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15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2010See Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 754, 768 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (private citizen complainant lacked judicially cognizable property interest in police enforcement of restraining order against complainant’s husband who murdered their three children in violation of the restraining order); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86 , 102 S.Ct. 69 , 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981) (private citizen lacks judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201 (standing “consists of some interest peculiar to the perso 2010See Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 754, 768 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (private citizen complainant lacked judicially cognizable property interest in police enforcement of restraining order against complainant’s husband who murdered their three children in violation of the restraining order); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86 , 102 S.Ct. 69 , 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981) (private citizen lacks judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201 (standing “consists of some interest peculiar to the perso | 3 | 3 |
Barrios v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Id. 2013Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 3 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Taylor , 332 S.W.3d at 489-90 . 2012See Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 489-90 . | 2 | 2 |
Leeke v. Timmermangreen2 sentences2010See Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 754, 768 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (private citizen complainant lacked judicially cognizable property interest in police enforcement of restraining order against complainant’s husband who murdered their three children in violation of the restraining order); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86 , 102 S.Ct. 69 , 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981) (private citizen lacks judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201 (standing “consists of some interest peculiar to the perso 2010See Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 754, 768 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (private citizen complainant lacked judicially cognizable property interest in police enforcement of restraining order against complainant’s husband who murdered their three children in violation of the restraining order); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86 , 102 S.Ct. 69 , 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981) (private citizen lacks judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another); Fuller, 829 S.W.2d at 201 (standing “consists of some interest peculiar to the perso | 1 | 2 |
Ortiz v. Stategreen2 sentences2017However, the trial court’s rejection of the proposed thirty-five-year sentence was not a result of any error, but was a proper exercise of a "trial courtfs] ... broad discretion to accept or reject the State’s sentencing recommendation.” In re Duffey, 459 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, orig. proceeding) (citing Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. Crim. 2017However, the trial court’s rejection of the proposed thirty-five-year sentence was not a result of any error, but was a proper exercise of a “trial court[’s] . . . broad discretion to accept or reject the State’s sentencing recommendation.” In re Duffey, 459 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, orig. proceeding) (citing Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2017App. 1996)); see also Smith v. State, 243 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) ("By longstanding authority, the trial court is ‘free in every or any case to refuse to allow plea bargaining or to reject a particular plea bargain entered into by the State and the defense.’ ”). 2017App. 1996)); see also Smith v. State, 243 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) (“By long-standing authority, the trial court is ‘free in every or any case to refuse to allow plea bargaining or to reject a particular plea bargain entered into by the State and the defense.’”). | 1 | 1 |
in Re Roy Dean Duffeygreen2 sentences2017However, the trial court’s rejection of the proposed thirty-five-year sentence was not a result of any error, but was a proper exercise of a "trial courtfs] ... broad discretion to accept or reject the State’s sentencing recommendation.” In re Duffey, 459 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, orig. proceeding) (citing Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. Crim. 2017However, the trial court’s rejection of the proposed thirty-five-year sentence was not a result of any error, but was a proper exercise of a “trial court[’s] . . . broad discretion to accept or reject the State’s sentencing recommendation.” In re Duffey, 459 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, orig. proceeding) (citing Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 110 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Vosberg v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Vosberg v. State, 80 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd) (“The language in question, ‘It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt,’ merely notes that reasonable doubt does not mean possible doubt.”); Brown v. State, 91 S.W.3d 353, 358-59 (Tex.App.— *409 Eastland 2002, no pet.) (holding that it was not error to include entire Geesa charge and, alternatively, because appellant did not object to charge, he did not meet burden of showing | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Vosberg v. State, 80 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd) (“The language in question, ‘It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt,’ merely notes that reasonable doubt does not mean possible doubt.”); Brown v. State, 91 S.W.3d 353, 358-59 (Tex.App.— *409 Eastland 2002, no pet.) (holding that it was not error to include entire Geesa charge and, alternatively, because appellant did not object to charge, he did not meet burden of showing | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Vosberg v. State, 80 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd) (“The language in question, ‘It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt,’ merely notes that reasonable doubt does not mean possible doubt.”); Brown v. State, 91 S.W.3d 353, 358-59 (Tex.App.— *409 Eastland 2002, no pet.) (holding that it was not error to include entire Geesa charge and, alternatively, because appellant did not object to charge, he did not meet burden of showing | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Ellerbee v. State, 631 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (on motion for rehearing); Sanchez v. State, 589 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). | 1 | 1 |
Ellerbee v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Ellerbee v. State, 631 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (on motion for rehearing); Sanchez v. State, 589 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Almanza v. State
green
2 sentences2013Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 , 171–72 (Tex. Crim. 2013Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 , 171–72 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Cowan v. Cowan
green
1 sentence2016The court concludes with “since Mrs. Cowan is not dead, there are no heirs and there is no will,” and “[u]ntil she dies, the appellants have no interest in their mother’s will.” Id. at 865 . 12 the pendency of this appeal, not as the result of any challenge to it or to its initial admission to probate. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2015Exploration Co., 267 S.W.3d 277 , 287–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008), aff’d, 352 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2011) (holding that limitation phrases in indemnity agreement must be read in connection with clauses they modify). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wellington Underwriting Agencies Ltd. v. Houston Exploration Co.
green
1 sentence2015Exploration Co., 267 S.W.3d 277 , 287–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008), aff’d, 352 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2011) (holding that limitation phrases in indemnity agreement must be read in connection with clauses they modify). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.