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15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1914–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co.green2 sentences2019Orders affirmed. ____________________________________________ 2 With respect to Appellant’s argument against Second Nature that the trial court violated the rule established in Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 309 Pa. 236 , 163 A. 523 (1932), the record shows the court did not rely solely on oral testimony from Second Nature’s witnesses. 2019Orders affirmed. ____________________________________________ 2 With respect to Appellant’s argument against Second Nature that the trial court violated the rule established in Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 309 Pa. 236 , 163 A. 523 (1932), the record shows the court did not rely solely on oral testimony from Second Nature’s witnesses. | 1 | 3 |
Jacob v. Shultz-Jacobgreen1 sentence2020The doctrine of equitable estoppel is one of “fundamental fairness, designed to preclude a party from depriving another of a reasonable expectation when the party inducing the expectation albeit gratuitously knew or should have known that the other would rely on that conduct to his detriment.” Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 480 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re TJgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., In Re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73, 74 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also In re T.J., 739 A.2d 478, 481-83 (Pa. 1999). -8- J-A27035-14 … When [J.E.O.’s] absence from the [review hearing] is coupled with the facts that only a review of the taped hearing was performed, without a true hearing before the [Orphans’] Court and without a record being made, it is clear that [J.E.O.] was denied due process of law. [See In Re Estate of] S.G.L., supra [(where the appellant raised a due process challenge concerning the Orphans’ Court’s failure to conduct a proper de novo hearing (i.e., to review the | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of S.G.L.green2 sentences2014See, e.g., In Re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73, 74 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also In re T.J., 739 A.2d 478, 481-83 (Pa. 1999). -8- J-A27035-14 … When [J.E.O.’s] absence from the [review hearing] is coupled with the facts that only a review of the taped hearing was performed, without a true hearing before the [Orphans’] Court and without a record being made, it is clear that [J.E.O.] was denied due process of law. [See In Re Estate of] S.G.L., supra [(where the appellant raised a due process challenge concerning the Orphans’ Court’s failure to conduct a proper de novo hearing (i.e., to review the 2014See, e.g., In Re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73, 74 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also In re T.J., 739 A.2d 478, 481-83 (Pa. 1999). -8- J-A27035-14 … When [J.E.O.’s] absence from the [review hearing] is coupled with the facts that only a review of the taped hearing was performed, without a true hearing before the [Orphans’] Court and without a record being made, it is clear that [J.E.O.] was denied due process of law. [See In Re Estate of] S.G.L., supra [(where the appellant raised a due process challenge concerning the Orphans’ Court’s failure to conduct a proper de novo hearing (i.e., to review the | 1 | 1 |
Ario v. Reliance Insurancegreen2 sentences2011“The law of the case doctrine sets forth various rules that embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” Ario v. Reliance Insurance Co., 602 Pa. 490 , 980 A.2d 588, 597 (2009). 2011“The law of the case doctrine sets forth various rules that embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” Ario v. Reliance Insurance Co., 602 Pa. 490 , 980 A.2d 588, 597 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Starrgreen2 sentences2002The question of the scope of the release and its effect on the medical malpractice litigation is not before us; we have not reviewed the Superior Court's resolution of this question and do not disturb its holding. [1] In addition, as I believe that Goldey 's "change in facts" exception applies, I would not resort to reliance on the purported "manifest injustice" exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which is questionably grounded in dicta in Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564 , 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (1995). 2002The question of the scope of the release and its effect on the medical malpractice litigation is not before us; we have not reviewed the Superior Court's resolution of this question and do not disturb its holding. [1] In addition, as I believe that Goldey 's "change in facts" exception applies, I would not resort to reliance on the purported "manifest injustice" exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which is questionably grounded in dicta in Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564 , 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Singletarygreen2 sentences1991See, Commonwealth v. Singletary, 478 Pa. 610 , 387 A.2d 656 (1978). 1991See, Commonwealth v. Singletary, 478 Pa. 610 , 387 A.2d 656 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lineberger v. Wyeth
