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5 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2003In order to obtain or verify an account of the person’s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. ¶15 Moreover, “To justify an investigative stop, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 2 2003In order to obtain or verify an account of the person’s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. ¶15 Moreover, “To justify an investigative stop, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gopher
green
2 sentences1998By deciding to hold a hearing on Angeline’s motion to suppress, the District Court agreed that Angeline’s motion set forth facts that, if true, would result in the suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. ¶ 19 In his motion to suppress, Angeline moved the District Court “to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop in this matter on the grounds... that the officer did not have a particularized suspicion to initiate the traffic stop under § 46-5-401, MCA.” In Montana, the requirement of particularized suspicion was adopted in *229 State v. Gophe 1998By deciding to hold a hearing on Angeline’s motion to suppress, the District Court agreed that Angeline’s motion set forth facts that, if true, would result in the suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. ¶ 19 In his motion to suppress, Angeline moved the District Court “to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop in this matter on the grounds... that the officer did not have a particularized suspicion to initiate the traffic stop under § 46-5-401, MCA.” In Montana, the requirement of particularized suspicion was adopted in *229 State v. Gophe | 4 | 1997–2004 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2004A. The Initial Stop ¶41 Bar-Jonah contends the initial stop and questioning conducted by police in the early morning hours of December 13,1999, constituted an improper investigative stop and police violated Bar-Jonah’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution. ¶42 The standards in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , and United States v. Cortez (1980), 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , have been codifie 2004A. The Initial Stop ¶41 Bar-Jonah contends the initial stop and questioning conducted by police in the early morning hours of December 13,1999, constituted an improper investigative stop and police violated Bar-Jonah’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution. ¶42 The standards in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , and United States v. Cortez (1980), 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , have been codifie | 3 | 1998–2004 |
Kleinsasser v. State
green
2 sentences2004In order to obtain or verify an account of the person’s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person ... that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person ... has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. ¶43 In Kleinsasser v. State, 2002 MT 36, ¶ 12 , 308 Mont. 325, ¶ 12 , 42 P.3d 801, ¶ 12 , we cited State v. Gopher (1991), 193 Mont. 189,194 , 631 P.2d 293, 296 , wherein we set forth a two-part test for determining whether particularized suspicion is present. “[I]n asserting that 2004In order to obtain or verify an account of the person’s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person ... that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person ... has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. ¶43 In Kleinsasser v. State, 2002 MT 36, ¶ 12 , 308 Mont. 325, ¶ 12 , 42 P.3d 801, ¶ 12 , we cited State v. Gopher (1991), 193 Mont. 189,194 , 631 P.2d 293, 296 , wherein we set forth a two-part test for determining whether particularized suspicion is present. “[I]n asserting that | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2004A. The Initial Stop ¶41 Bar-Jonah contends the initial stop and questioning conducted by police in the early morning hours of December 13,1999, constituted an improper investigative stop and police violated Bar-Jonah’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution. ¶42 The standards in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , and United States v. Cortez (1980), 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , have been codifie 2004A. The Initial Stop ¶41 Bar-Jonah contends the initial stop and questioning conducted by police in the early morning hours of December 13,1999, constituted an improper investigative stop and police violated Bar-Jonah’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution. ¶42 The standards in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , and United States v. Cortez (1980), 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 , have been codifie | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.