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15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1885–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2005Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999). 2005Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999). | 3 | 3 |
Coughran v. Nunezgreen2 sentences2015See Nunez, 127 S.W.2d at 887; Gossett, 43 S.W.2d at 623 . 2014See Nunez, 127 S.W.2d at 887 ; Gossett, 43 S.W.2d at 623 . | 2 | 2 |
Bagwell v. Ridge at Alta Vista Investments I, LLCgreen1 sentence2018However, the trial court has wide discretion to enforce a scheduling order and manage its docket, see Bagwell v. Ridge at Alta Vista Investment, I, LLC, 440 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied), and the trial court explicitly stated its decision on Walmart’s motion for leave to file counteraffidavit was based on the “clear” requirements of section 18.001. –24– (1) not later than: (A) 30 days after the party receives a copy of the affidavit; and (B) at least 14 days before the day on which evidence is first presented at the trial of the case; or (C) with leave of the court, at a | 1 | 1 |
University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishopgreen1 sentence2016See University of Tex. v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 357-58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (“Because UTA has failed to bring forth the reporter’s record from the hearing on Bishop’s motion for sanctions, however, we must presume that sufficient evidence was introduced to support the trial court’s findings and the judgment based on them.”). | 1 | 1 |
Olivares v. Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc.green1 sentence2015See Olivares, 401 S.W.3d at 378 (concluding engineering company was independent contractor where evidence showed governmental entity hired company for set amount of time—time it took to complete tollway project—and 16 paid flat fee); Mid-Continent, 391 S.W.3d at 577 (evidence that worker was hired for short-term contract and was not promised any additional work after projects ended weighed in favor of concluding that he was independent contractor). | 1 | 1 |
City of Houston v. Ranjelgreen1 sentence2015See Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d at 891–92 (appellant failed to raise fact issue regarding third party operator’s employee status where evidence did “nothing more than establish that Houston controlled the end result of [operator’s] contractual duty to operate and maintain the [automated people-mover] system” at Houston-owned airport); EPGT Tex. Pipeline, 176 S.W.3d at 336–38 (undisputed summary-judgment evidence showed construction company hired by governmental entity was independent contractor where company furnished its own equipment and supplies, was paid by job, and decided means and methods used f | 1 | 1 |
TEXAS a & M UNIVERSITY v. Bishopgreen2 sentences2015See Bishop, 156 S.W.3d at 584–85. 2015See Bishop, 156 S.W.3d at 584–85. | 1 | 1 |
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Andregg Contracting, Inc. and Bacilio Zapatagreen1 sentence2015See Olivares, 401 S.W.3d at 378 (concluding engineering company was independent contractor where evidence showed governmental entity hired company for set amount of time—time it took to complete tollway project—and 16 paid flat fee); Mid-Continent, 391 S.W.3d at 577 (evidence that worker was hired for short-term contract and was not promised any additional work after projects ended weighed in favor of concluding that he was independent contractor). | 1 | 1 |
Del Valle Independent School District v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2015The court of appeals disagreed, stating that “the characterization of an order as a temporary injunction is controlled by the character and function of the order, regardless of its form” (citing Del Valle I.S.D. v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. 1992)): 9 The trial court ‘reinstated’ the March 15, 2010 temporary injunction by vacating and rescinding its order granting Bishop’s motion to dissolve. | 1 | 1 |
Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Zuleima Olivares, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Pedro Olivares, Jr., & Pedro Olivaresgreen1 sentence2015See Olivares, 2015 WL 1897646, at *7 (evidence showed company was independent contractor where it had discretion to design tollway’s signage and road layouts); White v. DR & PA Deliverance, Ltd., No. 01-12-00227-CV, 2014 WL 767218 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]n independent contractor has sole control over the means and methods of his work . . . . | 1 | 1 |
