relied factors in Pennsylvania

2023See id. - 12 - J-S04041-23 Here, Cool points to the trial court’s statement that: I mean the way things are going in society today it’s not unusual to hear stories about people involved in shooting in public places.

2021On appeal, this Court vacated the judgment of sentence, concluding the trial court relied on factors not related to his case: “[The defendant] was not charged in connection with the disappearance or death of any child.” Id.

2023See Durazo, 210 A.3d at 321 ; Sheller, 961 A.2d at 190 ); see also Trial Ct. Op. at 11-13. - 10 - J-A25026-22 In any event, even if the trial court relied on factors already subsumed in the guidelines, we discern no abuse of discretion because the trial court had “significant other support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.” See Sheller, 961 A.2d at 192 (citation omitted).

2023See Durazo, 210 A.3d at 321 ; Sheller, 961 A.2d at 190 ); see also Trial Ct. Op. at 11-13. - 10 - J-A25026-22 In any event, even if the trial court relied on factors already subsumed in the guidelines, we discern no abuse of discretion because the trial court had “significant other support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.” See Sheller, 961 A.2d at 192 (citation omitted).

2023See Durazo, 210 A.3d at 321 ; Sheller, 961 A.2d at 190 ); see also Trial Ct. Op. at 11-13. - 10 - J-A25026-22 In any event, even if the trial court relied on factors already subsumed in the guidelines, we discern no abuse of discretion because the trial court had “significant other support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.” See Sheller, 961 A.2d at 192 (citation omitted).

2019See Commonwealth v. Smith , 543 Pa. 566 , 673 A.2d 893 , 896-97 (1997) (determining that even if a sentencing court relies on a factor that should not have been considered, there is no abuse of discretion where the court provides significant additional support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines).

2019See Commonwealth v. Smith , 543 Pa. 566 , 673 A.2d 893 , 896-97 (1997) (determining that even if a sentencing court relies on a factor that should not have been considered, there is no abuse of discretion where the court provides significant additional support for its departure from the sentencing guidelines).

2018See Roper 543 U.S. at 569 and 579, 125 S.Ct. 1183 .

2018See Roper 543 U.S. at 569 and 579, 125 S.Ct. 1183 .

2017See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) ("To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post -sentence motion.

2015See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2008) (considering a claim that the court relied on factors already taken into account by the offense gravity score as a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence); Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446-447 (Pa. Super. 2006) (treating claim that the court erred by imposing sentences to run consecutively as a challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence); Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 996-997 (Pa. Super. 1999) -5- J-S18010-15 (stating that a claim that the court relied on an impermissible factor in fashioning a sent

2015See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2008) (considering a claim that the court relied on factors already taken into account by the offense gravity score as a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence); Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446-447 (Pa. Super. 2006) (treating claim that the court erred by imposing sentences to run consecutively as a challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence); Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 996-997 (Pa. Super. 1999) -5- J-S18010-15 (stating that a claim that the court relied on an impermissible factor in fashioning a sent

2015See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2008) (considering a claim that the court relied on factors already taken into account by the offense gravity score as a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence); Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446-447 (Pa. Super. 2006) (treating claim that the court erred by imposing sentences to run consecutively as a challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence); Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 996-997 (Pa. Super. 1999) -5- J-S18010-15 (stating that a claim that the court relied on an impermissible factor in fashioning a sent

2014Bratic v. Rubendall, 43 A.3d 497, 501 (Pa.Super.2012) (en banc) (citation omitted).

2004See Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 732 (Pa.Super.2000) (substantial question raised by claim that prior record was double-factored, and by claim that sentencing court failed to state adequate reasons on the record). ¶ 12 Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

1986The Court relied on the principle that "once it is determined that defendant is unavailable [as the defendant was because of the continuance], the critical inquiry is whether actual delay resulted from defendant's unavailability. `If the "unavailability" results in an actual delay in the proceeding, that delay is automatically excluded.'" Id. quoting Commonwealth v. Millhouse, 470 Pa. 512, 517 , 368 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1977).

1986The Court relied on the principle that "once it is determined that defendant is unavailable [as the defendant was because of the continuance], the critical inquiry is whether actual delay resulted from defendant's unavailability. `If the "unavailability" results in an actual delay in the proceeding, that delay is automatically excluded.'" Id. quoting Commonwealth v. Millhouse, 470 Pa. 512, 517 , 368 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1977).

1973The Court relied on the rule of Commonwealth v. Sampson, 445 Pa. 558, 563 , 285 A. 2d 480, 483 (1971), that it is error for a trial court to accept a guilty plea accompanied by a denial of responsibility and an assertion of facts establishing an affirmative defense.

1973The Court relied on the rule of Commonwealth v. Sampson, 445 Pa. 558, 563 , 285 A. 2d 480, 483 (1971), that it is error for a trial court to accept a guilty plea accompanied by a denial of responsibility and an assertion of facts establishing an affirmative defense.