consumer expectations test (Washington) · Go Syfert
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consumer expectations test in Washington

15 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Falk v. Keene Corp.green
wash · 1989 · cited in 9 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1990–2021
2 sentences

2021Relevant considerations under the consumer expectations test include “ ‘[t]he relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk.’ ” Falk, 113 Wn.2d at 649 (quoting Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 154 , 542 P.2d 774 (1975)).

2019The consumer expectations test requires the plaintiff to show "the product was unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." RCW 7.72.030(3); Falk, 113 Wn.2d at 654 .

19
Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products Co.green
wash · 1992 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Falk, 113 Wn.2d at 645 (design defect claim); Avers, 117 Wn.2d at 747 (failure to warn claim).

11
Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Companygreen
wash · 1984 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wn.2d 645, 649 , 782 P.2d 974 (1989) (citing Tabert, 86 Wn.2d at 154 ); see also Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wn.2d 208, 212 , 683 P.2d 1097 (1984) (“our rule of strict liability focuses attention upon the product and not upon the actions of the seller or manufacturer”).

2015Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wn.2d 645, 649 , 782 P.2d 974 (1989) (citing Tabert, 86 Wn.2d at 154 ); see also Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wn.2d 208, 212 , 683 P.2d 1097 (1984) (“our rule of strict liability focuses attention upon the product and not upon the actions of the seller or manufacturer”).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert green
wash · 1975
2 sentences

2021Relevant considerations under the consumer expectations test include “ ‘[t]he relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk.’ ” Falk, 113 Wn.2d at 649 (quoting Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 154 , 542 P.2d 774 (1975)).

2021Relevant considerations under the consumer expectations test include “ ‘[t]he relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk.’ ” Falk, 113 Wn.2d at 649 (quoting Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 154 , 542 P.2d 774 (1975)).

31984–2021
Anderson v. Weslo, Inc. green
washctapp · 1995
2 sentences

2003Anderson, 79 Wn.

2003Anderson, 79 Wash.App. at 838 , 906 P.2d 336 .

22003–2003
Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners green
wash · 1999
2 sentences

2003Id. at 209, 890 P.2d 469 . [1] Under the risk-utility test, liability can be established by showing that, "at the time of manufacture, the likelihood the product *218 would cause the plaintiff's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the manufacturer's burden to design a product that would have prevented those harms and any adverse effect a practical, feasible alternative would have on the product's usefulness." Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 94 Wash. App. 949, 959-60 , 973 P.2d 1110 (1999) (quoting Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash.2d 319, 326 , 97

2002Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wn.2d 319, 327 , 971 P.2d 500 (1999).

22002–2003
Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners green
wash · 1999
2 sentences

2003Id. at 209, 890 P.2d 469 . [1] Under the risk-utility test, liability can be established by showing that, "at the time of manufacture, the likelihood the product *218 would cause the plaintiff's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the manufacturer's burden to design a product that would have prevented those harms and any adverse effect a practical, feasible alternative would have on the product's usefulness." Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 94 Wash. App. 949, 959-60 , 973 P.2d 1110 (1999) (quoting Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash.2d 319, 326 , 97

2002Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wn.2d 319, 327 , 971 P.2d 500 (1999).

22002–2003
Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp. green
washctapp · 1999
2 sentences

2003Id. at 209. 1 Under the risk-utility test, liability can be established by showing that, “at time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the plaintiff’s harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the manufacturer’s burden to design a product that would have prevented those harms and any adverse effect a practical, feasible alternative would have on the product’s usefulness.” Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 94 Wn.

2003Id. at 209, 890 P.2d 469 . [1] Under the risk-utility test, liability can be established by showing that, "at the time of manufacture, the likelihood the product *218 would cause the plaintiff's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the manufacturer's burden to design a product that would have prevented those harms and any adverse effect a practical, feasible alternative would have on the product's usefulness." Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 94 Wash. App. 949, 959-60 , 973 P.2d 1110 (1999) (quoting Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash.2d 319, 326 , 97

22003–2003
Reece v. Good Samaritan Hospital green
washctapp · 1998
2 sentences

2002Division Two found that while a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the risk-utility test, no such issue existed related to the consumer expectations test. *495 The court stated that the consumer expectations test could not be met, "where, as here, a manufacturer has adequately warned consumers of the risks associated with using a product." Id. at 583 , 953 P.2d 117 .

2002The court stated that the consumer expectations test could not be met, “where, as here, a manufacturer has adequately warned consumers of the risks associated with using a product.” Id. at 583 .

