marriage doctrine in California

2021Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe[d] they were validly married.” (Id. at p. 719.) Accordingly, the statute simply requires “a threshold determination that a legal infirmity in the formation renders a marriage invalid.” (Ibid.) Putative spouse status has often been conferred when parties attempted to marry, but unknown to one party, the other was still married to someone else. ( Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th 1113 ; In re Marriage of Guo & Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491 , disapproved on another ground in Ceja, at p. 1128, fn. 12; In re Marr

2014Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Courts apply the putative spouse doctrine in a variety of actions and proceedings including dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973 , 978- 979, 985 ["the mandate of [Family Code] section 2251 must be applied, without regard to guilt or innocence, when the court makes the predicate findings that (1) the marriage is void or voidable, and (2) at least one party to the union maintained a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage"]; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003,

2021Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe[d] they were validly married.” (Id. at p. 719.) Accordingly, the statute simply requires “a threshold determination that a legal infirmity in the formation renders a marriage invalid.” (Ibid.) Putative spouse status has often been conferred when parties attempted to marry, but unknown to one party, the other was still married to someone else. ( Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th 1113 ; In re Marriage of Guo & Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491 , disapproved on another ground in Ceja, at p. 1128, fn. 12; In re Marr

2014Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Courts apply the putative spouse doctrine in a variety of actions and proceedings including dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973 , 978- 979, 985 ["the mandate of [Family Code] section 2251 must be applied, without regard to guilt or innocence, when the court makes the predicate findings that (1) the marriage is void or voidable, and (2) at least one party to the union maintained a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage"]; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003,

1955The court said “the deceased . . . would have been foreclosed from denying the validity of the divorce or the subsequent marriage under the doctrine of quasi estoppel.” (P. 585.) In Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N.J.Eq. 391 [ 157 A. 676 ], it is said that “One who induces a defendant to obtain a foreign divorce and pays the expenses thereof, and afterwards marries her, is precluded from attacking the validity of the decree.” Other cases to the same effect where similar aid had been rendered are Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753 [ 72 App.D.C. 287 ]; Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 64 [ 74 App.D.C. 287 ]; and

1955The court said “the deceased . . . would have been foreclosed from denying the validity of the divorce or the subsequent marriage under the doctrine of quasi estoppel.” (P. 585.) In Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N.J.Eq. 391 [ 157 A. 676 ], it is said that “One who induces a defendant to obtain a foreign divorce and pays the expenses thereof, and afterwards marries her, is precluded from attacking the validity of the decree.” Other cases to the same effect where similar aid had been rendered are Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753 [ 72 App.D.C. 287 ]; Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 64 [ 74 App.D.C. 287 ]; and

2026(Pletcher, at pp. 912–913; Wittgrove, at p. 1327; In re Marriage of Czapar (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1316 .) In exercising this broad discretion, a trial court may properly consider the “big picture” of the parties’ assets and income available for support in light of the marriage standard of living.

2026(In re Marriage of Lim & Carrasco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 768, 773 ; Wittgrove, at p. 1327.) Although the trial court also has the discretion to consider statutory factors applicable to awards of permanent spousal support (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1153 ), consideration of those factors is not required13 (In re Marriage of Frietas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1071 ; Czapar, at p. 1316), and the court is “not restricted by any set of statutory guidelines in fixing a temporary spousal support amount.” (Pletcher, at p. 912; Wittgrove, at p. 1327.) A trial court’s order aw

2026(In re Marriage of Lim & Carrasco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 768, 773 ; Wittgrove, at p. 1327.) Although the trial court also has the discretion to consider statutory factors applicable to awards of permanent spousal support (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1153 ), consideration of those factors is not required13 (In re Marriage of Frietas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1071 ; Czapar, at p. 1316), and the court is “not restricted by any set of statutory guidelines in fixing a temporary spousal support amount.” (Pletcher, at p. 912; Wittgrove, at p. 1327.) A trial court’s order aw

2025Brent contends See is distinguishable, and a total recapitulation method remains a legally viable tracing method in view of cases like Beam and Estate of Arstein (1961) 56 Cal.2d 239 (Arstein).

