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15 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2021The analysis under the Ramirez framework is quite similar, as it is itself a lengthy evaluation of estimator and system variables that is explicitly geared toward “determining the reliability of the identification.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 ; see also id. at 779 (noting that the need for courts to serve as the gatekeeper to the admissibility of eyewitness testimony is “particularly serious . . . because of the probability that such evidence[,] even [if] thoroughly discredited[,] has a powerful effect on a jury”). 2021The analysis under the Ramirez framework is quite similar, as it is itself a lengthy evaluation of estimator and system variables that is explicitly geared toward “determining the reliability of the identification.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 ; see also id. at 779 (noting that the need for courts to serve as the gatekeeper to the admissibility of eyewitness testimony is “particularly serious . . . because of the probability that such evidence[,] even [if] thoroughly discredited[,] has a powerful effect on a jury”). | 3 | 7 |
State v. Olsengreen2 sentences2010First, K.O. waived this issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court either by a request for a Ramires hearing, a motion to suppress, or an objection at trial. 4 See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) ("[T]his court has already held that it will not hear issues based on Ramirez that were not raised at trial." (citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (rejecting argument that unreliable eyewitness testimony was inappropriately admitted where no constitutional objection was made in the trial court))). 5 1 13 Second, a Ramirez hearing serves no purpose in a bench tr 2010First, K.O. waived this issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court either by a request for a Ramires hearing, a motion to suppress, or an objection at trial. 4 See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) ("[T]his court has already held that it will not hear issues based on Ramirez that were not raised at trial." (citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (rejecting argument that unreliable eyewitness testimony was inappropriately admitted where no constitutional objection was made in the trial court))). 5 1 13 Second, a Ramirez hearing serves no purpose in a bench tr | 3 | 3 |
State v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences2020See 2002 UT 45, ¶ 27 , 48 P.3d 953 (the Ramirez factors “provide guidance” but are not “exhaustive or exclusive” considerations in determining whether identifications are “violative of due process”). ¶6 We revisit and clarify Ramirez on this basis. 2020See 2002 UT 45, ¶ 27 , 48 P.3d 953 (the Ramirez factors “provide guidance” but are not “exhaustive or exclusive” considerations in determining whether identifications are “violative of due process”). ¶6 We revisit and clarify Ramirez on this basis. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2010First, K.O. waived this issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court either by a request for a Ramires hearing, a motion to suppress, or an objection at trial. 4 See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) ("[T]his court has already held that it will not hear issues based on Ramirez that were not raised at trial." (citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (rejecting argument that unreliable eyewitness testimony was inappropriately admitted where no constitutional objection was made in the trial court))). 5 1 13 Second, a Ramirez hearing serves no purpose in a bench tr 2010First, K.O. waived this issue by failing to raise it in the juvenile court either by a request for a Ramires hearing, a motion to suppress, or an objection at trial. 4 See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) ("[T]his court has already held that it will not hear issues based on Ramirez that were not raised at trial." (citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (rejecting argument that unreliable eyewitness testimony was inappropriately admitted where no constitutional objection was made in the trial court))). 5 1 13 Second, a Ramirez hearing serves no purpose in a bench tr | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lujangreen2 sentences2021Wright’s initial briefing on appeal argues that, under the Ramirez factors, Eyewitness’s identification of Wright was too unreliable to be admitted at trial. ¶28 But after the initial briefs were filed with this court, Wright’s appeal was recalled and stayed by the Utah Supreme Court pending issuance of its opinion in State v. Lujan, 2020 UT 5 , 459 P.3d 992 , which eventually “clarified and reformulated the framework for the analysis of the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony in Utah.” Id. ¶ 52. 2021Wright’s initial briefing on appeal argues that, under the Ramirez factors, Eyewitness’s identification of Wright was too unreliable to be admitted at trial. ¶28 But after the initial briefs were filed with this court, Wright’s appeal was recalled and stayed by the Utah Supreme Court pending issuance of its opinion in State v. Lujan, 2020 UT 5 , 459 P.3d 992 , which eventually “clarified and reformulated the framework for the analysis of the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony in Utah.” Id. ¶ 52. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Lujangreen2 sentences2021In State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 , 357 P.3d 20 , we expressed concern over this “disconnect between the legal analysis in Ramirez and its outcome” and called on our supreme court to 20100655-CA 14 2021 UT App 7 State v. Wright revisit the Ramirez framework in light of scientific and legal research so that it would “accurately reflect the changed views about handling” eyewitness identification testimony. 