relied factors in Oregon

2005The Court relied on the factors identified in Mathews, 424 US 319 , noting that those factors applied generally to determinations regarding the constitutional burdens of proof in “particular proceedingts].” Santosky, 455 US at 754 .

1999The Court relied on the factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), noting that those factors applied generally to determinations regarding the constitutional burdens of proof in “particular proceeding[s].” Santosky, 455 US at 754 .

2005The Court relied on the factors identified in Mathews, 424 US 319 , noting that those factors applied generally to determinations regarding the constitutional burdens of proof in “particular proceedingts].” Santosky, 455 US at 754 .

1999The Court relied on the factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), noting that those factors applied generally to determinations regarding the constitutional burdens of proof in “particular proceeding[s].” Santosky, 455 US at 754 .

2023In rejecting Taxpayer’s argument under the Sixteenth Amendment, the court relied on the doctrine that deductions are a matter of “legislative grace.” Id. at 43 .

2020In so saying, the court relied on defense counsel’s argument that defendant functioned as a 10-year old and referred to ORS 161.290(1), which makes age 12 the threshold for crimi- nal liability of a minor.3 Id. at 623-24 .

2019Id.

2012Nearly 80 years later, in Mayer v. First National Bank of Oregon, 260 Or 119, 134-36 , 489 P2d 385 (1971), the court relied on waiver principles in deciding that a plaintiff who had improperly joined legal and equitable claims had no right to a jury trial of the legal claims.

2012Nearly 80 years later, in Mayer v. First National Bank of Oregon, 260 Or 119, 134-36 , 489 P2d 385 (1971), the court relied on waiver principles in deciding that a plaintiff who had improperly joined legal and equitable claims had no right to a jury trial of the legal claims.

2007Although Justice Thomas observed in Shepard that a majority of Court had recognized that the ease that gave rise to the exception “was wrongly decided,” id. at 27 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), more recently a majority of the Court relied on the exception, James v. United States,_US_, 127 S Ct 1586 , 1600 n 8, 167 L Ed 2d 532 (2007). 15 Defendant appears to argue that determining whether a person’s prior offenses are “similar” to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced also presents a factual issue that falls outside the prior conviction exception.

2007Although Justice Thomas observed in Shepard that a majority of Court had recognized that the ease that gave rise to the exception “was wrongly decided,” id. at 27 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), more recently a majority of the Court relied on the exception, James v. United States,_US_, 127 S Ct 1586 , 1600 n 8, 167 L Ed 2d 532 (2007). 15 Defendant appears to argue that determining whether a person’s prior offenses are “similar” to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced also presents a factual issue that falls outside the prior conviction exception.

2004The primary case on which the trial court relied in reaching that conclusion was Johnson v. Cofer, 204 Or 142 , 281 P2d 981 (1955).

2004The primary case on which the trial court relied in reaching that conclusion was Johnson v. Cofer, 204 Or 142 , 281 P2d 981 (1955).

1998Indeed, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 316-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1601 , 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), the Court relied on the rule in Marsh when it forbade the owner of a private shopping mall from prohibiting union picketing of a store in the mall.

1998Indeed, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 316-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1601 , 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), the Court relied on the rule in Marsh when it forbade the owner of a private shopping mall from prohibiting union picketing of a store in the mall.

1997The court distinguished the case from State ex rel Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswego, 319 Or 537 , 878 P2d 403 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that mandamus relief was available to a plaintiff whose application had been denied by the city after the mandamus action was brought. 3 The trial court explained that “[w]hat we have here is a situation where [plaintiff] is, in essence, attempting to use the mandamus process to undermine a [land use] decision after it was already made.” Consequently, the court determined that, “as a matter of law, [plaintiff] is not entitled under ORS 215.428 t

1997The court distinguished the case from State ex rel Compass Corp. v. City of Lake Oswego, 319 Or 537 , 878 P2d 403 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that mandamus relief was available to a plaintiff whose application had been denied by the city after the mandamus action was brought. 3 The trial court explained that “[w]hat we have here is a situation where [plaintiff] is, in essence, attempting to use the mandamus process to undermine a [land use] decision after it was already made.” Consequently, the court determined that, “as a matter of law, [plaintiff] is not entitled under ORS 215.428 t