relied principle in Connecticut

2021The court relied on the standard articulated in State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236 , 951 A.2d 1257 (2008), in which this court emphasized the limitations on postverdict inquiry of jurors and then observed: ‘‘[O]nce a verdict has been reached, the proper inquiry does not involve a determi- nation of what conclusions the jurors actually drew but, rather, of whether the jurors were aware of or actually exposed to [extrinsic material], whether it affected their ability to be impartial and whether it was of such a nature that it probably rendered the juror[s] unfair or partial.’’ (Emphasis in original

2021The court relied on the standard articulated in State v. Johnson, 288 Conn. 236 , 951 A.2d 1257 (2008), in which this court emphasized the limitations on postverdict inquiry of jurors and then observed: ‘‘[O]nce a verdict has been reached, the proper inquiry does not involve a determi- nation of what conclusions the jurors actually drew but, rather, of whether the jurors were aware of or actually exposed to [extrinsic material], whether it affected their ability to be impartial and whether it was of such a nature that it probably rendered the juror[s] unfair or partial.’’ (Emphasis in original

2020Id.

2020The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies, the plaintiff’s complaint having clearly sought relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education: this court relied on the framework set forth in the United States Supreme Court decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools ( 137 S. Ct. 743 ), and adopted by our Supreme Court in Graham v. Friedlander ( 334 Conn. 564 ), in determining that, because the plaintiff’s claims could not have been brought outside the school setting, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s claims being that th

2020The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies, the plaintiff’s complaint having clearly sought relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education: this court relied on the framework set forth in the United States Supreme Court decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools ( 137 S. Ct. 743 ), and adopted by our Supreme Court in Graham v. Friedlander ( 334 Conn. 564 ), in determining that, because the plaintiff’s claims could not have been brought outside the school setting, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s claims being that th

2019Id., at 432 , 646 A.2d 85 .

2019Id., at 432 , 646 A.2d 85 .

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2009The defendant's brief is inadequate, in part, because the defendant does not know the law and specific facts on which the court relied to challenge the ruling in a well reasoned analysis. [1] See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] The majority refers to State v. Garcia, 108 Conn.App. 533, 550-55 , 949 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 , 957 A.2d 880 (2008), which was released after the proceedings in this case, as a possible basis of the court's order of forfeiture.

2009The defendant's brief is inadequate, in part, because the defendant does not know the law and specific facts on which the court relied to challenge the ruling in a well reasoned analysis. [1] See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] The majority refers to State v. Garcia, 108 Conn.App. 533, 550-55 , 949 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 , 957 A.2d 880 (2008), which was released after the proceedings in this case, as a possible basis of the court's order of forfeiture.

2009The defendant's brief is inadequate, in part, because the defendant does not know the law and specific facts on which the court relied to challenge the ruling in a well reasoned analysis. [1] See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] The majority refers to State v. Garcia, 108 Conn.App. 533, 550-55 , 949 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 , 957 A.2d 880 (2008), which was released after the proceedings in this case, as a possible basis of the court's order of forfeiture.

2009The defendant's brief is inadequate, in part, because the defendant does not know the law and specific facts on which the court relied to challenge the ruling in a well reasoned analysis. [1] See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] The majority refers to State v. Garcia, 108 Conn.App. 533, 550-55 , 949 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 , 957 A.2d 880 (2008), which was released after the proceedings in this case, as a possible basis of the court's order of forfeiture.

2009The defendant's brief is inadequate, in part, because the defendant does not know the law and specific facts on which the court relied to challenge the ruling in a well reasoned analysis. [1] See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] The majority refers to State v. Garcia, 108 Conn.App. 533, 550-55 , 949 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 , 957 A.2d 880 (2008), which was released after the proceedings in this case, as a possible basis of the court's order of forfeiture.

2009The defendant's brief is inadequate, in part, because the defendant does not know the law and specific facts on which the court relied to challenge the ruling in a well reasoned analysis. [1] See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). [2] The majority refers to State v. Garcia, 108 Conn.App. 533, 550-55 , 949 A.2d 499 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 , 957 A.2d 880 (2008), which was released after the proceedings in this case, as a possible basis of the court's order of forfeiture.

2005In Luna, the court relied on the explanation of the term "acute symptoms" in Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Hammon, supra, at 232, but ultimately adopted the test set forth in Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration, supra, 206 Ariz. at 8 , 75 P.3d 91 , for determining the existence of an "emergency medical condition." Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, at 12-13, 589 S.E.2d 917 ; see also footnote 15 of this opinion. [18] The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court's ruling will affect patient access to emergency care adverse

2005In Luna, the court relied on the explanation of the term "acute symptoms" in Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Hammon, supra, at 232, but ultimately adopted the test set forth in Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System Administration, supra, 206 Ariz. at 8 , 75 P.3d 91 , for determining the existence of an "emergency medical condition." Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, at 12-13, 589 S.E.2d 917 ; see also footnote 15 of this opinion. [18] The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court's ruling will affect patient access to emergency care adverse

2005In Medina v. Division of Social Services, supra, 165 N.C.App. at 508 , 598 S.E.2d 707 , which was cited in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, supra, 166 N.C.App. 209 , 600 S.E.2d 877 , the court relied on its analysis in Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, 162 N.C.App. at 11-12 , 589 S.E.2d 917 , which is the state's seminal case on the issue.

