case-specific inquiry in Oregon

2017Rather, Cole continues the case-specific inquiry established in Reguero v. Teacher Standards and Practices, 312 Or 402, 417 , 812 P2d 1171 (1991), where the court rejected “any categorical method of determining substantiality.” Cole merely clarifies that this court engages in a two-step analysis to establish whether hearsay evidence may constitute substantial evidence.

2011To determine whether hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable to constitute substantial evidence, we follow the case-specific inquiry announced in Reguero : *146 “[I]n assessing the substantiality of the evidence or lack of it, variable circumstances may be considered, such as: the alternative to relying on the hearsay evidence; the importance of the facts sought to be proved by the hearsay statements to the outcome of the proceeding and considerations of economy; the state of the supporting or opposing evidence, if any; the degree of lack of efficacy of cross-examination with respect to the

2008Noting that the United States Supreme Court “has not articulated and applied a consistent test,” the court explained that the cases “make it apparent that immunity is a case-specific inquiry that turns on whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ ” Johnson, 343 Or at 146 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US 89, 101 , 104 S Ct 900 , 79 L Ed 2d 67 (1984)).

2008Noting that the United States Supreme Court “has not articulated and applied a consistent test,” the court explained that the cases “make it apparent that immunity is a case-specific inquiry that turns on whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ ” Johnson, 343 Or at 146 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US 89, 101 , 104 S Ct 900 , 79 L Ed 2d 67 (1984)).

2019Our "determination whether joinder of charges substantially prejudices a defendant must be based on a case-specific analysis of the charges and the facts alleged to support them." Id. at 45, 153 P.3d 688 .

2017We have previously indicated that “the determination of whether a party should have a new spouse’s income attributed to him or her, and in what amount, is a case-specific inquiry.” Jones and Jones, 172 Or App 199, 204 , 17 P3d 491 , adh’d to on recons, 174 Or App 33 , 23 P3d 988 (2001); see also Rubey and Rubey, 165 Or App 616, 622 , 996 P2d 1006 (2000) (courts cannot always presume that a new spouse’s income is available).

2017We have previously indicated that “the determination of whether a party should have a new spouse’s income attributed to him or her, and in what amount, is a case-specific inquiry.” Jones and Jones, 172 Or App 199, 204 , 17 P3d 491 , adh’d to on recons, 174 Or App 33 , 23 P3d 988 (2001); see also Rubey and Rubey, 165 Or App 616, 622 , 996 P2d 1006 (2000) (courts cannot always presume that a new spouse’s income is available).

2017We have previously indicated that “the determination of whether a party should have a new spouse’s income attributed to him or her, and in what amount, is a case-specific inquiry.” Jones and Jones, 172 Or App 199, 204 , 17 P3d 491 , adh’d to on recons, 174 Or App 33 , 23 P3d 988 (2001); see also Rubey and Rubey, 165 Or App 616, 622 , 996 P2d 1006 (2000) (courts cannot always presume that a new spouse’s income is available).

2017We have previously indicated that “the determination of whether a party should have a new spouse’s income attributed to him or her, and in what amount, is a case-specific inquiry.” Jones and Jones, 172 Or App 199, 204 , 17 P3d 491 , adh’d to on recons, 174 Or App 33 , 23 P3d 988 (2001); see also Rubey and Rubey, 165 Or App 616, 622 , 996 P2d 1006 (2000) (courts cannot always presume that a new spouse’s income is available).

2016As we later explained in State v. Rivera, 261 Or App 657, 663-64 , 322 P3d 1125 (2014), vacating and remanding for a trial court to resentence the defendant in those circumstances is appropriate because, given the ambiguity concerning the court’s understanding of its authority, we would have to “speculate as to whether the court properly considered the relevant case-specific factors and made any necessary factual findings.” See also State v. Sanderlin, 276 Or App 574, 576 , 368 P3d 74 (2016) (vacating and remanding for resentencing because the trial court had concluded that it was not permitte

2016As we later explained in State v. Rivera, 261 Or App 657, 663-64 , 322 P3d 1125 (2014), vacating and remanding for a trial court to resentence the defendant in those circumstances is appropriate because, given the ambiguity concerning the court’s understanding of its authority, we would have to “speculate as to whether the court properly considered the relevant case-specific factors and made any necessary factual findings.” See also State v. Sanderlin, 276 Or App 574, 576 , 368 P3d 74 (2016) (vacating and remanding for resentencing because the trial court had concluded that it was not permitte

2014For purposes of reviewing the court’s ruling, we could speculate as to whether the court properly considered the relevant case-specific factors and made any necessary factual findings, but, as in Wilson , “there is no need for us to engage in an exercise that, in the final analysis, would result only in an interpretation of ambiguous language, when we can remand the case for a more authoritative disambiguation.” Id. at 469-70 .

2008Noting that the United States Supreme Court “has not articulated and applied a consistent test,” the court explained that the cases “make it apparent that immunity is a case-specific inquiry that turns on whether ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’ ” Johnson, 343 Or at 146 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US 89, 101 , 104 S Ct 900 , 79 L Ed 2d 67 (1984)).

2006Ailes, 312 Or at 381 .

2001In past cases, where the attribution of a new spouse’s income to a party has been in dispute, courts have considered factors such as whether the new spouse has other child or spousal support obligations, Bates and Bates, 303 Or 40, 47 , 733 P2d 1363 (1987), whether the new spouse has independently incurred medical bills, Ganger and Little, 139 Or App 350, 356-57 , 911 P2d 1276 (1996), and whether the party and the new spouse have entered into and abide by an agreement about how their income will be distributed between them.

2001In past cases, where the attribution of a new spouse’s income to a party has been in dispute, courts have considered factors such as whether the new spouse has other child or spousal support obligations, Bates and Bates, 303 Or 40, 47 , 733 P2d 1363 (1987), whether the new spouse has independently incurred medical bills, Ganger and Little, 139 Or App 350, 356-57 , 911 P2d 1276 (1996), and whether the party and the new spouse have entered into and abide by an agreement about how their income will be distributed between them.

2001In past cases, where the attribution of a new spouse’s income to a party has been in dispute, courts have considered factors such as whether the new spouse has other child or spousal support obligations, Bates and Bates, 303 Or 40, 47 , 733 P2d 1363 (1987), whether the new spouse has independently incurred medical bills, Ganger and Little, 139 Or App 350, 356-57 , 911 P2d 1276 (1996), and whether the party and the new spouse have entered into and abide by an agreement about how their income will be distributed between them.

2001In past cases, where the attribution of a new spouse’s income to a party has been in dispute, courts have considered factors such as whether the new spouse has other child or spousal support obligations, Bates and Bates, 303 Or 40, 47 , 733 P2d 1363 (1987), whether the new spouse has independently incurred medical bills, Ganger and Little, 139 Or App 350, 356-57 , 911 P2d 1276 (1996), and whether the party and the new spouse have entered into and abide by an agreement about how their income will be distributed between them.