2021In State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 , 357 P.3d 20 , we expressed concern over this “disconnect between the legal analysis in Ramirez and its outcome” and called on our supreme court to 20100655-CA 14 2021 UT App 7 State v. Wright revisit the Ramirez framework in light of scientific and legal research so that it would “accurately reflect the changed views about handling” eyewitness identification testimony. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2023As a result, our inquiry is guided by the Utah Rules of Evidence and not the Ramirez factors. 12 See id. ¶¶ 39–40 (reviewing the admissibility of eyewitness testimony under rule 403 and not Ramirez). 12. 2023As a result, our inquiry is guided by the Utah Rules of Evidence and not the Ramirez factors. 12 See id. ¶¶ 39–40 (reviewing the admissibility of eyewitness testimony under rule 403 and not Ramirez). 12. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cloptengreen2 sentences2020See State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 , ¶ 10 n.1, 357 P.3d 20 (referring to developments in “scientific and legal research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification[]” testimony over the years since our decision in Ramirez and suggesting that the Ramirez framework “must be revisited” by this court); see also Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 80 , 362 P.3d 1216 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring) (the evolution of eyewitness identification science “can and should be dealt with by an amendment to our rules of evidence”). 2020See State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 , ¶ 10 n.1, 357 P.3d 20 (referring to developments in “scientific and legal research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification[]” testimony over the years since our decision in Ramirez and suggesting that the Ramirez framework “must be revisited” by this court); see also Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 80 , 362 P.3d 1216 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring) (the evolution of eyewitness identification science “can and should be dealt with by an amendment to our rules of evidence”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Longgreen2 sentences2019Ramirez argues that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to take three actions related to a mistaken-identity defense: (1) calling an eyewitness expert to testify regarding factors present in this case that could make the eyewitnesses’ identifications less reliable; (2) 20180268-CA 6 2019 UT App 196 State v. Ramirez requesting a cautionary instruction to “sensitize the jury to the factors that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications,” State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986); and (3) objecting to the admissibili 2018This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Long , 721 P.2d 483 , 493 (Utah 1986) ). ¶16 Because Defendant challenges his convictions on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, "we are not directly tasked with determining whether the eyewitness testimony was admissible." See State v. Craft , 2017 UT App 87 , ¶ 18, 397 P.3d 889 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Glasscockgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Glasscock, 2014 UT App 221, ¶ 27 , 336 P.3d 46 (“The circumstances surrounding [v]ictim’s identification of [the defendant] are far less troubling than those in [Ramirez].”). 2021See, e.g., State v. Glasscock, 2014 UT App 221, ¶ 27 , 336 P.3d 46 (“The circumstances surrounding [v]ictim’s identification of [the defendant] are far less troubling than those in [Ramirez].”). | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2021See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 17 , 266 P.3d 828 (“[T]he Utah Court of Appeals ha[s] on countless occasions exercised [its] discretion to refuse to consider new issues, arguments, claims, or matters on appeal.”); Federated Cap. 2021See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 17 , 266 P.3d 828 (“[T]he Utah Court of Appeals ha[s] on countless occasions exercised [its] discretion to refuse to consider new issues, arguments, claims, or matters on appeal.”); Federated Cap. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thorntongreen2 sentences2021And more fundamentally, “appellate review of evidentiary decisions” should only “assess whether the district judge made an error in admitting or excluding the evidence in question” and should thus affirm so long as the trial court made the “right decision,” even if it was for “a mistaken reason.” See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶¶ 51, 53 , 391 P.3d 1016 . ¶42 With that said, it is important to note that there are appreciable similarities between a rule 403 analysis and the Ramirez framework. 2021And more fundamentally, “appellate review of evidentiary decisions” should only “assess whether the district judge made an error in admitting or excluding the evidence in question” and should thus affirm so long as the trial court made the “right decision,” even if it was for “a mistaken reason.” See State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶¶ 51, 53 , 391 P.3d 1016 . ¶42 With that said, it is important to note that there are appreciable similarities between a rule 403 analysis and the Ramirez framework. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Willettgreen1 sentence2020And, importantly, Lujan has proffered no basis for a determination that the Ramirez factors would have been understood by the public as an element of the guarantee of “due process of law” at the time of the ratification of the Utah _____________________________________________________________ identification following a police lineup); State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1995) (addressing admissibility of identification following a photo array arranged by police). 