investigative privilege in Texas

1991While the court did state that the investigative privilege “can be invoked only where the document sought to be protected was prepared in connection with the prosecution or defense of the lawsuit in which the discovery is sought ...,” 559 S.W.2d at 803 , the court did not have before it the question of the duration of the work product privilege. *751 Indications of the high degree of protection to be afforded the mental processes of an attorney exist in both the rules and our case law.

1989The investigative privilege of Rule 166b(3) is governed by the rule in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.1977); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex.1986).

1989The investigative privilege of Rule 166b(3) is governed by the rule in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.1977); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex.1986).

1989The investigative privilege of Rule 166b(3) is governed by the rule in Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.1977); Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex.1986).

2020Because the jury’s no-privilege answer regarding Maynard was not parsed as to which of Maynard’s kickback statements were or were not privileged, our holding regarding Maynard’s statements to Durant and Cote made under the investigative privilege does not end our qualified-privilege inquiry regarding Maynard’s statement to Bermea. (2.) common-interest privilege Maynard argues that he was qualifiedly privileged to make the kickback statements to Bermea because they had a common and corresponding business interest in “the book value of the cars” that “directly related to Bermea’s ability to obta

2018This investigative privilege “remains intact as long as communications pass only to persons having an interest or duty in the matter to which the communications relate.” Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 646 ; Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., 177 S.W.3d 241, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2021Thus, the trial court properly allowed Officer Gadra to testify that based on the “totality of the circumstances” of his investigation, he concluded that an “incident” had occurred on the night in question, and that he had enough probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for Appellant on a charge of family violence assault. 17 See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 243 S.W.3d 57, 65 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (where officer’s testimony did not reveal the details of the information that the informant provided to him, his “reference to the confidential informant was merely a general

2021Thus, the trial court properly allowed Officer Gadra to testify that based on the “totality of the circumstances” of his investigation, he concluded that an “incident” had occurred on the night in question, and that he had enough probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for Appellant on a charge of family violence assault. 17 See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 243 S.W.3d 57, 65 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (where officer’s testimony did not reveal the details of the information that the informant provided to him, his “reference to the confidential informant was merely a general

2021See Head v. State, 4 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (en banc) (“where there is an inescapable conclusion that a piece of evidence is being offered to prove statements made outside the courtroom, a party may not circumvent the hearsay prohibition through artful questioning designed to elicit hearsay indirectly.”), quoting Schaffer, 777 at 114.

2020The jury was charged that the common-interest privilege would apply if the kickback statement was “made in good faith on a subject matter in which the speaker Maynard does not argue that the common-interest privilege applies to his 42 kickback statements to Durant and Cote. 66 has a common interest with the other person, or with reference to which the speaker has a duty to communicate to the other person.” See Bergman v. Oshman’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, no writ); Butler v. C.

2018This investigative privilege “remains intact as long as communications pass only to persons having an interest or duty in the matter to which the communications relate.” Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 646 ; Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., 177 S.W.3d 241, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2001P. 166b(3)(a)), leave cond. granted, 798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.1990); Terry v. Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Tex.1985) (explaining that photographs taken during an insurance investigation are not exempt from discovery under the investigative privilege set forth in Tex.R.

2001P. 166b(3)(a)), leave cond. granted, 798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.1990); Terry v. Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Tex.1985) (explaining that photographs taken during an insurance investigation are not exempt from discovery under the investigative privilege set forth in Tex.R.

1994See Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(3)(d); National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 202-03 (Tex.1993).

1994See Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(3)(d); National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 202-03 (Tex.1993).

1989In Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1986) this court held that a trial judge who denies discovery in the absence of evidence substantiating the claim of privilege, abuses his discretion.

1989In Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1986) this court held that a trial judge who denies discovery in the absence of evidence substantiating the claim of privilege, abuses his discretion.