale of Moran. 1972The courts have created the defense as a control on illegal police conduct ‘out of regard for [the court’s] own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law.’ (People v. Benford, supra, 53 Cal.2d 1, 9 [ 345 P.2d 928 ].) Moreover, this court acknowledged the continuing validity of the rule of the Valverde case in In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 457, fn. 10 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]. 3 ” The rale of Winship is not contrary to the rale of Moran. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Wattersongreen2 sentences2006(See People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 944-947 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 13 ; People v. Thomas, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 304-306, 282 Cal.Rptr. 258 .) We need not decide this question, because those cases, even if still valid, are irrelevant to the issue here. 2006(See People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 944-947 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 13 ; People v. Thomas, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 304-306, 282 Cal.Rptr. 258 .) We need not decide this question, because those cases, even if still valid, are irrelevant to the issue here. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gallardogreen1 sentence2019(See, e.g., People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 1138–1141; id. at p. 1141 [“it is our duty to reconsider” precedent when subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on our reading of that court’s earlier decisions]; see also, e.g., People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 , 134–135 [reconsidering precedent in light of reasoning of subsequent high court decisions].) Of necessity, then, we retain “the flexibility to consider emerging United States Supreme Court case law when considering earlier decisions on federal issues . . . even when the 17 PEOPLE v. LOPEZ Opinion of th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reedgreen1 sentence2016But the court stated it did not have to decide that question because Rogers and two other authorities, even if valid, were not relevant to the elements test issue decided in Reed. ( Reed, supra, at p. 1228, fn. 2 .) Justice Moreno in a concurring and dissenting opinion in Reed argued for the application of both the elements test and a modified version of the accusatory pleading test when deciding whether multiple convictions were proper. | 1 | 1 |
Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLCgreen1 sentence2013(Concepcion, at p. 1746.) Third, the California Courts of Appeal have recognized that “Concepcion did not eliminate state law unconscionability as a defense to the enforcement of arbitration agreements subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1519 ; accord, Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1123– 1126; Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1141, 1150 .) In Concepcion, the court held that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, a state may not rely on categor | 1 | 1 |
Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc.green1 sentence2013(Concepcion, at p. 1746.) Third, the California Courts of Appeal have recognized that “Concepcion did not eliminate state law unconscionability as a defense to the enforcement of arbitration agreements subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1519 ; accord, Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1123– 1126; Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1141, 1150 .) In Concepcion, the court held that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, a state may not rely on categor | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nguyengreen2 sentences2009“It has been settled law for nearly a century that an essential element of the crime of robbery is that property be taken from the possession of the victim.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 762 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 14 P.3d 221 ] (Nguyen).) We affirmed the continuing validity of that principle in Nguyen , overruling an appellate court decision, People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141 ], that had dispensed entirely with the requirement of possession. 2009“It has been settled law for nearly a century that an essential element of the crime of robbery is that property be taken from the possession of the victim.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 762 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 14 P.3d 221 ] (Nguyen).) We affirmed the continuing validity of that principle in Nguyen , overruling an appellate court decision, People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141 ], that had dispensed entirely with the requirement of possession. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kevin Williams-Davisgreen1 sentence2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin | 1 | 1 |
cluster 509297green1 sentence2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Zelinkagreen1 sentence2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mark Sylvester, Leon Brown, and Willie Earl Culleygreen2 sentences2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 [“the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano,” and remains applicable “only when the court determines that prejudice is likely”]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C. 2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Vernon Dutkelgreen2 sentences2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 [“the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano,” and remains applicable “only when the court determines that prejudice is likely”]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C. 2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin | 1 | 1 |
Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniackgreen2 sentences1996(Ibid.; see also Gause v. McClelland (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 762, 764 [ 228 P.2d 91 ]; Black v. Knight (1919) 44 Cal.App. 756, 770 [ 187 P. 89 ]; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 785-788 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 ].) The several references in Sheldon Appel to freedom from “unjustifiable” and “unreasonable” litigation suggest the continuing validity of the rule that a prior determination of “probable cause” cannot be second-guessed in a malicious prosecution action even where the judgment in the underlying action is reversed on appeal. 8 It follows necessarily that where, as here 1996(Ibid.; see also Gause v. McClelland (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 762, 764 [ 228 P.2d 91 ]; Black v. Knight (1919) 44 Cal.App. 756, 770 [ 187 P. 89 ]; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 785-788 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 ].) The several references in Sheldon Appel to freedom from “unjustifiable” and “unreasonable” litigation suggest the continuing validity of the rule that a prior determination of “probable cause” cannot be second-guessed in a malicious prosecution action even where the judgment in the underlying action is reversed on appeal. 8 It follows necessarily that where, as here | 1 | 1 |
Gause v. McClellandgreen2 sentences1996(Ibid.; see also Gause v. McClelland (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 762, 764 [ 228 P.2d 91 ]; Black v. Knight (1919) 44 Cal.App. 756, 770 [ 187 P. 89 ]; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 785-788 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 ].) The several references in Sheldon Appel to freedom from “unjustifiable” and “unreasonable” litigation suggest the continuing validity of the rule that a prior determination of “probable cause” cannot be second-guessed in a malicious prosecution action even where the judgment in the underlying action is reversed on appeal. 8 It follows necessarily that where, as here 1996(Ibid.; see also Gause v. McClelland (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 762, 764 [ 228 P.2d 91 ]; Black v. Knight (1919) 44 Cal.App. 756, 770 [ 187 P. 89 ]; Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777, 785-788 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 ].) The several references in Sheldon Appel to freedom from “unjustifiable” and “unreasonable” litigation suggest the continuing validity of the rule that a prior determination of “probable cause” cannot be second-guessed in a malicious prosecution action even where the judgment in the underlying action is reversed on appeal. 8 It follows necessarily that where, as here | 1 | 1 |
| Black v. Knightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Figueroagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kiihoagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2016(Ibid.) Reed further noted the continuing validity of the rule announced in Rogers was dubious in light of more recent authorities, citing Watterson and People v. Thomas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 299, 304-305 . 2006(See People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 944-947 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 13 ; People v. Thomas, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 304-306, 282 Cal.Rptr. 258 .) We need not decide this question, because those cases, even if still valid, are irrelevant to the issue here. | 2 | 2006–2016 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . 2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Mesa
green
2 sentences2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . 2013(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 344 .) 10 People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 699 [punishment permitted on each count of assault with a firearm under the “multiple victim” exception].) O’Sullivan asks us to ignore the “multiple victim” exception on the grounds Neal v. State of California was wrongly decided on that issue and the continuing validity of the exception has been undercut by recent Supreme Court decisions in People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 and People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Arbuckle
green
2 sentences2020Because of that discretion, “the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.” (Id. at p. 757.) Recently, in K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295 (K.R.), the Supreme Court affirmed the continuing validity of the rule announced in Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d 749 : “[W]e adhere to the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence.” ( K.R., su 2020Because of that discretion, “the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.” (Id. at p. 757.) Recently, in K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295 (K.R.), the Supreme Court affirmed the continuing validity of the rule announced in Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d 749 : “[W]e adhere to the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence.” ( K.R., su | 1 | 2020–2020 |
K.R. v. Superior Court of Sacramento Cnty.
