investigative inquiry in New York

1997As the hearing court concluded, the complainant’s identification of the defendant during a neighborhood canvass provided a sufficient basis for the officer to stop the defendant in order to conduct an investigative inquiry (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People v Johnson, 220 AD2d 455 ).

1994This founded suspicion that criminality was afoot provided a reasonable basis for the officer’s investigative inquiry as to what was in the bag (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 185 ).

1997The officer’s inquiry as to the whereabouts of the knife, after having been apprised by the complainant and eyewitnesses that appellant had stabbed the complainant, did not constitute a custodial interrogation, but rather, a proper investigative inquiry at the scene of a crime (see, Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213 ; see also, New York v Quarles, 467 US 649 ).

1979Officers Kilborn and Kulp certainly had reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime may have been committed, "thus giving them the right—in fact a duty—to inquire whether the [defendant] had knowledge as to the present whereabouts of the [gun]” (Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 219 ).

1979The police had no reason to question this defendant and there was no justification for surrounding him in a manner constituting a seizure.” (People v Cantor, supra, p 114 .) The underlying rationale was expressed by the Court of Appeals as follows: "Whenever an individual is physically or constructively detained by virtue of a significant interruption of his liberty of movement as a result of police action, that individual has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (Terry v. Ohio, supra).

1975The police had no reason to question this defendant and there was no justification for surrounding him in a manner constituting a seizure” (People v Cantor, supra, p 114 ; emphasis supplied).

1998Petitioners, probationary police officers, were subject to dismissal without a hearing for any reason other than one involving bad faith (see, Matter of Prestia v Brown, 191 AD2d 224 ), clearly not the case here, in view of petitioners’ refusal to obey a direct order by a superior officer to answer questions at an investigative hearing despite having been granted use immunity with respect to their answers (see, Gardner v Broderick, 392 US 273 ).

1998Petitioners, probationary police officers, were subject to dismissal without a hearing for any reason other than one involving bad faith (see, Matter of Prestia v Brown, 191 AD2d 224 ), clearly not the case here, in view of petitioners’ refusal to obey a direct order by a superior officer to answer questions at an investigative hearing despite having been granted use immunity with respect to their answers (see, Gardner v Broderick, 392 US 273 ).

1998Respondent’s accountability to the public for the integrity of the Police Department justifies inquiries into inappropriate conduct of police officers while off duty and outside the jurisdiction (see, Matter of Hagmaier v Bratton, 245 AD2d 147 ), particularly where the alleged misconduct involves criminal acts (see, Trotta v Ward, 77 NY2d 827 ; Matter of Alfieri v Murphy, 38 NY2d 976 ).

1998Respondent’s accountability to the public for the integrity of the Police Department justifies inquiries into inappropriate conduct of police officers while off duty and outside the jurisdiction (see, Matter of Hagmaier v Bratton, 245 AD2d 147 ), particularly where the alleged misconduct involves criminal acts (see, Trotta v Ward, 77 NY2d 827 ; Matter of Alfieri v Murphy, 38 NY2d 976 ).

1998Respondent’s accountability to the public for the integrity of the Police Department justifies inquiries into inappropriate conduct of police officers while off duty and outside the jurisdiction (see, Matter of Hagmaier v Bratton, 245 AD2d 147 ), particularly where the alleged misconduct involves criminal acts (see, Trotta v Ward, 77 NY2d 827 ; Matter of Alfieri v Murphy, 38 NY2d 976 ).

1997Further, there was probable cause to arrest the defendant when the complainant, after having a better look at the defendant, again identified him as the robber (see, People v Banks, 151 AD2d 491 ; People v McCain, 134 AD2d 623 ).

1997Further, there was probable cause to arrest the defendant when the complainant, after having a better look at the defendant, again identified him as the robber (see, People v Banks, 151 AD2d 491 ; People v McCain, 134 AD2d 623 ).

1997As the hearing court concluded, the complainant’s identification of the defendant during a neighborhood canvass provided a sufficient basis for the officer to stop the defendant in order to conduct an investigative inquiry (see, People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 ; People v Johnson, 220 AD2d 455 ).

1996Its employee was responding bona fide to an investigative inquiry and, even if he was incorrect, there is no preliminary showing that he acted other than in good faith and the declarant, as well as the investigator, shared a corresponding interest in resolving the inquiry (see, Stukuls v State of New York, 42 NY2d 272, 278-279 ).

1994Defendant’s advice that the bag contained narcotics provided probable cause for his arrest (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 ).

1991The defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings were not required prior to the inquiry (see, People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891 ; People v Morales, 65 NY2d 997 ; see also, People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 ; People v Stackhouse, 160 AD2d 822 ; People v Freeman, 149 AD2d 727 ), and his response was properly admitted in evidence at the trial.

1991The defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings were not required prior to the inquiry (see, People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891 ; People v Morales, 65 NY2d 997 ; see also, People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 ; People v Stackhouse, 160 AD2d 822 ; People v Freeman, 149 AD2d 727 ), and his response was properly admitted in evidence at the trial.

1991The defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings were not required prior to the inquiry (see, People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891 ; People v Morales, 65 NY2d 997 ; see also, People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 ; People v Stackhouse, 160 AD2d 822 ; People v Freeman, 149 AD2d 727 ), and his response was properly admitted in evidence at the trial.

1989Based upon the paucity of information available to the police officers from their observations of the defendant, the requisite reasonable suspicion was not established” (People v Terracciano, 135 AD2d 849, 851 ).

1987The pursuit of a person who flees after first being approached by the police for purposes of an investigative inquiry is justified only when reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed or was about to commit a crime (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; see also, People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736 ).

1987The pursuit of a person who flees after first being approached by the police for purposes of an investigative inquiry is justified only when reasonable suspicion exists that the person has committed or was about to commit a crime (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 592 , cert denied 449 US 1023 ; see also, People v Leung, 68 NY2d 734, 736 ).

1987Based upon the paucity of information available to the police officers from their observations of the defendant, the requisite reasonable suspicion was not established (see, People v Howard, supra).

1985Therefore, the statement made by defendant during the inquiry prior to her arrest did not require suppression (see, People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 , cert denied 400 US 851 ).

1985Therefore, the statement made by defendant during the inquiry prior to her arrest did not require suppression (see, People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 , cert denied 400 US 851 ).

1979The police had no reason to question this defendant and there was no justification for surrounding him in a manner constituting a seizure.” (People v Cantor, supra, p 114 .) The underlying rationale was expressed by the Court of Appeals as follows: "Whenever an individual is physically or constructively detained by virtue of a significant interruption of his liberty of movement as a result of police action, that individual has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (Terry v. Ohio, supra).

1977Certainly, "there is no litmus-paper test for determining what kind or degree of interference with one’s freedom of action brings the [fifth] amendment into play.” (La Fave, "Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 Mich L Rev 40, 97.) In Miranda , the Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” ( 384 US, at p 444 , supra.) There is, of course, a wide spectrum of police conduct separating

1974The recently decided case of Matter of Kanterman v. Attorney-General ( 76 Misc 2d 743 ) is directly in point.