Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2006Ketchem argues that the trial court violated the rule discussed in Blakely v. Washington that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) ( quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 2005IV Propriety of Sentence and Fine DeWhitt claims that the trial court violated the rule espoused in Blakely v. *1067 Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2581 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) in imposing his sentence and fine. | 1 | 3 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2006Ketchem argues that the trial court violated the rule discussed in Blakely v. Washington that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) ( quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 2005In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court applied the rule from the earlier case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 485 (2000), wherein the Court had stated, "'Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ' Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). | 1 | 2 |
Lefkowitz v. Turleygreen1 sentence2019See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Bleeke, 6 N.E.3d at 925 . | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Here, it is apparent that Stack only pleaded guilty to the theft of the watch.2 And to the extent Stack’s guilty plea may be interpreted to have been for theft of the jewelry beyond the watch, the acceptance of the plea by the trial court violated the rule “that a judge may not accept a plea of guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and maintains [her] innocence at the same time.” Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983). 2 In fact, the State does not contend that Stack pleaded guilty to the theft of anything beyond the watch, but rather that she could be ordered to pay restitution | 1 | 1 |
Kashman v. Haasgreen1 sentence2009See Kashman v. Haas, 766 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bleeke v. Lemmon
green
1 sentence2019See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Bleeke, 6 N.E.3d at 925 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Salinas v. Texas
green
2 sentences2016He also argues that the State used this inadmissible evidence to impeach his innocence even before he ever had a legitimate opportunity to, defend himself. [19] The State argues that evidence of Nichols’s failure to appear was admissible under-Salinas v. Texas, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2174 , 186 L.Ed.2d 376 (2013), and Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh’g •denied, trans. denied. 2016He also argues that the State used this inadmissible evidence to impeach his innocence even before he ever had a legitimate opportunity to, defend himself. [19] The State argues that evidence of Nichols’s failure to appear was admissible under-Salinas v. Texas, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2174 , 186 L.Ed.2d 376 (2013), and Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh’g •denied, trans. denied. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Owens v. State
green
1 sentence2016He also argues that the State used this inadmissible evidence to impeach his innocence even before he ever had a legitimate opportunity to, defend himself. [19] The State argues that evidence of Nichols’s failure to appear was admissible under-Salinas v. Texas, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2174 , 186 L.Ed.2d 376 (2013), and Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh’g •denied, trans. denied. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Smylie v. State
green
1 sentence2005Although Chupp made no argument in his appellant's brief or his reply brief that *124 the trial court violated the rule set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), reh'g denied, Chupp submitted to this court on March 17, 2005, a citation to additional authority in which he cites Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005), a case which addressed the impact of the Blakely holding in Indiana. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Montgomery v. State
green
1 sentence1989He argues the trial court violated the rule against proving a conspiracy by out-of-court acts or statements of a co-conspirator not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, citing Montgomery v. State (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 646 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Patton, Nickelson v. State
green
2 sentences1989He also cites Patton v. State (1961), 241 Ind. 645 , 175 N.E.2d 11 for the corollary rule that post-conspiracy statements or guilty pleas by co-conspirators should not be admitted. 1989He also cites Patton v. State (1961), 241 Ind. 645 , 175 N.E.2d 11 for the corollary rule that post-conspiracy statements or guilty pleas by co-conspirators should not be admitted. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Hinshaw v. State
green
2 sentences1941In the celebrated case of Hinshaw v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 334, 363 , 47 N. E. 157, 166 , it was said: “This process of tallying and confirming each circumstance by the others does not infringe the general rule that one inference cannot be based on another. 1941In the celebrated case of Hinshaw v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 334, 363 , 47 N. E. 157, 166 , it was said: “This process of tallying and confirming each circumstance by the others does not infringe the general rule that one inference cannot be based on another. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Woollen v. Whitacre
green
1 sentence1899The court in the tenth instruction did not merely tell the jury that the matters alluded to were matters which they had a right to consider and judge for themselves in determining the question as to the relative weight of the opinions of witnesses; to this there could have been no objection; Pratt v. State, supra; but the court went further, and told the jury how to determine the question, and so the court violated the principle of the foregoing decisions, and usurped the province of the jury.” In Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502, 503 , the court was requested to instruct the jury in relation | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Wilson v. Bennett
green
1 sentence1898It was contended by appellee in the trial that there was plenty of room for a person to walk between the barrel and the wall in safety, and he was asked this question: “You may state, Mr. Cummins, whether there was sufficient room, between where the barrel was and the wall for a man to walk with safety?” To which he made answer: “Yes, I think so, as much room as we commonly have; as much room as between the well-house and brick wall.” Elliott, J., speaking for the court said: “The court violated the rule forbidding the expression of opinions by witnesses, in allowing this testimony to go to th | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.