Randle v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2012See Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218 ; Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 516 (determining that appellant did not demonstrate that time restrictions on filing claims were unreasonable).5 His claim does not make the trial court's application of chapter 14 unreasonable in light of these provisions' purposes in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Bushgreen1 sentence2012See Bush, 23 S.W.3d at 218 ; Randle, 26 S.W.3d at 516 (determining that appellant did not demonstrate that time restrictions on filing claims were unreasonable).5 His claim does not make the trial court's application of chapter 14 unreasonable in light of these provisions' purposes in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Dartgreen1 sentence2006See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gossett v. Manley
green
2 sentences2015See Nunez, 127 S.W.2d at 887; Gossett, 43 S.W.2d at 623 . 2014See Nunez, 127 S.W.2d at 887 ; Gossett, 43 S.W.2d at 623 . | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Prater v. State Farm Lloyds
green
1 sentence2018See LandAmercia, 2015 WL 6545685 , at *9; Blackstone, 470 S.W.3d at 648 ; Oliphant, 295 S.W.3d at 423–24; Prater, 217 S.W.3d at 740–41. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Oliphant Financial LLC v. Angiano
green
1 sentence2018See LandAmercia, 2015 WL 6545685 , at *9; Blackstone, 470 S.W.3d at 648 ; Oliphant, 295 S.W.3d at 423–24; Prater, 217 S.W.3d at 740–41. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Blackstone Medical, Inc. D/B/A Orthofix Spinal Implants v. Phoenix Surgicals, LLC
green
1 sentence2018See LandAmercia, 2015 WL 6545685 , at *9; Blackstone, 470 S.W.3d at 648 ; Oliphant, 295 S.W.3d at 423–24; Prater, 217 S.W.3d at 740–41. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bunton v. Bentley
green
1 sentence2015See Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d at 891–92 (appellant failed to raise fact issue regarding third party operator’s employee status where evidence did “nothing more than establish that Houston controlled the end result of [operator’s] contractual duty to operate and maintain the [automated people-mover] system” at Houston-owned airport); EPGT Tex. Pipeline, 176 S.W.3d at 336–38 (undisputed summary-judgment evidence showed construction company hired by governmental entity was independent contractor where company furnished its own equipment and supplies, was paid by job, and decided means and methods used f | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lucas v. United States
green
1 sentence2012Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark
green
1 sentence2010Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Drope v. Missouri
green
2 sentences1979Finally, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 , 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the Court held that because there was sufficient evidence raised at the state trial concerning the defendant’s incompetence due process was denied by the state’s failure to conduct a hearing into the defendant’s competency. 1979Finally, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 , 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the Court held that because there was sufficient evidence raised at the state trial concerning the defendant’s incompetence due process was denied by the state’s failure to conduct a hearing into the defendant’s competency. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Biggs v. State
neutral
1 sentence1885Mr. Bishop’s rule, as above quoted, also commends itself to us as both just and proper; “If a husband is not actually witnessing his wife’s adultery, but knows it is transpiring, and in an overpowering passion, no time for cooling having elapsed, he kills the wrong-doer, the offense is reduced to manslaughter.” (Citing The State. v. Holmes, 54 Miss., 153 ; Biggs v. The State, 29 Ga., 723 ; Cheek v. The State, 35 Ind., 492 .) And to the same effect is Maher v. The State, 10 Mich., 212 . | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Maher v. People
green
1 sentence1885Mr. Bishop’s rule, as above quoted, also commends itself to us as both just and proper; “If a husband is not actually witnessing his wife’s adultery, but knows it is transpiring, and in an overpowering passion, no time for cooling having elapsed, he kills the wrong-doer, the offense is reduced to manslaughter.” (Citing The State. v. Holmes, 54 Miss., 153 ; Biggs v. The State, 29 Ga., 723 ; Cheek v. The State, 35 Ind., 492 .) And to the same effect is Maher v. The State, 10 Mich., 212 . | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Cheek v. State
green
1 sentence1885Mr. Bishop’s rule, as above quoted, also commends itself to us as both just and proper; “If a husband is not actually witnessing his wife’s adultery, but knows it is transpiring, and in an overpowering passion, no time for cooling having elapsed, he kills the wrong-doer, the offense is reduced to manslaughter.” (Citing The State. v. Holmes, 54 Miss., 153 ; Biggs v. The State, 29 Ga., 723 ; Cheek v. The State, 35 Ind., 492 .) And to the same effect is Maher v. The State, 10 Mich., 212 . | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.