9 STATE v. LUJAN Opinion of the Court Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Neil v. Biggersgreen2 sentences2020But unless and until the framework for a backstop due process test is rooted in the original meaning of the Utah due process clause, these factors remain just that—guidance, rather than a constitutionally required test.7 _____________________________________________________________ 7 In so holding we do not rule out the possibility of a determination, in a future case in which the question is squarely presented, that state constitutional standards under the Utah due process clause differ from federal due process standards under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972). 2020But unless and until the framework for a backstop due process test is rooted in the original meaning of the Utah due process clause, these factors remain just that—guidance, rather than a constitutionally required test.7 _____________________________________________________________ 7 In so holding we do not rule out the possibility of a determination, in a future case in which the question is squarely presented, that state constitutional standards under the Utah due process clause differ from federal due process standards under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Graydon
green
2 sentences2023And we (continued…) 20190918-CA 30 2023 UT App 4 State v. Graydon ¶74 Here, the district court made several similar findings that likewise indicated that Victim’s identification was reliable. 2023And we (continued…) 20190918-CA 30 2023 UT App 4 State v. Graydon ¶74 Here, the district court made several similar findings that likewise indicated that Victim’s identification was reliable. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Lomu
green
2 sentences2021For one thing, “scrupulous examination under rule 403 . . . can be inferred when the trial court has heard arguments on the relevant issues and has made sufficient inquiry, even if that inquiry was not expressly identified by the court.” See State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, ¶ 34 , 321 P.3d 243 (cleaned up) (referencing the now defunct Shickles and Verde factors). 2021For one thing, “scrupulous examination under rule 403 . . . can be inferred when the trial court has heard arguments on the relevant issues and has made sufficient inquiry, even if that inquiry was not expressly identified by the court.” See State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 41, ¶ 34 , 321 P.3d 243 (cleaned up) (referencing the now defunct Shickles and Verde factors). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole
green
2 sentences2020There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a _____________________________________________________________ 1 See In re Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 186 (explaining that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution is not a “free-wheeling constitutional license” for this court to “assure fairness on a case-by-case basis,” but a guarantee of procedural rights “measured by reference to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 See South Salt Lake Ci 2020There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a _____________________________________________________________ 1 See In re Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 186 (explaining that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution is not a “free-wheeling constitutional license” for this court to “assure fairness on a case-by-case basis,” but a guarantee of procedural rights “measured by reference to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 See South Salt Lake Ci | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah & Dr. William McMahon
green
2 sentences2020There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a _____________________________________________________________ 1 See In re Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 186 (explaining that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution is not a “free-wheeling constitutional license” for this court to “assure fairness on a case-by-case basis,” but a guarantee of procedural rights “measured by reference to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 See South Salt Lake Ci 2020There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a _____________________________________________________________ 1 See In re Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 186 (explaining that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution is not a “free-wheeling constitutional license” for this court to “assure fairness on a case-by-case basis,” but a guarantee of procedural rights “measured by reference to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 See South Salt Lake Ci | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Guzman
green
2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991); State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ¶ 21 , 133 P.3d 363 ; State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 25 , 48 P.3d 953 . 2020See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991); State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ¶ 21 , 133 P.3d 363 ; State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 25 , 48 P.3d 953 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Discipline of Brian Steffensen
green
