retained acreage clause in Texas

2015The retained acreage clause there provided that rather required an affirmative action by the lessee,” upon the lessee's failure to comply with the continuous and thus, it was not surprising that “the [c]ourt de- drilling program, the lease terminated as to the entire clined to imply a continuing release obligation that premises except as to “forty (40) acres designated as a would effectuate ‘rolling’ lease termination.” But that well block around such producing well, and said well was not the reason why the Seale court declined to block designation shall be filed of record immediately construe

2014In Seale , the court held that, in the absence of language in the retained acreage clause calling for a 'continual relinquishment on non-producing lease acreage, the general rule provides that production anywhere on the leased premises maintains the lease. 716 S.W.2d at 622 .

2026"The effect of a particular retained-acreage clause depends on the terms the parties freely chose" and the "clause must be construed on its own, under governing principles of contract interpretation." Id.

2026Construing a retained-acreage clause to terminate as to the unearned acreage "does not result in forfeiture, but rather a partial termination of the leases under their own terms." Id. 12 q22 In Endeavor, if the lessee "did not assign the undeveloped acreage to a proration unit, [its] leases automatically terminated as to those lands." Id. at 607 .

2015See Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Energen Resources Corp., 445 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 94 S.W.3d at 554 , and stating “adopting the construction [of a retained acreage clause] urged by Chesapeake imposes an unnecessary limitation on the kind and character of the estate the parties chose to convey, i.e., an expansive one maintained by production from any part of pooled lands unless limited by language so clear, precise, and un-equivocal that no other conclusion could be reached.”); Tomlin v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 694 S.W.2d 441

2015Tiblets Tel: 956-796-0330 State Bar No. 24066194 Fax: 956-796-0399 Email: [email protected] Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2200 Dallas, Texas 75201-6776 Tel: 214-740-8520 Fax: 214-740-8800 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY TABLE OF CONTENTS INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii QUESTION 1 In 1998, when the Railroad Commission adopted the Vaquillas Ranch (Lobo Cons.) Field Rules, how, at that time, did those rules establish any units different from 640 acres per producing or shut-in gas well, as req

2017"The plain, grammatical language of the retained acreage clause does not expressly provide for rolling termination of proration units as they cease to exist." Id. at 883 .

2015See Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Energen Resources Corp., 445 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 94 S.W.3d at 554 , and stating “adopting the construction [of a retained acreage clause] urged by Chesapeake imposes an unnecessary limitation on the kind and character of the estate the parties chose to convey, i.e., an expansive one maintained by production from any part of pooled lands unless limited by language so clear, precise, and un-equivocal that no other conclusion could be reached.”); Tomlin v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 694 S.W.2d 441

2015Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965), dealt with a pooling clause and proration units prescribed by the Railroad Commission, not a retained acreage clause.

2015Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965), dealt with a pooling clause and proration units prescribed by the Railroad Commission, not a retained acreage clause.

2026Blackstone answered and counterclaimed, and Zarvona filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations that “(a) the retained acreage clause is a snapshot provision and does not provide for rolling lease terminations during the secondary term on a unit-by-unit basis, and (b) Section 11.0(b) does not apply on a unit-by-unit basis and does not define the measuring period for assessing production in paying quantities when production has not ceased[.]” Based on an affidavit and 5 various exhibits including production records from wells in the Clarke, Delta, Simmons, and Woods units,

2015If there were any doubt about the proper interpretation of Sentence (2), the Court should apply the strong presumption in Texas law against making that sentence a “limitation on the grant.” .............................27 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................31 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................34 APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF................................

2026"Although originally drafted to prevent the lessee from losing those portions of a lease that had productive wells located thereon if the rest of the lease terminated, retained-acreage clauses have expanded to include clauses that require the release of all acreage that, at the end of the primary term, is not within a drilling, spacing, or proration unit." Id. (internal quotations omitted). q20 The parties focus on the distinction between conditions and covenants, which "lies in the appropriate remedy for their breach." Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989).

2015(Tex., June 12, 2015) ........................................................ 6 Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989)...................................................................................5 Springer Ranch, Ltd. v. Jones, 421 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) ................................11 Terrill v. Tuckness, 985 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no writ) .................................... 6 iii OTHER AUTHORITIES 16 T.A.C. § 3.37 (Statewide Rule 37) ....................................................................... 9 16 T.A.C.

2015If there were any doubt about the proper interpretation of Sentence (2), the Court should apply the strong presumption in Texas law against making that sentence a “limitation on the grant.” .............................27 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................31 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................34 APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF................................

2015Tiblets Tel: 956-796-0330 State Bar No. 24066194 Fax: 956-796-0399 Email: [email protected] Locke Lord LLP 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2200 Dallas, Texas 75201-6776 Tel: 214-740-8520 Fax: 214-740-8800 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY TABLE OF CONTENTS INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii QUESTION 1 In 1998, when the Railroad Commission adopted the Vaquillas Ranch (Lobo Cons.) Field Rules, how, at that time, did those rules establish any units different from 640 acres per producing or shut-in gas well, as req

2017See *659 McCreary v. Bay Area Bank & Trust , 68 S.W.3d 727 , 732 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (noting preference for typewritten provisions over pre-printed forms in contract construction).

2015See Sutton v. SM Energy Co., 421 S.W.3d 153, 159 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.); H.

2015See Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Energen Resources Corp., 445 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 94 S.W.3d at 554 , and stating “adopting the construction [of a retained acreage clause] urged by Chesapeake imposes an unnecessary limitation on the kind and character of the estate the parties chose to convey, i.e., an expansive one maintained by production from any part of pooled lands unless limited by language so clear, precise, and un-equivocal that no other conclusion could be reached.”); Tomlin v. Petroleum Corp. of Texas, 694 S.W.2d 441

2015If there were any doubt about the proper interpretation of Sentence (2), the Court should apply the strong presumption in Texas law against making that sentence a “limitation on the grant.” .............................27 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................31 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................34 APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF................................

2015The Court examines the entire lease “and consider[s] each part with every other part so that the effect and meaning of one part on any other part may be determined.” Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996); Birnbaum v. SWEPI LP, 48 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).

2015(Tex., June 12, 2015) ........................................................ 6 Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989)...................................................................................5 Springer Ranch, Ltd. v. Jones, 421 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) ................................11 Terrill v. Tuckness, 985 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no writ) .................................... 6 iii OTHER AUTHORITIES 16 T.A.C. § 3.37 (Statewide Rule 37) ....................................................................... 9 16 T.A.C.

2015As interpreted by the Eastland Court, the retained acreage clause in that lease unambiguously obligated the lessee to file a certified proration plat for each well with the Railroad Commission, and the clause then allowed the operator to retain only the specific acreage the operator had 5 This Court described the procedure for deciding whether a contract is ambiguous in Terrill v. Tuckness, 985 S.W.2d 97, 102-03 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no writ) (stating: “An instrument is ambiguous only when the application of the rules of construction leaves it unclear which meaning is the correct one.”