judicial proceeding privilege in Utah

2005See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997) (“[JJudges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, and counsel in judicial proceedings have an absolute privilege against defamation.” (quotations and citations omitted)). ¶ 36 To determine whether Forsyth qualifies for this judicial proceeding privilege, we must apply the three-part test announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990): First, the statement must have been made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding.

2003See Cantu, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 169 ("Where ... a party acts in good faith to pursue its own legal rights, such conduct is privileged, even if emotional distress will result."). 167 Moreover, even if we were to assume that the Jones Waldo defendants' alleged conduct in connection with the bar order litigation, that is, their statements to the court during the judicial proceeding and the use of the legal process itself, were sufficiently outrageous, Bennett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the judicial proceeding privilege. 8 See DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ¶25

2007Id. at 1313 ; see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶¶ 27-31 , 164 P.3d 366 (applying the judicial proceeding privilege in the context of a complaint); Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ¶ 13 , 40 P.3d 1128 (discussing the privilege, its elements, and its furthered public policies as akin to that of the legislative proceeding privilege); Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ¶ 8 , 20 P.3d 895 (applying the privilege in the context of a published demand letter); Allen, 802 P.2d at 1311-13 (reviewing the history to date of Utah jurisprudence surrounding the privilege).

2007Id. at 1313 ; see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶¶ 27-31 , 164 P.3d 366 (applying the judicial proceeding privilege in the context of a complaint); Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ¶ 13 , 40 P.3d 1128 (discussing the privilege, its elements, and its furthered public policies as akin to that of the legislative proceeding privilege); Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ¶ 8 , 20 P.3d 895 (applying the privilege in the context of a published demand letter); Allen, 802 P.2d at 1311-13 (reviewing the history to date of Utah jurisprudence surrounding the privilege).

2015Fowler and Schow filed eross-motions for summary judgment. 3 [ 4 The district court first determined that Schow's allegedly defamatory statements "were made ... in the course of the present proceeding and referred directly to [her] malpractice claims." The Utah Supreme Court explained -in DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111 , 992 P.2d 979 , that for the judicial proceeding privilege to apply, the statements must be "(1) made during or in the course of a judicial proceéding; (2) have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) be made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juro

2015Fowler and Schow filed eross-motions for summary judgment. 3 [ 4 The district court first determined that Schow's allegedly defamatory statements "were made ... in the course of the present proceeding and referred directly to [her] malpractice claims." The Utah Supreme Court explained -in DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111 , 992 P.2d 979 , that for the judicial proceeding privilege to apply, the statements must be "(1) made during or in the course of a judicial proceéding; (2) have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) be made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juro

2025To determine whether such statements are capable of defamatory meaning, a court must look at the statements in context, “giving the words their most common and accepted meaning.” See West, 872 P.2d at 1009 . 14 That a statement is made concerning litigation might be very helpful __________________________________________________________ 14 To be clear, Utah law recognizes a judicial proceeding privilege that protects certain statements “made during a judicial proceeding.” See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 27 , 164 P.3d 366 .

2025To determine whether such statements are capable of defamatory meaning, a court must look at the statements in context, “giving the words their most common and accepted meaning.” See West, 872 P.2d at 1009 . 14 That a statement is made concerning litigation might be very helpful __________________________________________________________ 14 To be clear, Utah law recognizes a judicial proceeding privilege that protects certain statements “made during a judicial proceeding.” See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 27 , 164 P.3d 366 .

2025To determine whether such statements are capable of defamatory meaning, a court must look at the statements in context, “giving the words their most common and accepted meaning.” See West, 872 P.2d at 1009 . 14 That a statement is made concerning litigation might be very helpful __________________________________________________________ 14 To be clear, Utah law recognizes a judicial proceeding privilege that protects certain statements “made during a judicial proceeding.” See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 27 , 164 P.3d 366 .

1999See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007-08 (Utah 1994). ¶ 9 The trial court held that the judicial proceeding privilege applied to the letter and *983 that the defendant was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the defamation claim.

2015See Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 21 , 212 P.3d 535 (stating that a prima facie case for defamation must, among other factors, demonstrate that "the statements were not subject to privilege" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015See Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 21 , 212 P.3d 535 (stating that a prima facie case for defamation must, among other factors, demonstrate that "the statements were not subject to privilege" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2007Id. at 697 ; see Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538 , 560-61 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the judicial proceeding privilege did not apply to statements made at a press conference). 98 .

2007Id. at 697 ; see Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank, 112 F.3d 538 , 560-61 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that the judicial proceeding privilege did not apply to statements made at a press conference). 98 .

2007Asay, 594 F.2d at 698 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 99 .

2006See id. at ¶ 21; Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (concluding that the “plaintiff can show abuse of [a] privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the publication of the defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving it”).