2021Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe[d] they were validly married.” (Id. at p. 719.) Accordingly, the statute simply requires “a threshold determination that a legal infirmity in the formation renders a marriage invalid.” (Ibid.) Putative spouse status has often been conferred when parties attempted to marry, but unknown to one party, the other was still married to someone else. ( Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th 1113 ; In re Marriage of Guo & Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491 , disapproved on another ground in Ceja, at p. 1128, fn. 12; In re Marr

2021Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe[d] they were validly married.” (Id. at p. 719.) Accordingly, the statute simply requires “a threshold determination that a legal infirmity in the formation renders a marriage invalid.” (Ibid.) Putative spouse status has often been conferred when parties attempted to marry, but unknown to one party, the other was still married to someone else. ( Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th 1113 ; In re Marriage of Guo & Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491 , disapproved on another ground in Ceja, at p. 1128, fn. 12; In re Marr

2021These are all issues which the trial court has discretion to determine. “[A] motion to bifurcate and separately adjudicate the issue of dissolution of the marriage is addressed to the judicial discretion of the court” (In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 235 ), as are a trial court’s orders valuing and dividing community property (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 309 ).

2021These are all issues which the trial court has discretion to determine. “[A] motion to bifurcate and separately adjudicate the issue of dissolution of the marriage is addressed to the judicial discretion of the court” (In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 235 ), as are a trial court’s orders valuing and dividing community property (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 309 ).

2015David’s reliance on In re Marriage of Reynolds (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1373 (Fourth Dist., Div. Two) does not persuade us otherwise.

2015(In re Marriage of Olson, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 5-6, fn. 3.) When using such a program, the trial court must make adjustments for unusual factors, but in the absence of such factors, computations may be based solely upon the parties’ income.

2014He cites as support In re Marriage of Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450-1452 , which noted that persons outside a marriage who claim an interest in community property may be joined to or intervene in dissolution proceedings, 16 and that the family law court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the property rights of such individuals participating in the suit.

2014When a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, "an innocent party nevertheless may be entitled to relief under the long recognized protections of the putative marriage doctrine." (In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 717 , 11 overruled on other grounds Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126 .) "Relief under the putative spouse doctrine is not precluded even if the circumstances do not establish either a void or voidable marriage." (In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005 , overruled on other grounds Ceja, at p. 1126.) Family Code sec

2014Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Courts apply the putative spouse doctrine in a variety of actions and proceedings including dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973 , 978- 979, 985 ["the mandate of [Family Code] section 2251 must be applied, without regard to guilt or innocence, when the court makes the predicate findings that (1) the marriage is void or voidable, and (2) at least one party to the union maintained a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage"]; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003,

2005BHCC, the majority reasons, was not required to use criteria or methods of proof that were "arguably less reliable and more intrusive than a marriage license to ascertain the nature and stability of its unmarried members' relationships." (Maj. opn., ante, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 584 , 115 P.3d at p. 1227 .) While this reason justifies rejecting plaintiffs' claim that BHCC's policy illegally discriminates against all unmarried couples, it carries no justificatory power with regard to registered domestic partners, whose status is readily and nonintrusively verifiable by their registration.

2005BHCC, the majority reasons, was not required to use criteria or methods of proof that were "arguably less reliable and more intrusive than a marriage license to ascertain the nature and stability of its unmarried members' relationships." (Maj. opn., ante, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 584 , 115 P.3d at p. 1227 .) While this reason justifies rejecting plaintiffs' claim that BHCC's policy illegally discriminates against all unmarried couples, it carries no justificatory power with regard to registered domestic partners, whose status is readily and nonintrusively verifiable by their registration.

2004(See Dick, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 165 .) Subject only to the general “need” and “the ability to pay,” the amount of a temporary spousal support award lies within the court’s sound discretion, which will only be reversed on appeal on a showing of clear abuse of discretion.

1988In People v. Navarro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 692 ], it was held that a good faith belief in the legal right to the subject property was a defense to the charge of theft.

1988In People v. Navarro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 692 ], it was held that a good faith belief in the legal right to the subject property was a defense to the charge of theft.

1988Code, § 281.) In People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798 [ 299 P.2d 850 ], the Supreme Court held that a good faith belief in the termination of a prior marriage was a defense to bigamy.

1988Code, § 281.) In People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798 [ 299 P.2d 850 ], the Supreme Court held that a good faith belief in the termination of a prior marriage was a defense to bigamy.