22002–2002
Connor v. SKAGIT CORPORATION green
wash · 1983
2 sentences

2000This was in keeping with an earlier common law holding that “[a] plaintiff may . . . establish that a product is unreasonably dangerous by means of factors other than the existence of alternative design.” Connor v. Skagit Corp., 99 Wn.2d 709, 715 , 664 P.2d 1208 (1983) (emphasis added). 7 We did note in Couch, however, that in cases where a plaintiff seeks to prove liability through the use of only one factor, such as the risk-utility test instead of the consumer expectations test, that factor must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

2000This was in keeping with an earlier common law holding that “[a] plaintiff may . . . establish that a product is unreasonably dangerous by means of factors other than the existence of alternative design.” Connor v. Skagit Corp., 99 Wn.2d 709, 715 , 664 P.2d 1208 (1983) (emphasis added). 7 We did note in Couch, however, that in cases where a plaintiff seeks to prove liability through the use of only one factor, such as the risk-utility test instead of the consumer expectations test, that factor must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

22000–2000
Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. green
wash · 1986
2 sentences

2000In Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 107 Wn.2d 232 , 728 P.2d 585 , 78 A.L.R. 4th 139 (1986), we held that “the availability of an alternative, reasonably safe design is not a necessary element of a plaintiffs burden of proof in a product liability action based on defective design.” Id. at 234 (emphasis added).

2000In Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 107 Wn.2d 232 , 728 P.2d 585 , 78 A.L.R. 4th 139 (1986), we held that “the availability of an alternative, reasonably safe design is not a necessary element of a plaintiffs burden of proof in a product liability action based on defective design.” Id. at 234 (emphasis added).

22000–2000
Baughn v. Honda Motor Co. green
wash · 1986
2 sentences

2000Couch and Connor demonstrate that Washington strict liability analysis is not a one-dimensional, risk-utility test that requires proof of a specific design “defect.” Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107 Wn.2d 127, 136 , 727 P.2d 655 (1986) (noting that we do not “deem it necessary to apply the type of risk-utility analysis . . . that specifically requires preliminary proof of ‘something wrong’.”) (quoting Perkins v. F.I.E.

2000Couch and Connor demonstrate that Washington strict liability analysis is not a one-dimensional, risk-utility test that requires proof of a specific design “defect.” Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107 Wn.2d 127, 136 , 727 P.2d 655 (1986) (noting that we do not “deem it necessary to apply the type of risk-utility analysis . . . that specifically requires preliminary proof of ‘something wrong’.”) (quoting Perkins v. F.I.E.

22000–2000
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co. green
or · 1967
2 sentences

2021RTDI disagrees and argues, relying on Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467 , 435 P.2d 806 (1967), 8 that expert testimony was required because “[t]he susceptibility of failure of an axle housing that was remanufactured 60 years after its original manufacture and then installed on an amphibious-tour vehicle and used heavily for another 10-plus years simply is not within common knowledge or experience.” But RTDI’s argument fails because RTDI did not manufacture the original axle housing.

2021RTDI disagrees and argues, relying on Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467 , 435 P.2d 806 (1967), 8 that expert testimony was required because “[t]he susceptibility of failure of an axle housing that was remanufactured 60 years after its original manufacture and then installed on an amphibious-tour vehicle and used heavily for another 10-plus years simply is not within common knowledge or experience.” But RTDI’s argument fails because RTDI did not manufacture the original axle housing.

12021–2021
Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc. green
wash · 2017
2 sentences

2019WE CONCUR: c/...„ 9, 28 For the first time at oral argument, Strout cited Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 187 Wn.2d 743 , 389 P.3d 517 (2017), to argue Ply Gem breached the duty to warn the purchaser of the window about the danger of installing the window on the second floor with a low sill.

2019WE CONCUR: c/...„ 9, 28 For the first time at oral argument, Strout cited Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 187 Wn.2d 743 , 389 P.3d 517 (2017), to argue Ply Gem breached the duty to warn the purchaser of the window about the danger of installing the window on the second floor with a low sill.

12019–2019
Bruns v. Paccar, Inc. green
washctapp · 1995
1 sentence

2003Id. at 209, 890 P.2d 469 . [1] Under the risk-utility test, liability can be established by showing that, "at the time of manufacture, the likelihood the product *218 would cause the plaintiff's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the manufacturer's burden to design a product that would have prevented those harms and any adverse effect a practical, feasible alternative would have on the product's usefulness." Lecy v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 94 Wash. App. 949, 959-60 , 973 P.2d 1110 (1999) (quoting Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash.2d 319, 326 , 97

12003–2003
O'BRIEN v. Muskin Corp. green
nj · 1983
2 sentences

1986Most jurisdictions that employ the risk-utility approach require that there be something wrong with the product before a risk-utility analysis is permitted. 11 Baughn, however, urges us to adopt the pure form of risk-utility analysis employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169 , 463 A.2d 298 (1983).

1986Most jurisdictions that employ the risk-utility approach require that there be something wrong with the product before a risk-utility analysis is permitted. 11 Baughn, however, urges us to adopt the pure form of risk-utility analysis employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169 , 463 A.2d 298 (1983).

11986–1986

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030 (14) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.010 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.050 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 64 (1984–2026) WA 15 (1984–2021) FL 9 (2004–2025) PA 8 (2003–2025) IL 8 (2004–2012) NJ 6 (1983–2017) OR 4 (1999–2021) SC 4 (2010–2014) MS 3 (1998–2006) NY 2 (2003–2005) MO 2 (1996–2013) CT 2 (1997–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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