case-specific inquiry in Washington

2024If a defendant’s act or practice is not per se unfair, then the plaintiff must show the conduct is unfair “under a case-specific analysis of those terms.” Rush v. Blackburn, 190 Wn.

2018"If a defendant's act is not per se unfair or deceptive, then the plaintiff must show the conduct is "unfair" or "deceptive" under a case-specific analysis of those terms." Rush, 190 Wn.

2018App. at 962 ; Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn.2d at 786 .

2015Hangman Ridge, 105 Wn.2d at 786 ; accord Klem, 176 Wn.2d at 785-87.

2008Application of these principles has repeatedly led the court to conclude that automatic limitations on the openness of court proceedings violate article I, section 10 because they are not based on a case-specific inquiry. ¶9 In Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. Eikenberry, 121 Wn.2d 205 , 848 P.2d 1258 (1993), an association of newspapers challenged a statute 4 that provided that the courts could not disclose to the public or the press the identities of child victims of sexual assault, either by disseminating court records or by allowing the public access to court proceedings.

2008Application of these principles has repeatedly led the court to conclude that automatic limitations on the openness of court proceedings violate article I, section 10 because they are not based on a case-specific inquiry. ¶9 In Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. Eikenberry, 121 Wn.2d 205 , 848 P.2d 1258 (1993), an association of newspapers challenged a statute 4 that provided that the courts could not disclose to the public or the press the identities of child victims of sexual assault, either by disseminating court records or by allowing the public access to court proceedings.

2003Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 .

2003Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 .

2025To the contrary, State v. Leming held these convictions can violate double jeopardy in some cases. 133 Wn.

2020The,provisions of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 26.50 RCW, do not require a court “to allow live testimony or cross-examination in every protective order proceeding.”3 Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 499 , 387 P.3d 680 (2017); Gourley, 158 Wn.2d at 469-70 .

2020The,provisions of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 26.50 RCW, do not require a court “to allow live testimony or cross-examination in every protective order proceeding.”3 Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 499 , 387 P.3d 680 (2017); Gourley, 158 Wn.2d at 469-70 .

2020The,provisions of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 26.50 RCW, do not require a court “to allow live testimony or cross-examination in every protective order proceeding.”3 Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 499 , 387 P.3d 680 (2017); Gourley, 158 Wn.2d at 469-70 .

2012App. 872, 876 , 888 P.2d 759 (1995), rev’d, 128 Wn.2d 254 . 7 Our Supreme Court rejected this analysis, recognizing that such a justification for closure would apply to all hearings involving the testimony of undercover officers: “We immediately question the characterization of this generalized evidence as a compelling interest: only evidence of a particularized threat would likely justify encroachment into a defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights.” Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 . ¶45 Indeed, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . conclude [d] that automatic limitations on th

2012App. 872, 876 , 888 P.2d 759 (1995), rev’d, 128 Wn.2d 254 . 7 Our Supreme Court rejected this analysis, recognizing that such a justification for closure would apply to all hearings involving the testimony of undercover officers: “We immediately question the characterization of this generalized evidence as a compelling interest: only evidence of a particularized threat would likely justify encroachment into a defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights.” Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 . ¶45 Indeed, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . conclude [d] that automatic limitations on th

2012I, 144 Wn.

2012App. 872, 876 , 888 P.2d 759 (1995), rev’d, 128 Wn.2d 254 . 7 Our Supreme Court rejected this analysis, recognizing that such a justification for closure would apply to all hearings involving the testimony of undercover officers: “We immediately question the characterization of this generalized evidence as a compelling interest: only evidence of a particularized threat would likely justify encroachment into a defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights.” Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 . ¶45 Indeed, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . conclude [d] that automatic limitations on th

2011Foster parents generally have neither a right to intervene in dependency proceedings nor a very high likelihood of being granted permissive intervention in such proceedings because “a foster parent’s adversarial participation in a dependency hearing has a tendency to shift the focus of the proceeding from the ability of the natural parent to care for the child to a comparison of the natural parent to the foster parent.” In re Welfare of Coverdell, 39 Wn.

2009ELAINE NUGENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TRUANCY REDUCTION: KEEPING STUDENTS IN SCHOOL (2001) at 1, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/188947.pdf. [52] Br. of Resp't at 18. [53] The appellant in her brief represented that there are more than 1,000 truancy cases per year in Pierce County alone. [54] If E.S. is correct that the petition was legally insufficient at the outset, appointment of counsel at the initial hearing would likely have prevented the expense of counsel at the many hearings that followed. [55] Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). [56

2009ELAINE NUGENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TRUANCY REDUCTION: KEEPING STUDENTS IN SCHOOL (2001) at 1, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/188947.pdf. [52] Br. of Resp't at 18. [53] The appellant in her brief represented that there are more than 1,000 truancy cases per year in Pierce County alone. [54] If E.S. is correct that the petition was legally insufficient at the outset, appointment of counsel at the initial hearing would likely have prevented the expense of counsel at the many hearings that followed. [55] Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). [56