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15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boyles v. Kerrgreen1 sentence1993Because the Texas Supreme Court overruled Garrard in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex.1993), appellees urge that they are entitled to a new trial to raise other causes of action which may support recovery for their damages. | 1 | 1 |
Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbockgreen2 sentences1979See Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 489 S.W.2d 697, 705 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo, rev'd on other grounds, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.1974)). 1979See Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 489 S.W.2d 697, 705 (Tex.Civ.App—Amarillo, rev’d on other grounds, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.1974)). | 1 | 1 |
Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbockgreen2 sentences1979See Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 489 S.W.2d 697, 705 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo, rev'd on other grounds, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.1974)). 1979See Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 489 S.W.2d 697, 705 (Tex.Civ.App—Amarillo, rev’d on other grounds, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.1974)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Transportation v. Needham
green
2 sentences2002MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles asks this Court to reconsider our opinion in light of the supreme court's recent decision in Texas Department of Transportation v. Needham , 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 631 , 2002 Tex. LEXIS 1555 (Tex. May 9, 2002) which defines what the current whistleblower statute means by "an appropriate law enforcement authority." We have carefully considered the holding in Needham, which reversed a jury verdict because the aggrieved employee failed to report the alleged violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authorit 2002MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles asks this Court to reconsider our opinion in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Texas Department of Transportation v. Needham, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 631 , 82 S.W.3d 314 , 2002 Tex. LEXIS 1555 (Tex.2002) which defines what the current whistle-blower statute means by “an appropriate law enforcement authority.” We have carefully considered the holding in Needham, which reversed a jury verdict because the aggrieved employee failed to report the alleged violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.
green
1 sentence2000We express no opinion as to whether the attorney’s fees awarded by the district court can or should be modified, see Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.1997), and reverse and remand this issue to the district court for further consideration. 1 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Shepherd v. Ledford
green
1 sentence1999The law firm of Edwards, Perry & Hass, L.L.P. has filed an amicus curie brief contending this court failed to apply the correct standard of review and misinterpreted Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard
red
1 sentence1993OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING By motion for rehearing, appellees maintain that when they elected to proceed in the trial court on the cause of action of emotional distress negligently inflicted by appellant, they were entitled to rely on St Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1987), which recognized that doctrine as an independent cause of action. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank
green
2 sentences1991As authority for the proposition that unreasonableness of attorney’s fees must be pled as an affirmative defense, Snyder cites Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation, 676 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ). 1991As authority for the proposition that unreasonableness of attorney's fees must be pled as an affirmative defense, Snyder cites Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation, 576 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App. —Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp.
green
1 sentence1991As authority for the proposition that unreasonableness of attorney's fees must be pled as an affirmative defense, Snyder cites Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation, 576 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App. —Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden
green
2 sentences1991As authority for the proposition that unreasonableness of attorney’s fees must be pled as an affirmative defense, Snyder cites Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation, 676 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ). 1991As authority for the proposition that unreasonableness of attorney's fees must be pled as an affirmative defense, Snyder cites Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation, 576 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App. —Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Love v. City of Dallas
green
2 sentences1991OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, plaintiff-intervenors request that we modify our opinion to overrule Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351 , 40 S.W.2d 20 (1931), or interpret that case “in a manner that would permit the [state-wide] recapture of local ad valorem revenues for purposes of equalization.” We believe Love is sound and decline to overrule or modify it. 1991OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, plaintiff-intervenors request that we modify our opinion to overrule Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351 , 40 S.W.2d 20 (1931), or interpret that case “in a manner that would permit the [state-wide] recapture of local ad valorem revenues for purposes of equalization.” We believe Love is sound and decline to overrule or modify it. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1990MOPAC cites a criminal case, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to support its position. [1] ERROR The burden of proof in civil cases is, and always has been, on the party appealing from the trial court's judgment to show error in the judgment. 1990MOPAC cites a criminal case, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to support its position. [1] ERROR The burden of proof in civil cases is, and always has been, on the party appealing from the trial court's judgment to show error in the judgment. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Billie v. State
green
2 sentences1988OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, appellant, Charles Otis Herring, argues that we *856 should have applied the rule stated in Billie v. State, 605 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) in determining whether the trial court properly denied his motion for continuance. 1988OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, appellant, Charles Otis Herring, argues that we should have applied the rule stated in Billie v. State, 605 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) in determining whether the trial court properly denied his motion for continuance. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hudson v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1986ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, Moore contends that we erred in (1) applying the rules of civil procedure and (2) in misreading Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43 , 101 S.Ct. 970, 972 , 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). 1986ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, Moore contends that we erred in (1) applying the rules of civil procedure and (2) in misreading Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43 , 101 S.Ct. 970, 972 , 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Ector County Independent School District v. Hopkins Ex Rel. Hopkins
green
2 sentences1983ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, Appellants cite Ector County Independent School Dist. v. Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Civ.App.— El Paso 1974, no writ) to urge error in our disposition of this appeal. 1983ON MOTION FOR REHEARING On motion for rehearing, Appellants cite Ector County Independent School Dist. v. Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Civ.App.— El Paso 1974, no writ) to urge error in our disposition of this appeal. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences1982ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING By motion for rehearing, the State urges reconsideration of our original opinion in light of the recent Supreme Court opinion of United States v. Ross, -U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1982). 1982ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING By motion for rehearing, the State urges reconsideration of our original opinion in light of the recent Supreme Court opinion of United States v. Ross, -U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 , (1982). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Morrow v. Shotwell
green
2 sentences1979In urging remand of the cause for new trial, appellee invokes Rule 434 and relies on Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Sup.1972). 1979In urging remand of the cause for new trial, appellee invokes Rule 434 and relies on Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Sup.1972). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1965With vigor and ability it is again asserted that Coyle v. Palatine Insurance Company, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 973 , is a voice from the "mauve period in the history of the United States," and is a mistaken one at that. 1965With vigor and ability it is again asserted that Coyle v. Palatine Insurance Company, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 973 , is a voice from the “mauve period in the history of the United States,” and is a mistaken one at that. | 1 | 1965–1965 |