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15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Giant Eagle Markets Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local Union No. 23green2 sentences2024See Giant Eagle Markets, 652 A.2d at 1292-93 . 2024See Giant Eagle Markets, 652 A.2d at 1292-93 . | 2 | 2 |
Solvent MacHinery & Filter Systems, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 115green2 sentences2015See Solvent Machinery, 495 A.2d at 580-81 ; see also Indiana Cobra, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local No. 23, 406 Pa.Super. 342 , 594 A.2d 368, 371 (1991) (finding that threatening language by a protester without evidence that the threat was made “with the intention of compelling [the plaintiff] to accede to [the protestors’] demands as required by the seizure exception to the [LAIA],” rendering section 206d(d) inapplicable), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 655 , 608 A.2d 30 (1992). 2015See Solvent Machinery, 495 A.2d at 580-81 ; see also Indiana Cobra, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local No. 23, 594 A.2d 368, 371 (Pa. Super. 1991) (finding that threatening language by a protester without evidence that the threat was made “with the intention of compelling [the plaintiff] to accede to [the protestors’] demands as required by the seizure exception to the [LAIA],” rendering section 206d(d) inapplicable), appeal denied, 608 A.2d 30 (Pa. 1992). | 2 | 2 |
Indiana Cobra, Inc. v. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL NO. 23green2 sentences2015See Solvent Machinery, 495 A.2d at 580-81 ; see also Indiana Cobra, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local No. 23, 406 Pa.Super. 342 , 594 A.2d 368, 371 (1991) (finding that threatening language by a protester without evidence that the threat was made “with the intention of compelling [the plaintiff] to accede to [the protestors’] demands as required by the seizure exception to the [LAIA],” rendering section 206d(d) inapplicable), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 655 , 608 A.2d 30 (1992). 2015See Solvent Machinery, 495 A.2d at 580-81 ; see also Indiana Cobra, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local No. 23, 406 Pa.Super. 342 , 594 A.2d 368, 371 (1991) (finding that threatening language by a protester without evidence that the threat was made “with the intention of compelling [the plaintiff] to accede to [the protestors’] demands as required by the seizure exception to the [LAIA],” rendering section 206d(d) inapplicable), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 655 , 608 A.2d 30 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Widmergreen1 sentence2018“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stricklergreen1 sentence2018Thus, the test permits subjective considerations, as noted supra. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 901 (Pa. 2000) (maturity, sophistication, mental or - 15 - J-S10004-18 J-S10005-18 J-S10006-18 J-S10007-18 to the balance of the totality of the circumstances, and adopt its analysis as our own, which is summarized. | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016A traffic stop is a relatively brief encounter and a seizure for such a violation justifies a police investigation of that particular violation. -6- J-S45001-16 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). 2016The permissible duration of a traffic stop is determined by the seizure’s “mission, [which is to] address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Ohio v. Robinettegreen2 sentences2000The majority opinion in Robinette II has been criticized for failing to expressly resolve, or offering an unduly truncated resolution of, the question of the existence and lawfulness of a detention at the time consent was obtained under such circumstances. 13 Nevertheless, as such question was framed as essential to the disposition, see Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 38 , 117 S.Ct. at 420 (“the issue as to the continuing legality of the detention is a ‘predicate to an intelligent resolution’ of the question presented”), and the Court expressly indicated that it was undertaking to answer it, id. (“w 2000The majority opinion in Robinette II has been criticized for failing to expressly resolve, or offering an unduly truncated resolution of, the question of the existence and lawfulness of a detention at the time consent was obtained under such circumstances. 13 Nevertheless, as such question was framed as essential to the disposition, see Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 38 , 117 S.Ct. at 420 (“the issue as to the continuing legality of the detention is a ‘predicate to an intelligent resolution’ of the question presented”), and the Court expressly indicated that it was undertaking to answer it, id. (“w | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinettegreen2 sentences2000See Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 697 . 2000See Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 697 . | 1 | 1 |
