marriage presumption (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
← Pennsylvania issues

marriage presumption in Pennsylvania

15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Adoption of R.B.F.green
pa · 2002 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2024
2 sentences

2024See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1128-30 (Pa. 2016) (holding that the parties seeking to adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, were excused from satisfying the Adoption Act’s marriage requirement); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2002) (same). -7- J-A17005-24 particular case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements.’” M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 127 (quoting In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 , 1201- 02 (Pa. 2002)).

2024In both [In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002)] and M.R.D., the parties seeking to adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, could not satisfy the Act’s marriage requirement.

23
Bell v. Ferrarogreen
pasuperct · 2004 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2016
2 sentences

2016“The burden to prove a common-law marriage rests on the proponent of the marriage and such a claim must be reviewed with great scrutiny.” Id.

2015Bell v. Ferraro, 849 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2004). -3- J-A33038-14 Our Supreme Court has explained the presumptions and proof required in cases of common law marriage as follows: Generally, words in the present tense are required to prove common law marriage.

23
In Re: Adopt. of M.R.D. and T.M.D. Appeal of: M.C.green
pa · 2016 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2024
2 sentences

2024See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1128-30 (Pa. 2016) (holding that the parties seeking to adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, were excused from satisfying the Adoption Act’s marriage requirement); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2002) (same). -7- J-A17005-24 particular case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements.’” M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 127 (quoting In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 , 1201- 02 (Pa. 2002)).

2023Cf. In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1128-30 (Pa. 2016) (holding that the parties seeking to adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, could not satisfy the Adoption Act’s marriage requirement); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2002) (same).

22
Doran v. Dorangreen
pasuperct · 2003 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023In this case, application of estoppel would punish the party that sought to do what was righteous and reward the party that has perpetrated a fraud. - 28 - J-A19020-22 Doran, supra at 1283-84 (emphasis added).

2023In this case, application of estoppel would punish the party that sought to do what was righteous and reward the party that has perpetrated a fraud. - 28 - J-A19020-22 Doran, supra at 1283-84 (emphasis added).

11
In Re Estate of Reesgreen
pa · 1984 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See also In re Estate of Rees, 480 A.2d 327 (Pa.Super. 1984) (explaining that words in praesenti are usually required to establish common-law marriage relationship).

11
Gaboury v. Gabourygreen
pasuperct · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Appellant’s Brief at 4-7 (bolding and unnecessary capitalization omitted).2 “‘[T]his Court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.’” Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 492 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2006)). “[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court committed an error of law.

11
Rambo v. Greenegreen
pasuperct · 2006 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Appellant’s Brief at 4-7 (bolding and unnecessary capitalization omitted).2 “‘[T]his Court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.’” Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 492 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2006)). “[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court committed an error of law.

11
Michael H. v. Gerald D.green
scotus · 1989 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998See Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 , 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 937 , 110 S.Ct. 22 , 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989); Jones, supra; Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409 , 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669 , 677 A.2d 840 (1996); John M., supra .

1998See Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 , 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 937 , 110 S.Ct. 22 , 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989); Jones, supra; Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409 , 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669 , 677 A.2d 840 (1996); John M., supra .

11
Waye v. Townleygreen
scotus · 1989 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998See Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 , 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 937 , 110 S.Ct. 22 , 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989); Jones, supra; Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409 , 661 A2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669 , 677 A.2d 840 (1996); John M., supra. The two positions proffered by the appellant as to equal protection of the child are contained in one section of argument in the appellant’s brief.

1998See Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 , 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 937 , 110 S.Ct. 22 , 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989); Jones, supra; Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409 , 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669 , 677 A.2d 840 (1996); John M., supra .

11
Watt Estategreen
pa · 1962 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1971–1971
2 sentences

1971See also Watt Estate, 409 Pa. 44 , 185 A. 2d 781 (1962) (Jones, J.).

1971See also Watt Estate, 409 Pa. 44 , 185 A. 2d 781 (1962) (Jones, J.).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Mrd, by Pd v. Fmgreen
coloctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997But see Colorado—M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband’s paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa—Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man’s paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child’s best interest).

1997But see Colorado — M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband's paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa — Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man's paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child's best interest).

11

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Troxel v. Granville green
scotus · 2000
2 sentences

2019Brief of GAL, at 5. -4- J-A08013-19 control of their children is perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by [the Unites States Supreme] Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).

2019Brief of GAL, at 5. -4- J-A08013-19 control of their children is perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by [the Unites States Supreme] Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).

22019–2019
Com. v. Rocco neutral
pa · 2010
1 sentence

2015Appellant’s Brief at 4-7 (bolding and unnecessary capitalization omitted).2 “‘[T]his Court will reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.’” Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 492 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2006)). “[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court committed an error of law.

12015–2015
Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer green
pa · 1998
1 sentence

2004The burden to prove a common law marriage rests on the proponent of the marriage and such a claim must be reviewed with great scrutiny. 4 Id.

12004–2004
Paulshock v. Bonomo green
pasuperct · 1995
2 sentences

1998See Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 , 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 937 , 110 S.Ct. 22 , 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989); Jones, supra; Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409 , 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669 , 677 A.2d 840 (1996); John M., supra .

1998See Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 , 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 937 , 110 S.Ct. 22 , 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989); Jones, supra; Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409 , 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 669 , 677 A.2d 840 (1996); John M., supra .

11998–1998
Dye v. Geiger green
iowa · 1996
2 sentences

1997But see Colorado—M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband’s paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa—Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man’s paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child’s best interest).

1997But see Colorado — M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband's paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa — Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man's paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child's best interest).

11997–1997
Wilson v. Mitchell neutral
nysupct · 1957
1 sentence

1969In Wilson v. Mitchell (1957) 10 Misc. 2d 559 , 169 N.Y.S. 2d 219 , the husband had been adjudicated insane three months prior to his marriage.

11969–1969

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2511 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2512 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2901 (3) PA § 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2903 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 33 (1898–2026) NY 24 (1930–2024) PA 15 (1969–2024) AL 13 (1917–2017) FL 9 (1967–2024) TX 9 (1949–2024) IN 9 (1998–2019) LA 8 (1957–2012) WA 7 (1954–2025) MD 6 (1974–2013) TN 5 (1950–2000) CO 5 (1995–2026) CT 5 (1932–1999) OH 4 (2001–2025) IL 4 (1917–2003) MN 3 (1953–1985) SD 3 (1980–1996) WI 3 (2017–2025) NC 3 (2004–2014) NE 3 (1944–1996) SC 2 (2006–2018) MT 2 (2004–2004) MA 2 (1910–1946) NJ 2 (2005–2005) MO 2 (2011–2018) NM 2 (2022–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check