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6 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zaza v. Marquess and Nell, Inc.green2 sentences2017Failure to Warn The PLA defines "a warning defect by defining its opposite, an adequate warning." Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, 144 N.J. 34, 55 (1996). 2017Failure to Warn The PLA defines "a warning defect by defining its opposite, an adequate warning." Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, 144 N.J. 34, 55 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.green2 sentences2017Under that test, an expert is not required when "it is self-evident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it was built.'" Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 170 -71 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64 (1963)). 2017Under that test, an expert is not required when "it is self-evident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it was built.'" Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 170 -71 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64 (1963)). | 2 | 2 |
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.red2 sentences1990Section 3a(2) also modifies the method of analyzing “obvious danger” as established in Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 98 N.J. 198 , 485 A.2d 305 : Although some jurisdictions have adopted an “obvious danger rule” that would absolve a manufacturer of a duty to warn of dangers that are objectively apparent, in our state the obviousness of a danger, as distinguished from a plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of a danger, is merely one element to be factored into the analysis to determine whether a duty to warn exists. [Id. at 207, 485 A.2d 305 .] Instead of representing a single facto 1990Section 3a(2) also modifies the method of analyzing “obvious danger” as established in Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 98 N.J. 198 , 485 A.2d 305 : Although some jurisdictions have adopted an “obvious danger rule” that would absolve a manufacturer of a duty to warn of dangers that are objectively apparent, in our state the obviousness of a danger, as distinguished from a plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of a danger, is merely one element to be factored into the analysis to determine whether a duty to warn exists. [Id. at 207, 485 A.2d 305 .] Instead of representing a single facto | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & MacHine Company
green
2 sentences2017Under that test, an expert is not required when "it is self-evident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it was built.'" Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 170 -71 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64 (1963)). 2017Under that test, an expert is not required when "it is self-evident that the product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it was built.'" Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 170 -71 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64 (1963)). | 4 | 1983–2017 |
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
1 sentence1995Indeed, because “under [the Act], the consumer-expectations test cannot be avoided,” id., some commentators have referred to it as an element of the plaintiffs case: [S]ince the Act so clearly provides that the test under section 3a(2) constitutes an absolute defense to liability, the net effect upon a plaintiff (suing on a claim in which consumer-expectations may be a component) requires that the section 3a(2) standard be included within the proof of defect presented in the affirmative case. [William A. Dreier et al., Products Liability and Toxic Tort Law in New Jersey: A Practitiones-’s Guid | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dewey v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
2 sentences1990Moreover, the O’Brien court made clear that in a design-defect case containing a claim that a product is unavoidably unsafe, manufacturers cannot insulate themselves from liability merely by placing warnings on their products. [ 216 N.J.Super. at 357 , 523 A.2d 712 .] Hereafter, under the Products Liability Law, the consumer-expectations test cannot be avoided in a claim for design defect. 1990Moreover, the O’Brien court made clear that in a design-defect case containing a claim that a product is unavoidably unsafe, manufacturers cannot insulate themselves from liability merely by placing warnings on their products. [ 216 N.J.Super. at 357 , 523 A.2d 712 .] Hereafter, under the Products Liability Law, the consumer-expectations test cannot be avoided in a claim for design defect. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.