O'TOOLE v. Franklingreen1 sentence1978See O’Toole v. Franklin, supra, 279 Or. at-, 569 P.2d at 565 . | 1 | 1 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen1 sentence1974Such consent must appear from “all the surrounding circumstances” to have been voluntary, i.e., not “coerced, by *378 explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Beck v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1965See, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 , 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964). 1965See, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 , 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Muldoon v. Rickey
green
2 sentences1982This court has stated that injury to reputation is “the kind of secondary [consequence] which the seizure requirement was designed to make non-compensable.” Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., supra, 256 Pa.Super. at 80 -81 n. 6, 389 A.2d at 610 n. 6; Citing Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883); Roberts v. Gibson, 214 Pa.Super. 220 , 251 A.2d 799 (1969). 1978Muldoon v. Rickey, supra; Roberts v. Gibson, supra. Finally, appellants’ argument that the seizure requirement deprives them of their due process rights is patently frivolous. | 2 | 1978–1982 |
Roberts v. Gibson
green
2 sentences1982This court has stated that injury to reputation is “the kind of secondary [consequence] which the seizure requirement was designed to make non-compensable.” Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., supra, 256 Pa.Super. at 80 -81 n. 6, 389 A.2d at 610 n. 6; Citing Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883); Roberts v. Gibson, 214 Pa.Super. 220 , 251 A.2d 799 (1969). 1982This court has stated that injury to reputation is “the kind of secondary [consequence] which the seizure requirement was designed to make non-compensable.” Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., supra, 256 Pa.Super. at 80 -81 n. 6, 389 A.2d at 610 n. 6; Citing Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883); Roberts v. Gibson, 214 Pa.Super. 220 , 251 A.2d 799 (1969). | 2 | 1978–1982 |
Florian v. Southwestern Veterans Center
green
1 sentence2020In his final issue, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a probation violation because the Commonwealth failed to present a seizure analysis or expert testimony to confirm that the substance seized ____________________________________________ hearing.’” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
California v. Hodari D.
green
2 sentences2009The court’s reliance on “actual detainment” even for a momentary period, is akin to the seizure analysis proclaimed by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (person seized under Fourth Amendment when lawful authority applies physical force to individual or individual submits to assertion of authority). 2009The court’s reliance on “actual detainment” even for a momentary period, is akin to the seizure analysis proclaimed by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (person seized under Fourth Amendment when lawful authority applies physical force to individual or individual submits to assertion of authority). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982This court has stated that injury to reputation is “the kind of secondary [consequence] which the seizure requirement was designed to make non-compensable.” Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., supra, 256 Pa.Super. at 80 -81 n. 6, 389 A.2d at 610 n. 6; Citing Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883); Roberts v. Gibson, 214 Pa.Super. 220 , 251 A.2d 799 (1969). 1982This court has stated that injury to reputation is “the kind of secondary [consequence] which the seizure requirement was designed to make non-compensable.” Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., supra, 256 Pa.Super. at 80 -81 n. 6, 389 A.2d at 610 n. 6; Citing Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883); Roberts v. Gibson, 214 Pa.Super. 220 , 251 A.2d 799 (1969). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Eberly v. Rupp
neutral
2 sentences1979In Norcross v. Otis Bros. & Co., supra , the seizure requirement was not fulfilled by defendant's instructions to a third party not to pay a sum of money to plaintiff because the sum of money was the subject of a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant, and in Eberly v. Rupp, supra , the requirement was not satisfied by defendant's institution of an earlier unfounded action to restrain plaintiff from committing *282 waste. 1979In Norcross v. Otis Bros. & Co., supra, the seizure requirement was not fulfilled by defendant’s instructions to a third party not to pay a sum of money to plaintiff because the sum of money was the subject of a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant, and in Eberly v. Rupp, supra, the requirement was not satisfied by defendant’s institution of an earlier unfounded action to restrain plaintiff from com mitting waste. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Kramer v. Stock
neutral
1 sentence1978In reaching this conclusion, we recall the words of our Supreme Court in the seminal case of Kramer v. Stock, supra at 118: “There is probably great difficulty in devising a system on the subject which would be free from inconvenience to one party or the other.” The competing interests were aptly articulated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in reaffirming its adherence to the seizure requirement: “Some sort of balance has to be struck between the social interests in preventing unconscionable suits and in permitting honest assertion of supposed rights. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.