2005Thus, it cannot be said *139 at this stage of the litigation that Forsyth’s second investigation is protected by the judicial proceeding privilege by her status as a witness. ¶ 38 Forsyth may nevertheless have protection to the extent her conduct is “an integral part of the judicial process.” Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (quotations and citation omitted) (holding that Utah State Bar’s failure to disclose the contents of unadjudicated complaints against attorney part of quasi-judicial function of bar). ¶ 39 As has been discussed in the federal context, social worker

2005See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687-89 . (10th Cir.1990).

2003See Cantu, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 169 ("Where ... a party acts in good faith to pursue its own legal rights, such conduct is privileged, even if emotional distress will result."). 167 Moreover, even if we were to assume that the Jones Waldo defendants' alleged conduct in connection with the bar order litigation, that is, their statements to the court during the judicial proceeding and the use of the legal process itself, were sufficiently outrageous, Bennett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the judicial proceeding privilege. 8 See DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ¶25

2001Both parties address Wright v. Lawson, 530 P.2d 823 (Utah 1975).

2001In Ortez, we explained that Wright turned on the fact that the allegedly defamatory letter in question "had 'no sufficient relationship to pending or anticipated litigation' to entitle any defamatory material in the letter to an absolute privilege [i.e. the judicial proceeding privilege]." Ortez, 802 P.2d at 1312 (quoting Wright, 530 P.2d at 826 ); see also DeBry, 1999 UT 111 at ¶ 18 , 992 P.2d 979 (stating that "Wright held that an attorney's letter did not relate to pending or anticipated litigation, even though the parties were engaged in a lawsuit, because the letter discussed matters outs

1999The conduct of litigation includes the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, comments upon the evidence and arguments both oral and written upon the evidence, whether made to the court or jury.” 4 Utah 2d 64, 66 , 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (1955) (quoting Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. III § 586, at 29-30). ¶ 13 Plaintiff argues that the statements in the Godbe letter do not fall within any of the examples stated in Beezley of when the judicial proceeding- privilege applies.

1999The conduct of litigation includes the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, comments upon the evidence and arguments both oral and written upon the evidence, whether made to the court or jury.” 4 Utah 2d 64, 66 , 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (1955) (quoting Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. III § 586, at 29-30). ¶ 13 Plaintiff argues that the statements in the Godbe letter do not fall within any of the examples stated in Beezley of when the judicial proceeding- privilege applies.

1999As God-be argued in her motion for summary judgment, the judicial proceeding privilege extends not only to defamation claims but to “all claims arising from the same statements.” Price, 949 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added); see also Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 , 906 n. 37 (Utah 1992).

1997Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.1966) (in context of privilege, “the negotiation of a settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding”); Larmour v. Campanale, 96 Cal.App.3d 566 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1979) (judicial proceeding privilege was applicable to letters demanding settlement of claim); Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that “defamatory statement in the ‘Settlement’ letter is also privileged as a statement made in an ongoing judicial proceeding”); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474 , 513 P.2d 717, 720 (N.M.Ct.App.1973)

1997Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.1966) (in context of privilege, “the negotiation of a settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding”); Larmour v. Campanale, 96 Cal.App.3d 566 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1979) (judicial proceeding privilege was applicable to letters demanding settlement of claim); Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that “defamatory statement in the ‘Settlement’ letter is also privileged as a statement made in an ongoing judicial proceeding”); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474 , 513 P.2d 717, 720 (N.M.Ct.App.1973)

1997Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.1966) (in context of privilege, “the negotiation of a settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding”); Larmour v. Campanale, 96 Cal.App.3d 566 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1979) (judicial proceeding privilege was applicable to letters demanding settlement of claim); Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that “defamatory statement in the ‘Settlement’ letter is also privileged as a statement made in an ongoing judicial proceeding”); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474 , 513 P.2d 717, 720 (N.M.Ct.App.1973)

1997Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.1966) (in context of privilege, “the negotiation of a settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding”); Larmour v. Campanale, 96 Cal.App.3d 566 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1979) (judicial proceeding privilege was applicable to letters demanding settlement of claim); Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that “defamatory statement in the ‘Settlement’ letter is also privileged as a statement made in an ongoing judicial proceeding”); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474 , 513 P.2d 717, 720 (N.M.Ct.App.1973)

1997Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.1966) (in context of privilege, “the negotiation of a settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding”); Larmour v. Campanale, 96 Cal.App.3d 566 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1979) (judicial proceeding privilege was applicable to letters demanding settlement of claim); Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that “defamatory statement in the ‘Settlement’ letter is also privileged as a statement made in an ongoing judicial proceeding”); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474 , 513 P.2d 717, 720 (N.M.Ct.App.1973)

1997Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.1966) (in context of privilege, “the negotiation of a settlement is a part of a judicial proceeding”); Larmour v. Campanale, 96 Cal.App.3d 566 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1979) (judicial proceeding privilege was applicable to letters demanding settlement of claim); Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (holding that “defamatory statement in the ‘Settlement’ letter is also privileged as a statement made in an ongoing judicial proceeding”); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474 , 513 P.2d 717, 720 (N.M.Ct.App.1973)