second preliminary hearing in Illinois

2017He expressed the opinion that the accused would be entitled to a second preliminary hearing if the new charge were ‘completely unrelated’ and ‘fundamentally different.’ (We need not consider the correctness of this view under the facts here.) The delegate went on to say: ‘I don’t think it is the intention or the contemplation of the committee that a further preliminary hearing would be required if the offense was substantially the same one on which he received a preliminary hearing before being bound over to the grand jury.’ 3 Proceedings 1452.” Id. at 247-48 , 367 N.E.2d at 705-06 . - 19 - ¶

2017He expressed the opinion that the accused would be entitled to a second preliminary hearing if the new charge were ‘completely unrelated’ and ‘fundamentally different.’ (We need not consider the correctness of this view under the facts here.) The delegate went on to say: ‘I don’t think it is the intention or the contemplation of the committee that a further preliminary hearing would be required if the offense was substantially the same one on which he received a preliminary hearing before being bound over to the grand jury.’ 3 Proceedings 1452.” Id. at 247-48 , 367 N.E.2d at 705-06 . - 19 - ¶

1992If the State proceeds first by information, and a finding of no probable cause results from the preliminary hearing, our courts have recognized that the State can subsequently proceed with a grand jury indictment for the same offense. [Citation.] The State also can proceed by filing an information and then, prior to the preliminary hearing, obtain grand jury indictments, thus avoiding the necessity of the preliminary hearing. [Citation.] A finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing does not, in itself, bar proceeding on a new information charging the same offense and with a new prel

1992If the State proceeds first by information, and a finding of no probable cause results from the preliminary hearing, our courts have recognized that the State can subsequently proceed with a grand jury indictment for the same offense. [Citation.] The State also can proceed by filing an information and then, prior to the preliminary hearing, obtain grand jury indictments, thus avoiding the necessity of the preliminary hearing. [Citation.] A finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing does not, in itself, bar proceeding on a new information charging the same offense and with a new prel

1990App. 3d 287, 289 , 381 N.E.2d 305, 306 .) This court, in Overstreet, conditioned the validity of a second preliminary hearing upon the absence of harassment, bad faith, or fundamental unfairness.

1989(Overstreet, 64 Ill.

2012Id. ¶ 124 As an alternative to starting from scratch, the supreme court suggested a better procedure: “A better procedure would be to allow the State’s Attorney to amend an information to include essential elements of the crime charged only when such amendment is made -16- before trial, a prompt preliminary hearing is held to determine probable cause, and the defendant is allowed to plead anew and is afforded a reasonable time to further prepare his defense, which time shall be attributable to the State for [speedy-trial purposes].” Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d at 125 . ¶ 125 It is noteworthy that the

2012Id. ¶ 124 As an alternative to starting from scratch, the supreme court suggested a better procedure: “A better procedure would be to allow the State’s Attorney to amend an information to include essential elements of the crime charged only when such amendment is made -16- before trial, a prompt preliminary hearing is held to determine probable cause, and the defendant is allowed to plead anew and is afforded a reasonable time to further prepare his defense, which time shall be attributable to the State for [speedy-trial purposes].” Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d at 125 . ¶ 125 It is noteworthy that the

1986App. 3d 764, 772 , 370 N.E.2d 1315, 1321-22 .) Accordingly, the refusal of the trial court to conduct a second preliminary hearing based on the amended information did not deprive defendant of any substantial rights.

1982An accused would be entitled to a second preliminary hearing only if the new charge was “completely unrelated” and “fundamentally different” from the offenses originally charged. ( 67 Ill. 2d 242, 248 .) In People v. Nash (1980), 90 Ill.

1982App. 3d 612 , 413 N.E.2d 16 , the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument there that a charge of aggravated kidnapping was improper where it was added to a charge of robbery after a preliminary hearing court found no probable cause for a charge of unlawful restraint, a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.

1978App. 3d 1064 , 316 N.E.2d 549 , revd on other grounds (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 298 , 335 N.E.2d 769 .) Consequently, a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary hearing should not in itself bar a second preliminary hearing.

1978App. 3d 1064 , 316 N.E.2d 549 , revd on other grounds (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 298 , 335 N.E.2d 769 .) Consequently, a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary hearing should not in itself bar a second preliminary hearing.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.

1978App. 3d 1064 , 316 N.E.2d 549 , revd on other grounds (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 298 , 335 N.E.2d 769 .) Consequently, a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary hearing should not in itself bar a second preliminary hearing.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.

1978(Accord, Commonwealth v. Britt (1972), 362 Mass. 325 , 285 N.E.2d 780 ; State v. Maki (1971), 291 Minn. 427 , 192 N.W.2d 811 ; Commonwealth v. Hetherington (1975), 460 Pa. 24 , 331 A.2d 205 ; Thomas v. Justice Court (Wyo. 1975), 538 P.2d 42 ; Fed.