2005In Medina v. Division of Social Services, supra, 165 N.C.App. at 508 , 598 S.E.2d 707 , which was cited in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, supra, 166 N.C.App. 209 , 600 S.E.2d 877 , the court relied on its analysis in Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, 162 N.C.App. at 11-12 , 589 S.E.2d 917 , which is the state's seminal case on the issue.

2005In Medina v. Division of Social Services, supra, 165 N.C.App. at 508 , 598 S.E.2d 707 , which was cited in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, supra, 166 N.C.App. 209 , 600 S.E.2d 877 , the court relied on its analysis in Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, 162 N.C.App. at 11-12 , 589 S.E.2d 917 , which is the state's seminal case on the issue.

2005In Medina v. Division of Social Services, supra, 165 N.C.App. at 508 , 598 S.E.2d 707 , which was cited in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, supra, 166 N.C.App. 209 , 600 S.E.2d 877 , the court relied on its analysis in Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, 162 N.C.App. at 11-12 , 589 S.E.2d 917 , which is the state's seminal case on the issue.

2005In Medina v. Division of Social Services, supra, 165 N.C.App. at 508 , 598 S.E.2d 707 , which was cited in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, supra, 166 N.C.App. 209 , 600 S.E.2d 877 , the court relied on its analysis in Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, 162 N.C.App. at 11-12 , 589 S.E.2d 917 , which is the state's seminal case on the issue.

2005In Medina v. Division of Social Services, supra, 165 N.C.App. at 508 , 598 S.E.2d 707 , which was cited in Diaz v. Division of Social Services, supra, 166 N.C.App. 209 , 600 S.E.2d 877 , the court relied on its analysis in Luna v. Division of Social Services, supra, 162 N.C.App. at 11-12 , 589 S.E.2d 917 , which is the state's seminal case on the issue.

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2002In support of its holding, the court relied on the principle that, “[b]ecause the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

2001The court relied on the principle recited in Hackett v. Hackett, 42 Conn. Sup. 36 , 598 A.2d 1112 (1990), affd, 26 Conn. App. 149 , 598 A.2d 1103 (1991), cert, denied, 221 Conn. 905 , 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).

2001The court relied on the principle recited in Hackett v. Hackett, 42 Conn. Sup. 36 , 598 A.2d 1112 (1990), affd, 26 Conn. App. 149 , 598 A.2d 1103 (1991), cert, denied, 221 Conn. 905 , 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).

2001The court relied on the principle recited in Hackett v. Hackett, 42 Conn. Sup. 36 , 598 A.2d 1112 (1990), affd, 26 Conn. App. 149 , 598 A.2d 1103 (1991), cert, denied, 221 Conn. 905 , 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).

2001The court relied on the principle recited in Hackett v. Hackett, 42 Conn. Sup. 36 , 598 A.2d 1112 (1990), affd, 26 Conn. App. 149 , 598 A.2d 1103 (1991), cert, denied, 221 Conn. 905 , 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).

2001The court relied on the principle recited in Hackett v. Hackett, 42 Conn. Sup. 36 , 598 A.2d 1112 (1990), affd, 26 Conn. App. 149 , 598 A.2d 1103 (1991), cert, denied, 221 Conn. 905 , 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).

2001In Hackett, the court stated that it is established in Connecticut and numerous other jurisdictions that have considered the question that “where one spouse purchases property entirely with his or her funds and takes title in the names of both spouses jointly, a rebuttable presumption arises that a gift was intended to the other spouse of a one-half interest in the property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 41; see Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 602 , 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Oldham v. Oldham, 58 R.I. 268 , 275, 192 A. 758 (1937); Sundín v. Klein] 221 Va. 232, 236-37 , 269 S.E.2d 78

2001In Hackett, the court stated that it is established in Connecticut and numerous other jurisdictions that have considered the question that “where one spouse purchases property entirely with his or her funds and takes title in the names of both spouses jointly, a rebuttable presumption arises that a gift was intended to the other spouse of a one-half interest in the property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 41; see Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 602 , 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Oldham v. Oldham, 58 R.I. 268 , 275, 192 A. 758 (1937); Sundín v. Klein] 221 Va. 232, 236-37 , 269 S.E.2d 78