pretext arrest doctrine (Texas) · Go Syfert
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pretext arrest doctrine in Texas

15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
Garcia v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1992 · cited in 9 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–2018
2 sentences

2018See Carmona v. State, No. 07-17-00018-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6185 , at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 7, 2018 no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that “[a]lthough a traffic stop ‘significantly curtails the 3To the extent that appellant suggests the traffic violation was merely a pretext for conducting an impermissible search, we note that the pretext arrest doctrine was rejected by our Court of Criminal Appeals years ago in Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)(noting that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action," quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)("It makes little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine solely to deter the

89
Devenpeck v. Alfordgreen
scotus · 2004 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)(noting that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action," quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)("It makes little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine solely to deter the

2010See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)(noting that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action," quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)("It makes little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine solely to deter the

33
Scott v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)(noting that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action," quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)("It makes little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine solely to deter the

2010See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 , 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 , 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004)(noting that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action," quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)("It makes little sense to maintain the pretext arrest doctrine solely to deter the

33
Black v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1987 · cited in 5 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1990–1995
2 sentences

1995Black, 739 S.W.2d at 244 .-245. 2 In United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit reversed Amador-Gonzalez and essentially abolished the pretext arrest doctrine, explaining: In the matter of religious conviction, Elizabeth the Great is said to have remarked that she would make no windows into the minds of men who served her loyally.

1995Black, 739 S.W.2d at 244 .-245. [2] In United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit reversed Amador-Gonzalez and essentially abolished the pretext arrest doctrine, explaining: In the matter of religious conviction, Elizabeth the Great is said to have remarked that she would make no windows into the minds of men who served her loyally.

25
Gordon v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1990 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–1993
2 sentences

1993We now address whether a pretextual stop violates article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. 1 In Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), in a plurality opinion, Judge Davis of the Court of Criminal Appeals said the pretext arrest doctrine is no longer a valid objection under article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, just as it is no longer a valid objection under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 2 Judge Davis endorsed *72 the proposition that if a valid stop is made for any reason (e.g., an actual offense) and the officer’s objective conduct in re

1992See, Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 943 , n. 8 [citing Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Cr.App.1991)]. 4 Appellant correctly recognizes a conflict between our plurality decisions in Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Cr.App.1990).

22
Bobo v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1992 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1993–1995
2 sentences

1995In Bobo v. State, 843 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), we granted review to determine the continued viability of the pretext arrest doctrine under the Texas Constitution.

1993Last year, in Bobo v. State, 843 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals “granted appellant’s petition ... to decide the continued viability of the pretext arrest doctrine under the Texas Constitution.” The court, however, did not reach the issue because it found that the officer’s detention of the appellant “was not a pretext arrest[.]” Id.

12
Heitman v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1991 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–1995
2 sentences

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion "in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

12
Payton v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1980 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

11
Crittenden v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995This criticism is strange coming from Judge Clinton who, in Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex.Cr.App.1995), did away with the pretext arrest doctrine on the basis of the "implicit" or "tacit" holdings in two unrelated cases.

11
Kolb v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1976 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion "in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

11
United States v. Timothy Andrew Smith, Stephen Lawrence Swindellgreen
ca11 · 1986 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995See, Part I., supra, and, United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.1986).

1995See, Part I., supra, and, United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.1986).

11
Bain v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Cr.

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Chimel v. California red
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

11995–1995
United States v. Reginald James Causey green
ca5 · 1987
2 sentences

1995Black, 739 S.W.2d at 244 .-245. 2 In United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit reversed Amador-Gonzalez and essentially abolished the pretext arrest doctrine, explaining: In the matter of religious conviction, Elizabeth the Great is said to have remarked that she would make no windows into the minds of men who served her loyally.

1995Black, 739 S.W.2d at 244 .-245. [2] In United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit reversed Amador-Gonzalez and essentially abolished the pretext arrest doctrine, explaining: In the matter of religious conviction, Elizabeth the Great is said to have remarked that she would make no windows into the minds of men who served her loyally.

11995–1995
United States v. Jose Luis Guzman and Sonia Cruz-Lazo green
ca10 · 1988
2 sentences

1995Indeed, thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom to stop_ [I]n the absence of standardized police procedures that limit discretion, whether we are ... stopped and subjected to lengthy and intrusive interrogation when we forget to wear our seat belts, turns on no more than “the state of the digestion of any officer who stops us, or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair or the color of our skin.” Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516 (quo

1995Indeed, thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom to stop.... [I]n the absence of standardized police procedures that limit discretion, whether we are ... stopped and subjected to lengthy and intrusive interrogation when we forget to wear our seat belts, turns on no more than "the state of the digestion of any officer who stops us, or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair or the color of our skin." Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516 (

11995–1995
Delaware v. Prouse green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

1995Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, n. 21 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, n. 21 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 , 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Fourth Amendment intended to restrict police discretion “in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 682 ; and, Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

11995–1995
Vercher v. State green
texapp · 1993
2 sentences

1994This Court recently analyzed the pretext arrest doctrine under the Texas Constitution in Vercher, 861 S.W.2d at 68 : When a defendant is stopped, as any citizen might be, for violating a traffic law, and a not otherwise, improper seizure of contraband from the defendant takes place, the seizure is not “arbitrary” or “unreasonable,” and is thus not forbidden by article I, section 9.

1994Id. at 73 .

11994–1994
Dodson v. State green
texcrimapp · 1983
2 sentences

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Cr.

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

11992–1992
United States v. Lefkowitz green
scotus · 1932
2 sentences

1992Id. 285 U.S. at 467 , 52 S.Ct. at 424 , 76 L.Ed, at 884.

1992Id. 285 U.S. at 467 , 52 S.Ct. at 424 , 76 L.Ed, at 884.

11992–1992
McDonald v. State green
texcrimapp · 1967
2 sentences

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Cr.

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

11992–1992
Eduardo Amador-Gonzalez v. United States green
ca5 · 1968
2 sentences

1992In advancing the pretext arrest doctrine, this Court relied, in Black , primarily upon Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1968), a panel decision of the Fifth Circuit which concerned a fact situation similar to that of the instant case.

1992In advancing the pretext arrest doctrine, this Court relied, in Black , primarily upon Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1968), a panel decision of the Fifth Circuit which concerned a fact situation similar to that of the instant case.

11992–1992
Hooper v. State green
texcrimapp · 1976
2 sentences

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Cr.

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

11992–1992
Gutierrez v. State green
texcrimapp · 1973
2 sentences

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Cr.

1992See, e.g., Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (op. on rehearing); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McDonald v. State, 415 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

11992–1992

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