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15 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2003–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Douthitt v. Stategreen2 sentences2015After, the trial court overruled appellant’s objection, Wilson replied: “Based on the two assumptions that the individual is in the elimination phase and eliminates [at] a normal rate of .01 to a .03 grams per one hundred liters of blood, alcohol concentration at the time of the stop can range from a .095 to a 0124 [sic].” 4 See Douthitt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex.App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (noting none of Mata factors were included, in State’s hypothetical and concluding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting retrograde extrapolation testimony). 2009See Douthitt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (appeals court used Mata to determine whether trial court erred in permitting expert to testify that defendant’s alcohol concentration would have been “at least .13 or greater” rather than expressing any range of numbers); Blumenstetter v. State, 135 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (appeals court used Mata factors to determine whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to expert’s testimony that there was “no scenario” in which defendant’s alcohol concentration would not ha | 3 | 3 |
Mata v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 908–09; see also Burns v. State, 298 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (concluding expert testimony, given in response to the State’s hypotheticals, that signified criminal defendant’s blood alcohol level would have been at least .10 while driving was retrograde extrapolation evidence subject to Mata analysis). 2005Mata , 46 S.W.3d at 904 . (footnote: 3) We note that although appellant complains in her point that the State’s expert was “short” on the Mata factors required to establish the expert’s reliability for purposes of giving retrograde extrapolation testimony, even a liberal construction of her point does not include the complaint that the State’s expert was unqualified to answer the question under rule 702 because appellant has not challenged the retrograde extrapolation testimony that the expert later provided. | 2 | 5 |
Luis Enrique Veliz v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Veliz, 474 S.W.3d at 360–61. 2024Veliz, 474 S.W.3d at 360–61. | 1 | 1 |
Allridge v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 158 . | 1 | 1 |
McQuarrie v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 150 . | 1 | 1 |
Gerald Martin Hansen v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See e.g. 4 Hansen v. United States, 956 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoner was entitled to access the court reporter's original sound tape of sentencing proceeding to prove his claim). | 1 | 1 |
Bledsoe v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Simon v. Levariogreen1 sentence2014Mandamus Analysis Mandamus is appropriate in a criminal proceeding when the relator establishes (1) “that he has no adequate remedy at law to redress the harm that he alleges will ensue” and (2) “that the act he seeks to compel or prohibit does not involve a discretionary or judicial decision.” Simon v. Levario, 306 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (orig.proceeding); see State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 908–09; see also Burns v. State, 298 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (concluding expert testimony, given in response to the State’s hypotheticals, that signified criminal defendant’s blood alcohol level would have been at least .10 while driving was retrograde extrapolation evidence subject to Mata analysis). 2011See Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 908–09; see also Burns v. State, 298 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (concluding expert testimony, given in response to the State’s hypotheticals, that signified criminal defendant’s blood alcohol level would have been at least .10 while driving was retrograde extrapolation evidence subject to Mata analysis). | 1 | 1 |
Bigon v. Stategreen1 sentence2009On the other hand, “[i]f the State had more than one test, each test a reasonable length of time apart, and the first test were conducted within a reasonable time from the time of the offense, then an expert could 3 … For convenience, we refer to these individual characteristics as the “Mata factors.” … In Mata, where the breath test was administered over two hours after the offense, the court stated the delay 4 was “significant” and “seriously affects the reliability of any extrapolation.” Id. at 917. -5- 04-08-00286-CR potentially create a reliable estimate of the defendant’s [alcohol concen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blumenstetter v. State
green
2 sentences2009See Douthitt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (appeals court used Mata to determine whether trial court erred in permitting expert to testify that defendant’s alcohol concentration would have been “at least .13 or greater” rather than expressing any range of numbers); Blumenstetter v. State, 135 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (appeals court used Mata factors to determine whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to expert’s testimony that there was “no scenario” in which defendant’s alcohol concentration would not ha 2009See Douthitt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 327 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet.) (appeals court used Mata to determine whether trial court erred in permitting expert to testify that defendant’s alcohol concentration would have been “at least .13 or greater” rather than expressing any range of numbers); Blumenstetter v. State, 135 S.W.3d 234 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (appeals court used Mata factors to determine whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to expert’s testimony that there was “no scenario” in which defendant’s alcohol concentration would not have | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Romero v. State
green
2 sentences2003Should the State produce such a witness, the Mata factors must be satisfied prior to admission of retrograde extrapolation testimony. [3] Appellee argues that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion and that the trial court’s ruling should be sustained if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case per Romero v. State , 800 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Crim . 2003Should the State produce such a witness, the Mata factors must be satisfied prior to admission of retrograde extrapolation testimony. [3] Appellee argues that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion and that the trial court’s ruling should be sustained if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case per Romero v. State , 800 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Crim . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2009In Mata , where the breath test was administered over two hours after the offense, the court stated the delay was “significant” and "seriously affects the reliability of any extrapolation.” Id. at 917 . 5 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.