green
2 sentences2020Because of that discretion, “the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.” (Id. at p. 757.) Recently, in K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295 (K.R.), the Supreme Court affirmed the continuing validity of the rule announced in Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d 749 : “[W]e adhere to the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence.” ( K.R., su 2020Because of that discretion, “the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.” (Id. at p. 757.) Recently, in K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295 (K.R.), the Supreme Court affirmed the continuing validity of the rule announced in Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d 749 : “[W]e adhere to the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence.” ( K.R., su | 1 | 2020–2020 |
MA Carpenter's Coll. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar
green
1 sentence2019Co. (1st Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 136 , 141.) This is so even when the high court’s decision does not directly address the continuing validity of the rule in question; the high court’s guidance may nonetheless erode the analytical foundations of the old rule or make clear that the rule is substantially out of step with the broader body of relevant federal law. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Anderson
red
1 sentence2019(See, e.g., People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 , 1138–1141; id. at p. 1141 [“it is our duty to reconsider” precedent when subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on our reading of that court’s earlier decisions]; see also, e.g., People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 , 134–135 [reconsidering precedent in light of reasoning of subsequent high court decisions].) Of necessity, then, we retain “the flexibility to consider emerging United States Supreme Court case law when considering earlier decisions on federal issues . . . even when the 17 PEOPLE v. LOPEZ Opinion of th | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Services
green
1 sentence2013(Concepcion, at p. 1746.) Third, the California Courts of Appeal have recognized that “Concepcion did not eliminate state law unconscionability as a defense to the enforcement of arbitration agreements subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1519 ; accord, Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 1123– 1126; Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1141, 1150 .) In Concepcion, the court held that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, a state may not rely on categor | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Van Mai
green
2 sentences2009“It has been settled law for nearly a century that an essential element of the crime of robbery is that property be taken from the possession of the victim.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 762 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 14 P.3d 221 ] (Nguyen).) We affirmed the continuing validity of that principle in Nguyen , overruling an appellate court decision, People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141 ], that had dispensed entirely with the requirement of possession. 2009“It has been settled law for nearly a century that an essential element of the crime of robbery is that property be taken from the possession of the victim.” (People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 762 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 14 P.3d 221 ] (Nguyen).) We affirmed the continuing validity of that principle in Nguyen , overruling an appellate court decision, People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141 ], that had dispensed entirely with the requirement of possession. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Remmer v. United States
green
2 sentences2004It is reasonable to infer that the declarations of K.A. and E.M. both refer to the same statement by B.P., in which case E.M.'s declaration demonstrates that it was said during deliberations. [3] In the wake of two more recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 ; Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 ), there is doubt as to the continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 . 2004It is reasonable to infer that the declarations of K.A. and E.M. both refer to the same statement by B.P., in which case E.M.'s declaration demonstrates that it was said during deliberations. [3] In the wake of two more recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 ; Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 ), there is doubt as to the continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2004It is reasonable to infer that the declarations of K.A. and E.M. both refer to the same statement by B.P., in which case E.M.'s declaration demonstrates that it was said during deliberations. [3] In the wake of two more recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 ; Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 ), there is doubt as to the continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 . 2004It is reasonable to infer that the declarations of K.A. and E.M. both refer to the same statement by B.P., in which case E.M.'s declaration demonstrates that it was said during deliberations. [3] In the wake of two more recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 ; Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 ), there is doubt as to the continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Nesler
green
2 sentences2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin 2004(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dutkel (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 893, 894-896 [presumption applies to cases of jury tampering]; U.S. v. Sylvester (5th Cir.1998) 143 F.3d 923, 934 ["the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano , " and remains applicable "only when the court determines that prejudice is likely"]; U.S. v. Williams-Davis (D.C.Cir.1996) 90 F.3d 490, 496 [presumption exists but is "not ... particularly forceful"]; U.S. v. Zelinka (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 92, 95 [" Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placin | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Smith v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2004It is reasonable to infer that the declarations of K.A. and E.M. both refer to the same statement by B.P., in which case E.M.'s declaration demonstrates that it was said during deliberations. [3] In the wake of two more recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 ; Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 ), there is doubt as to the continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 . 2004It is reasonable to infer that the declarations of K.A. and E.M. both refer to the same statement by B.P., in which case E.M.'s declaration demonstrates that it was said during deliberations. [3] In the wake of two more recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court ( United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 ; Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 ), there is doubt as to the continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice articulated in Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 227 , 74 S.Ct. 450 , 98 L.Ed. 654 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.