second preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania

2019Id. -8- J-E01001-19 supra at 10; see also Commonwealth v. Weigle, 997 A.2d 306 , 308 n.5 (Pa. 2000) (“under Philadelphia County Local Criminal Rule [520](H), Common Pleas Motions Court judges’ orders discharging an accused or denying a re[-]arrest petition constitute final orders subject to appellate review.”).6 The instant order, issued by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Motions Court, dismissed homicide charges against Perez following his re- arrest and a second preliminary hearing.

2019We note, though Prado proceeded from a distinct procedural posture, wherein the Commonwealth appealed after the court dismissed a petition for re-arrest following a second preliminary hearing, its holding controls the instant case; the Prado court found “the court’s orders discharging the appellee and refusing the prosecution’s petition for re[-]arrest are final orders subject to appellate review.” Id. (emphasis added).

2003Id. at 22 , 331 A.2d at 208 .

2003Id. at 22 , 331 A.2d at 208 .

1983It is irrelevant that some cases declare a preliminary hearing not a “trial” for the purpose of determining whether an accused has been twice put in jeopardy if a second preliminary hearing is held, Commonwealth v. Flanders, 247 Pa.Super. 41 , 371 A.2d 1316 (1977), over ruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Scott, 279 Pa.Super. 8 , 420 A.2d 717 (1980), or that some courts approve an indictment issued without a prior preliminary hearing.

1983It is irrelevant that some cases declare a preliminary hearing not a “trial” for the purpose of determining whether an accused has been twice put in jeopardy if a second preliminary hearing is held, Commonwealth v. Flanders, 247 Pa.Super. 41 , 371 A.2d 1316 (1977), over ruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Scott, 279 Pa.Super. 8 , 420 A.2d 717 (1980), or that some courts approve an indictment issued without a prior preliminary hearing.

1983It is irrelevant that some cases declare a preliminary hearing not a “trial” for the purpose of determining whether an accused has been twice put in jeopardy if a second preliminary hearing is held, Commonwealth v. Flanders, 247 Pa.Super. 41 , 371 A.2d 1316 (1977), over ruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Scott, 279 Pa.Super. 8 , 420 A.2d 717 (1980), or that some courts approve an indictment issued without a prior preliminary hearing.

1983It is irrelevant that some cases declare a preliminary hearing not a “trial” for the purpose of determining whether an accused has been twice put in jeopardy if a second preliminary hearing is held, Commonwealth v. Flanders, 247 Pa.Super. 41 , 371 A.2d 1316 (1977), over ruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Scott, 279 Pa.Super. 8 , 420 A.2d 717 (1980), or that some courts approve an indictment issued without a prior preliminary hearing.

2024Commonwealth v. Pettersen, 49 A.3d 903 , 910 (Pa. Super. 2012); Commonwealth v. Carbo, 822 A.2d 60 , 67 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc).

2024Commonwealth v. Pettersen, 49 A.3d 903 , 910 (Pa. Super. 2012); Commonwealth v. Carbo, 822 A.2d 60, 67 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc).

2019Accordingly, when the trial court quashed the charges that were brought against Appellee, extinguishing all of the Commonwealth’s claims and allowing it to proceed no further, it became a “final order.” See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (identifying a final order as one that “disposes of all claims and of all parties”); see also Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. 2005) (“[A]n order quashing a charge is unquestionably ‘final’ as to that charge.”); Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862 , 865 n. 2 (Pa. 2003) -6- J-S26005-19 While the Rules provide that, at a preliminary hearing, a defendant ma

2016Considering all of the ____________________________________________ 11 See Philadelphia Prison Phone Calls of Vorrado, dated 8/15/2012 (telling “Female D” to “[h]ave a nice party” with Wasko the night before the second preliminary hearing); 8/16/2012 (telling “Female D” she is “going to have one more rough night [doing drugs with Wasko] on the 27 th,” the night (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 15 - J-A19020-16 above circumstances, we find the court acted well within its discretion when it determined Vorrado’s assertion of innocence was not “plausible.” Carrasquillo, supra, 115 A.3d at 1292 .

2016Considering all of the ____________________________________________ 11 See Philadelphia Prison Phone Calls of Vorrado, dated 8/15/2012 (telling “Female D” to “[h]ave a nice party” with Wasko the night before the second preliminary hearing); 8/16/2012 (telling “Female D” she is “going to have one more rough night [doing drugs with Wasko] on the 27 th,” the night (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 15 - J-A19020-16 above circumstances, we find the court acted well within its discretion when it determined Vorrado’s assertion of innocence was not “plausible.” Carrasquillo, supra, 115 A.3d at 1292 .

2003Id.

2003Id.

2003In so holding, our Court also directed that the Commonwealth must present additional evidence at the second preliminary hearing to bolster its case so as not to collaterally attack the previous determination of the trial court. • Id. ¶ 31 Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that the refiling of charges is a viable option following the trial court’s decision to grant a defendant’s habeas corpus petition.

2003Id.

2002In response, the defense asserted that the matter was controlled by the case of Commonwealth v. Moore, 749 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super.2000), which [Singletary] contended stands for the proposition that the Commonwealth is without authority to re-file criminal charges against an individual in the absence of “new evidence” not available or discoverable until after a preliminary hearing which resulted in the dismissal of the charges. [Singletary] maintained that since the evidence presented at the second preliminary hearing was not “new evidence,” the Commonwealth had no authority to re-file charges agai

1995This court stated that “where the Commonwealth in good faith alleges improper dismissal by a district justice, it must have the opportunity to bring the re-arrest before another district justice.” Id. at 610 , 617 A.2d at 353 .

1995While first noting that after a defen dant has been found guilty at trial any defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial, the court then stated that, contrary to the defendant’s allegations, the case of Liciaga did not require that “a second preliminary hearing be held before a different district justice.” The court further stated that it was “aware of no procedural rule which sets forth any such mandate.” Id. at 480, 609 A.2d at 852 .

1995This court stated that “where the Commonwealth in good faith alleges improper dismissal by a district justice, it must have the opportunity to bring the re-arrest before another district justice.” Id. at 610 , 617 A.2d at 353 .

1987Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the refiled charge, and, following a hearing on that motion, the complaint was dismissed as having been filed in violation of the rule established in Commonwealth v. Hatcher, 345 Pa.Super. *317 481, 498 A.2d 925 (1985).

1983Commonwealth v. Boyle, 470 Pa. 343 , 368 A.2d 661 (1977).

1983Commonwealth v. Boyle, 470 Pa. 343 , 368 A.2d 661 (1977).

1977WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., concur in the result. 1 . 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 , vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 808 , 94 S.Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A.2d 854 (1974). 2 .

1977WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., concur in the result. 1 . 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 , vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 808 , 94 S.Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A.2d 854 (1974). 2 .

1977WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., concur in the result. 1 . 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 , vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 808 , 94 S.Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A.2d 854 (1974). 2 .

1977WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., concur in the result. 1 . 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 , vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 808 , 94 S.Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A.2d 854 (1974). 2 .

1977WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., concur in the result. 1 . 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 , vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 808 , 94 S.Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A.2d 854 (1974). 2 .

1977WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., concur in the result. 1 . 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 , vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 808 , 94 S.Ct. 73 , 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622 , 314 A.2d 854 (1974). 2 .