2 sentences2020There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a _____________________________________________________________ 1 See In re Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 186 (explaining that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution is not a “free-wheeling constitutional license” for this court to “assure fairness on a case-by-case basis,” but a guarantee of procedural rights “measured by reference to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 See South Salt Lake Ci 2020There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a _____________________________________________________________ 1 See In re Steffensen, 2016 UT 18 , ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 186 (explaining that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution is not a “free-wheeling constitutional license” for this court to “assure fairness on a case-by-case basis,” but a guarantee of procedural rights “measured by reference to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 See South Salt Lake Ci | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2019Ramirez argues that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to take three actions related to a mistaken-identity defense: (1) calling an eyewitness expert to testify regarding factors present in this case that could make the eyewitnesses’ identifications less reliable; (2) 20180268-CA 6 2019 UT App 196 State v. Ramirez requesting a cautionary instruction to “sensitize the jury to the factors that empirical research have shown to be of importance in determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications,” State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986); and (3) objecting to the admissibili | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Craft
green
2 sentences2018Having considered the two eyewitnesses' identifications of Defendant under each of the five Ramirez factors, we conclude that the eyewitnesses' identifications were "sufficiently reliable to pass constitutional muster under the Ramirez standard." See id. 2018Having considered the two eyewitnesses' identifications of Defendant under each of the five Ramirez factors, we conclude that the eyewitnesses' identifications were "sufficiently reliable to pass constitutional muster under the Ramirez standard." See id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Sykes
green
1 sentence1993One statement in Ramirez needing further clarification was the basis for a recent concurring opinion by Judge Jackson of the court of appeals in Sykes, 840 P.2d at 831 , in which he criticized Ramirez’s standard of review discussion. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Williams v. City of Longmont
green
2 sentences1980For example, public parks are proprietary in Indiana, City of Terre Haute v. *1234 Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101 , 40 N.E.2d 972 (1942); governmental in Michigan, Collision v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. App. 325 , 269 N.W.2d 586 (1978), reversed on other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 643 ; and proprietary in Colorado, Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567 , 129 P.2d 110 (1942). 1980For example, public parks are proprietary in Indiana, City of Terre Haute v. *1234 Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101 , 40 N.E.2d 972 (1942); governmental in Michigan, Collision v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. App. 325 , 269 N.W.2d 586 (1978), reversed on other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 643 ; and proprietary in Colorado, Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567 , 129 P.2d 110 (1942). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
City of Terre Haute v. Webster
green
2 sentences1980For example, public parks are proprietary in Indiana, City of Terre Haute v. *1234 Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101 , 40 N.E.2d 972 (1942); governmental in Michigan, Collision v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. App. 325 , 269 N.W.2d 586 (1978), reversed on other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 643 ; and proprietary in Colorado, Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567 , 129 P.2d 110 (1942). 1980For example, public parks are proprietary in Indiana, City of Terre Haute v. *1234 Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101 , 40 N.E.2d 972 (1942); governmental in Michigan, Collision v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. App. 325 , 269 N.W.2d 586 (1978), reversed on other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 643 ; and proprietary in Colorado, Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567 , 129 P.2d 110 (1942). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Collison v. City of Saginaw
neutral
2 sentences1980For example, public parks are proprietary in Indiana, City of Terre Haute v. *1234 Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101 , 40 N.E.2d 972 (1942); governmental in Michigan, Collision v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. App. 325 , 269 N.W.2d 586 (1978), reversed on other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 643 ; and proprietary in Colorado, Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567 , 129 P.2d 110 (1942). 1980For example, public parks are proprietary in Indiana, City of Terre Haute v. *1234 Webster, 112 Ind. App. 101 , 40 N.E.2d 972 (1942); governmental in Michigan, Collision v. City of Saginaw, 84 Mich. App. 325 , 269 N.W.2d 586 (1978), reversed on other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 643 ; and proprietary in Colorado, Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567 , 129 P.2d 110 (1942). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Madsen v. State
green
2 sentences1980Applying the Ramirez test (prior to the 1978 amendment to § 63-30-3), a publicly-owned and operated hospital in Utah was classified variously proprietary (in 1975 by Greenhalgh v. Payson City, supra ) and governmental (in 1978 by Madsen v. State, Utah, 583 P.2d 92 .) Other states have reached similar incongruous results in their attempts to distinguish proprietary and governmental functions. 1980Applying the Ramirez test (prior to the 1978 amendment to § 63-30-3), a publicly-owned and operated hospital in Utah was classified variously proprietary (in 1975 by Greenhalgh v. Payson City, supra ) and governmental (in 1978 by Madsen v. State, Utah, 583 P.2d 92 .) Other states have reached similar incongruous results in their attempts to distinguish proprietary and governmental functions. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.