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Cole
green
1 sentence2010According to Appellant, the prosecutor should have been forced to challenge for cause to secure the removal. *443 The trial court rejected Appellant’s position based on Chmiel, 585 Pa. at 547 , 889 A.2d at 501 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Tedford
green
2 sentences2010See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2); Commonwealth v. Bedford, 598 Pa. 639 , 706 n. 28, 960 A.2d 1 , 40 n. 28 (2008). 2010See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2); Commonwealth v. Bedford, 598 Pa. 639 , 706 n. 28, 960 A.2d 1 , 40 n. 28 (2008). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Chmiel
green
1 sentence2010According to Appellant, the prosecutor should have been forced to challenge for cause to secure the removal. *443 The trial court rejected Appellant’s position based on Chmiel, 585 Pa. at 547 , 889 A.2d at 501 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Mohn v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hospital
green
2 sentences1989Appellant contends that the court violated the rule of Mohn v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital, 357 Pa.Super. 173, 515 A.2d 920 (1986), in permitting this testimony and, more *349 over, was not evenhanded in its treatment of appellant when its counsel cross-examined appellee’s expert witness as to the same subject. 1989Appellant contends that the court violated the rule of Mohn v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital, 357 Pa.Super. 173, 515 A.2d 920 (1986), in permitting this testimony and, more *349 over, was not evenhanded in its treatment of appellant when its counsel cross-examined appellee’s expert witness as to the same subject. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1986Specifically, Appellant claims that the court violated the standard set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), which established a rule of law that limited venirepersons who could be excluded from a jury considering the death penalty to the following: Nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment witho 1986Specifically, Appellant claims that the court violated the standard set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), which established a rule of law that limited venirepersons who could be excluded from a jury considering the death penalty to the following: Nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment witho | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Armit v. Loveland
green
1 sentence1957It is immaterial to the question of negligence whether the violated standard is established by statute or by the common law so long as it is established by either: Armit v. Loveland, 115 F. 2d 308 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Goldberg v. Friedrich
green
1 sentence1957“The original statement placed the claim in a class governed by certain laws, and, whether statutory or common, it was not incumbent on plaintiff to further plead the particular law violated”: Goldberg v. Friedrich, 279 Pa. 572, 576 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Brennan's Estate
neutral
1 sentence1914The court clearly violated its rule, Ap., p. 13 by receiving and considering a petition after the argument, not filed until more than six weeks after the time specified by the rule: Knoblauch’s License, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 323 ; Brennen’s Estate, 65 Pa. 16 ; Gann v. Fritz, 79 Pa. 303 ; Todd v. Insurance Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 371 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Gannon v. Fritz
neutral
1 sentence1914The court clearly violated its rule, Ap., p. 13 by receiving and considering a petition after the argument, not filed until more than six weeks after the time specified by the rule: Knoblauch’s License, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 323 ; Brennen’s Estate, 65 Pa. 16 ; Gann v. Fritz, 79 Pa. 303 ; Todd v. Insurance Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 371 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Todd v. Quaker City Mutual Fire Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1914The court clearly violated its rule, Ap., p. 13 by receiving and considering a petition after the argument, not filed until more than six weeks after the time specified by the rule: Knoblauch’s License, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 323 ; Brennen’s Estate, 65 Pa. 16 ; Gann v. Fritz, 79 Pa. 303 ; Todd v. Insurance Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 371 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Knoblauch's License
green
1 sentence1914The court clearly violated its rule, Ap., p. 13 by receiving and considering a petition after the argument, not filed until more than six weeks after the time specified by the rule: Knoblauch’s License, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 323 ; Brennen’s Estate, 65 Pa. 16 ; Gann v. Fritz, 79 Pa. 303 ; Todd v. Insurance Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 371 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.